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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
This article-based dissertation explores cognitive behavioural programmes in 
Danish prisons. I am interested in current problem definitions of criminality as 
essentially a choice, and the result of a lack of social and interpersonal skills, and in 
the consequent solutions proposed, which, in this context, are cognitive behavioural 
programmes. The analyses are based upon ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 
three different prison settings; one ‘open’ (minimum-security) and two ‘closed’ 
(maximum-security) prisons. The ethnographic data consists of field notes from 
(participant) observation in two different cognitive behavioural programmes, Anger 
Management and Cognitive Skills, as well as focus group and individual interviews 
with the participants and the instructors.  
This dissertation consists of an introductory frame and four articles. The 
dissertation is embedded in a larger research project, but has its own research 
questions. The theoretical framework consists of Michel Foucault’s 
conceptualizations of discipline and power, Nikolas Rose’s further development 
thereof, and theories on social control developed by Stanley Cohen and David 
Garland. Besides these, I draw upon three supplementary analytical frameworks: 
cultures of prisons, subcultural theory, and friction.  
This dissertation is an alternative to quantitative studies on the effect of cognitive 
behavioural programmes, and a contribution to the existing research on how these 
programmes unfold and are experienced in practice. The core finding and 
conclusion of this dissertation is that crime is essentially framed as a choice in 
cognitive behavioural programmes, with the offender being seen as a rational actor 
who freely chooses whatever actions he finds most appropriate. Criminal behaviour 
is thus firmly placed within the individual and thereby decontextualized from the 
individual’s social and structural realities. The instructors walk a tightrope, because 
they have to respect the individuals’ own rationality while essentially having to 
change and correct the ‘wrong’ types of thoughts and behaviour. This results in 
ongoing clashes between the participants and the instructors. The participants draw 
upon subcultural notions of respect and honour in order to explain their criminality, 
but these understandings are reframed as ‘cognitive distortions’ that need to be 
changed. The participants do not readily accept the programmatic goals, but are 
happy to pay lip service in order to complete the programme. They use humour as a 
tool to disrupt the lessons and to create and enforce boundaries between them and 
the instructors. I have found that this friction or resistance cannot be explained 
away as simply a confirmation of the productiveness of power, but rather that it 
shows the limits of power in this rehabilitative setting.    
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The first article, ‘Caught between Soft Power and Neoliberal Punitiveness – An 
Exploration of the Practices of Cognitive-Behavioral Instructors in Danish 
Prisons’, is concerned with the practices and self-understanding of cognitive 
behavioural instructors. Although the Danish Prison Service brought in cognitive 
behavioural programmes twenty years ago, no Scandinavian research has been 
conducted either on the implications of these programmes for the prison climate or 
on the roles, aims and self-understanding of the instructors. This article seeks to 
address this gap by discussing the motivations, practices and sentiments of 
instructors in prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes. It also contributes to 
research on the implementation of penal policies and the changing occupational 
roles for professionals at the soft end of the correctional system. I show how 
punitive-risk thinking and penal welfarism have become strange bedfellows in a 
‘late modern hybrid’ (Kolind et al. 2015) that has implications for the instructors’ 
motivations, the realities they face in prisons, and the concrete workings and 
content of the programmes. Finally, I point to the wider implications of the tensions 
between neoliberal rehabilitation and the penal-welfare state, by highlighting how 
previous holistic understandings of prisoners seem to be overshadowed by an 
exclusive focus on the individual.     
The second article, ‘’Man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand”: Perspektiver 
på vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet Anger Management’ [‘“You Wouldn´t Beat 
up the Grocery Guy!” Perspectives on violence in the prison-based cognitive 
behavioural programme Anger Management’], revolves around the treatment of 
violence and aggression in the prison-based cognitive behavioural programme 
Anger Management. The empirical data point to the fact that the participants’ and 
instructors’ perspectives, understandings and rationales on violence diverge in 
significant ways. These discrepancies, and the participants’ norms for masculine 
respect, result in ongoing clashes of horizons and struggles in which the rationality 
of violence is at play. The participants’ understandings of and perspectives on 
violence are not seen as legitimate, because the instructors define all violence as 
unacceptable and deem it to be a result of erroneous thinking styles. The belief that 
violence is a result of pure choice, cognitive distortions and erroneous thinking 
styles excludes contextualized, social and structural explanations. The participants, 
on the other hand, do not readily accept the kind of decontextualized conceptions of 
violence, conflict and aggressiveness, and the focus on choice, that are embedded in 
the programmes. The article concludes by suggesting that a treatment programme 
more attuned to the participants’ own narratives and reasoning would perhaps work 
better. 
The third article, ‘Honour and Respect in Danish Prisons – Contesting “Cognitive 
Distortions” in Cognitive Behavioural Programmes’, is co-authored with PhD 
student Ben Laws from the University of Cambridge. We consider how prisoners’ 
subcultural capital shapes their responses to demands for ‘cognitive self-change’. 
We argue that accounts of ‘respect’ in the prior literature fail to capture how 
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prisoners react to these programmes, and that a discussion of honour (and what we 
term ‘respect plus’) needs to be incorporated. By attempting to create accountable 
and rational actors who ‘self-manage’, the therapeutic ethos neglects participants’ 
life experiences and subcultural capital. Open expressions of moral values by 
prisoners (such as displays of honour and respect) are considered to be cognitive 
distortions that are dismissed by the instructors, while alternative and ‘correct’ 
thinking styles are prescribed. Our findings advance understandings of the 
meanings of honour and respect in prisons in general and in cognitive behavioural 
programmes in particular.    
The fourth article, ‘(No) Laughing Allowed – Humorous Boundary-making in 
Prison’, examines humour in prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes. The 
empirical data from fieldwork in four different programme settings illuminates how 
the social interactions in the lessons are, surprisingly, saturated with humour. 
Humorous interactions and jocular stories serve as a lubricant in the lessons, but 
they also function as disruptions and boundary-making between the participants and 
the instructors. To that end, humour becomes a medium and a tool that prisoners 
can use to preserve autonomy and dignity despite the infantilizing nature of the 
programme curriculum. My findings advance understandings of the meaning of 
humour in prisons in general, and in cognitive behavioural programmes in 
particular, while showing the limits of soft power in therapeutic settings.    
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DANSK RESUME 
Denne artikelbaserede afhandling undersøger kognitive færdighedsprogrammer i 
danske fængsler. Jeg interesserer mig for løsningsmodeller, som i denne optik er 
tanke og handlingsrum for håndtering af problemer. Jeg er interesseret i aktuelle 
problemdefinitioner af kriminalitet som et valg, og som et resultat af mangel på 
sociale og interpersonelle færdigheder, samt de deraf foreslåede løsninger, som i 
denne sammenhæng, er kognitive færdighedsprogrammer. Analysen er baseret på 
etnografisk feltarbejde udført i tre forskellige fængsler; et åbent og to lukkede. De 
etnografiske data består af feltnoter fra (deltager) observation i to forskellige 
kognitive færdighedsprogrammer, Anger Management og det Kognitive 
Færdighedsprogram, samt fokusgruppe og individuelle interviews med deltagere og 
instruktører.   
Afhandlingen består af en indledende ramme og fire artikler. Afhandlingen er 
indlejret i et større forskningsprojekt, men har sine egne forskningsspørgsmål. Den 
teoretiske ramme består af Michel Foucaults teoretiseringer af disciplin, 
subjektivering og magt, Nikolas Rose videre udvikling heraf, og teorier om social 
kontrol udviklet af Stanley Cohen og David Garland. Desuden tager afhandlingen 
afsæt i tre supplerende analytiske greb: fængselskulturer, subkulturel teori og 
friktion. 
Denne afhandling er et alternativ til kvantitative undersøgelser af effekten af 
kognitive færdighedsprogrammer og et bidrag til den eksisterende forskning om, 
hvordan disse programmer udfolder sig og opleves i praksis. Afhandlingens fund er, 
at kriminalitet betragtes som et valg i kognitive færdighedsprogrammer, hvor 
lovovertræderen ses som en rationel aktør, der frit vælger, hvilke handlinger han 
finder mest hensigtsmæssige. Forklaringer på kriminel adfærd er individualiserede 
og dermed dekontekstualiseret fra den enkeltes sociale og strukturelle forhold. 
Instruktørerne arbejder indenfor en svær balancegang, fordi de skal respektere den 
enkeltes egen rationalitet, mens de søger at ændre og rette "forkerte" typer af tanker 
og adfærd. Dette resulterer i kontinuerlige sammenstød mellem deltagerne og 
instruktørerne. Deltagerne trækker på subkulturelle forestillinger om respekt og ære 
for at forklare deres kriminalitet, men disse forståelser omformuleres som 
”kognitive mangler", der skal ændres. Deltagerne accepterer ikke umiddelbart 
programmets mål, men de går gerne med på præmisserne i mindst muligt omfang 
for at gennemføre programmet. Deltagerne bruger humor som et redskab til at 
forstyrre lektionerne og skabe og håndhæve grænser mellem dem og instruktørerne. 
Afhandlingen argumenterer for, at denne modstand eller friktion ikke blot kan 
bortforklares som en bekræftelse på magtens produktivitet men snarere, at denne 
friktion viser grænserne for magt i denne rehabiliterende kontekst.       
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Artikel nummer et, ‘Caught between Soft Power and Neoliberal Punitiveness – 
An Exploration of the Practices of Cognitive-Behavioral Instructors in Danish 
Prisons’, beskæftiger sig med instruktørernes praksis og selvforståelser. Selvom 
den danske Kriminalforsorg implementerede kognitive færdighedsprogrammer for 
tyve år siden, findes der ingen skandinavisk forskning, der omhandler 
konsekvenserne af disse programmer for fængselsmiljøet eller instruktørernes 
roller, mål og selvforståelser. Denne artikel søger dermed at undersøge og diskutere 
instruktørernes motivationer, praksis og selvforståelser. Artiklen bidrager også til 
forskning i implementering af policies på straffuldbyrdelsesområdet og de deraf 
forandrede roller for professionelle i den bløde ende af fængselssystemet. Jeg viser, 
hvordan risiko tænkning og tidligere velfærdsidealer er fusioneret i en ”senmoderne 
hybrid" (Kolind et al. 2015), som har betydning for instruktørernes motivationer, 
arbejdsforhold, og den konkrete praksis og indhold af programmerne. Endelig peger 
artiklen på bredere konsekvenser af spændingerne mellem neoliberal rehabilitering 
og tidligere velfærdsidealer ved at fremhæve, hvordan tidligere holistiske 
forståelser af indsatte synes at blive overskygget af et intenst fokus på individet. 
Artikel nummer to, ´Man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand” Perspektiver 
på vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet Anger Management´, knytter an til 
antropologisk voldsforskning ved at inddrage deltagernes perspektiver og 
positioneringer og fokusere på henholdsvis instruktørernes og deltagernes 
forståelser af vold og konflikt. Det bærende spørgsmål i artiklen er dermed, hvordan 
vold fremstilles og forhandles i programmet Anger Management. Afledt af dette 
spørgsmål viser artiklen, hvordan deltagerne positionerer sig efter bestemte 
maskulinitetsnormer, som står i opposition til programmet. Deltagernes og 
instruktørernes forskellige perspektiver på vold i Anger Management ender i 
kontinuerlige horisontsammenstød, hvor definitionen af henholdsvis legitim og 
ikke-legitim vold er på spil. Deltagerne forsøger at definere nogle former for vold 
som legitime, mens de i andre situationer tager afstand fra vold. Instruktørerne 
stempler derimod al form for vold som uacceptabel og som resultat af fejlagtige 
tankemønstre, hvilket udelukker kontekstuelle, sociale og strukturelle forklaringer. 
Artiklen konkluderer, at sammenstødet mellem forskellige rationaliteter og 
instruktørernes insisteren på at arbejde med konstruerede eller irrelevante 
situationer fra fængslet kan være en begrænsning for programmernes mulighed for 
at ’behandle’ og forebygge vold. 
Artikel nummer tre, ‘Honour and Respect in Danish Prisons – Contesting 
‘Cognitive Distortions’ in Cognitive-Behavioural Programs’, er forfattet med 
ph.d.-studerende Ben Laws fra University of Cambridge. Vi diskuterer, hvordan 
fangernes subkulturelle kapital former deres reception af krav om "kognitiv selv-
forandring". Vi hævder, at tidligere forskning om betydningen af "respekt" overser, 
hvordan deltagerne reagerer på disse programmer, og at en diskussion af ære (og 
hvad vi kalder "respekt plus") kan være produktiv i den kontekst. Ved at forsøge at 
skabe ansvarlige og rationelle aktører, som "styrer sig selv", negligeres deltagernes 
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livserfaringer og subkulturelle kapital. Deltagernes udtryk for betydningen af 
moralske værdier (såsom ære og respekt) anses for at være kognitive mangler, som 
afskrives af instruktørerne, mens de forsøger at lære deltagerne alternative og 
"korrekte" tænkestile. Artiklens fund bidrager til forståelsen af betydninger af ære 
og respekt i fængsler i almindelighed og i kognitive færdighedsprogrammer i 
særdeleshed. 
Artikel nummer fire, ‘(No) Laughing Allowed – Humorous Boundary-making in 
Prison’, undersøger humor i kognitive færdighedsprogrammer. De empiriske data 
fra feltarbejde i fire forskellige programforløb belyser, hvordan de sociale 
interaktioner i lektionerne er fyldt med humor og jokes. Humoristiske interaktioner 
og spøgefulde historier tjener som et glidemiddel i lektionerne, men de fungerer 
også som forstyrrelser og grænsedragning mellem deltagerne og instruktørerne. 
Deltagernes humor bliver dermed et medium og et værktøj, som de kan bruge til at 
bevare autonomi og værdighed i den til tider barnliggørende undervisning. Artiklen 
bidrager til forståelser af betydningen af humor i fængsler i almindelighed og i 
kognitive færdighedsprogrammer i særdeleshed, samt viser grænserne for blød magt 
i fængselsbaseret rehabilitering. 
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‘We are not interested in those stupid crimes that you have committed. 
The Party is not interested in the overt act: the thought is all we care 
about’ (Orwell 1949:203). 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Instructor:  What could you do instead of resorting to violence 
if you were to use the ‘before, during and after’ 
techniques?  
Makin1:  Ridicule the other person.  
Instructor:  We don’t agree on this one. Maybe he loses control 
if you ridicule the other person.  
Makin:   Cool!  
Instructor:  We are not supposed to think about instrumental 
violence, we should think about consequences. We 
don’t want you to think criminal thoughts.  
Makin:  Well, we always do.  
Instructor:  You’re consciously choosing a negative behaviour, 
you’re choosing to start a fight. 
Makin:  You’re interrupting, you cannot understand it if 
you interrupt. It is context dependent. If I don’t 
have any power in my hands, here in prison in 
relation to the guards, I will try to gain some 
control of the situation by removing my pants in a 
slow manner [during the cell search]. It was just an 
example, but you’re interpreting it as the whole 
story. I don’t like to subject myself to anyone I 
don’t like to submit to.  
Jesper:  It’s a matter of self-respect. 
The above field note extract derives from an Anger Management lesson in 
‘Techniques to control anger, Part two – Thoughts during an episode’. The 
                                                          
1 All participants, instructors and prisons have been anonymized throughout this dissertation 
and the four articles embedded herein. The participants and instructors are anonymized in a 
manner that reflects their respective ethnic backgrounds.    
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condensed point of the lesson is that ‘the participants can control their thoughts, 
thus change the way they think and thereby change the way they react’2 (DfK 
2001:3.17). The example illustrates several points of interest in regards to this 
dissertation. It illustrates the emphasis on thoughts, rationality and choice 
embedded in prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes. The embedded 
normativity in the programmes is also visible, in the sense that the instructor is 
aiming to stop ‘criminal thoughts’ and to guide the participants towards a more 
‘proper’ or constructive way of thinking and reacting. Importantly, the example also 
illustrates the participants’ resistance or friction (Rubin 2015) towards the 
programmatic goals; they do not readily accept the premises for the programmes. 
On the contrary, the participants often emphasize other concepts of importance to 
them such as (self-) respect. Lastly, the example illustrates the importance of the 
context for cognitive behavioural programmes, namely prisons as particularly 
powerful institutional and social contexts (Haney 2009).  
Cognitive behavioural programmes have come to play a central role in the current 
rehabilitative efforts of the Danish Prison and Probation Service. Following 
Canadian and North American research (e.g. Ross, Fabiano & Ewles 1988), new 
rehabilitative interventions aimed at targeting offending behaviour spread to 
England and Wales and rapidly evolved from ad hoc and uncoordinated 
experimentation to importable programmes; these reached Denmark in 1994 
(Robinson 2008:431; Smith 2006). Since the first cognitive behavioural programme 
was implemented in Ringe State prison (Philip 1996), the programme portfolio has 
grown, and prisoners and probationers are now offered six different cognitive 
behavioural programmes. Cognitive behavioural programmes ‘are structured 
interventions that aim to develop and train offenders’ behavioural competencies – 
e.g. handling of anger, problem-solving and communication – which research has 
shown are some of the most important factors to focus on in crime-preventive 
interventions’ (DfK 2013:1, own translation). The emphasis on the individual 
causes of crime is evident in the cognitive behavioural programmes. The 
programmes are based upon a cognitive-psychological model of criminal conduct 
that has an explicit focus on thinking styles that control (or do not control) 
‘criminal’ behaviour. This model seeks to replace what are considered to be rigid 
and erroneous thinking styles with cognitive skills that can increase pro-social 
behavioural choices. The model aims, in particular, to teach ‘criminals’ to reflect 
better instead of solely reacting, to show better foresight and to plan better in 
relation to future problems, and, in general, to teach them to be more flexible, open-
minded, reasonable and thoughtful in their behaviour (DfK 2012:9, own 
translation). As described by some of the Canadian ‘founding fathers’ of cognitive 
behavioural programmes: 
                                                          
2 This is a condensed and translated version of the description of the lesson. The manuals are 
protected by copyright, so I will just refer to them in this manner throughout the dissertation. 
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A considerable number of offenders have deficits in the ability to 
conceptualise the consequences of their behaviour and are unable to use 
means–end reasoning to achieve their goals. Often the offender is 
concretistic, action oriented, non-reflective and impulsive. Many 
offenders have not progressed beyond an egocentric state of cognitive 
development and are unable to understand the behaviour, thoughts and 
feelings of other people (Ross, Fabiano & Ewles 1988:30). 
This understanding is also found in Henning Jørgensen’s article in the popular-
scientific journal From a Psychological Point of View [Psykologisk set]. Jørgensen 
writes that ‘criminals’ are often ‘rigid, dogmatic and inflexible in their thinking 
styles, with difficulties in understanding concepts which they cannot touch, smell, 
taste or see. A concept like “responsibility” does not exist to them or is very 
blurred. Their world is made up of absolutes and black and white conceptions of 
right and wrong. Thus, they are unable to understand the finesses and complexity of 
sociality and communication, but they do not comprehend the social handicap that 
follows from this lack of social skills’ (Jørgensen 1999:15, own translation). In 
essence, offenders are seen as ‘autonomous, rational actors who made poor 
decisions because of distorted thoughts and values’ (Fox 1999b:440).  
The above descriptions are interesting because they illustrate how certain problems 
are interpreted, formulated and presented, as well as illustrating the solutions that 
follow them. In this context, the understanding of criminal behaviour ‘defines the 
element that will constitute what the different solutions attempt to respond to’ 
(Foucault 1989:421 in Borch 2015:7). The anthropologists Steffen Jöhncke, Mette 
Nordahl Svendsen and Susan Reynolds Whyte (2004) describe how ‘problems’ are 
often shaped by the offered solutions [løsningsmodeller]. This means that problems 
are shaped by certain understandings and descriptions of, for example, 
responsibility and thereby irresponsibility, which again leads to certain solutions 
that might solve or at least remedy these problems (2004:385). In this respect, the 
rationality of the solutions shapes what seems to be possible and worth knowing 
about the problems and, not least, the carriers of these problems. The carriers of 
specific problems are thus specific groups, categories or individuals, in this case 
prisoners, who are characterized by the problem that the solutions can capture, 
handle and contain. This often results in hegemonic descriptions of these groups or 
individuals who are categorized into risk categories, diagnoses, etc. (Jöhncke, 
Svendsen, & Whyte 2004:393). A fruitful framework for analysing how the 
connections between techniques,3 moral perspectives and social actors appear in 
specific contexts is to understand solutions as ‘social technologies’. The concept of 
social technologies helps to illustrate what appears natural, necessary, useful and 
                                                          
3 Here, a technique is understood as a ‘practical art’, or how something should be done 
(Hacking 1996:80). This includes concrete tools (technical equipment, medicine, etc.) and 
metaphorical ones (therapies, counselling, etc.).  
‘WE DON’T WANT YOU TO THINK CRIMINAL THOUGHTS’ 
22
 
neutral (Shore & Wright 1997:87), and thus helps to portray the values and 
ideologies, social norms, cultural models and ideals that are at stake. Although it 
may seem like an obvious choice, an analysis of problems and solutions in the 
shape of social technologies need not be a Foucauldian identification of dominating 
descriptions and rationales on the discursive level (Jöhncke, Svendsen, & Whyte 
2004:386). This is not my aim, at least. In contrast, I aim to provide an empirically 
derived description of how dominating definitions of problems and solutions play 
out in practice. In this regard, the analysis will often point to the relationship 
between dominating descriptions of problems and solutions and lived experience. 
This means that I will draw attention to the various ways in which the prescribed 
solutions are not always followed and the rationalities behind them are not always 
adopted in the cognitive behavioural programmes as they are implemented in 
practice.  
Social technologies unfold in social relations, and often in institutional settings such 
as, in this case, prisons. In this context, problems and their solutions are intimately 
bound up with theories of offending, and these theories will guide what sort of 
intervention is seen to be needed (Raynor & Robinson 2005:5). As Stanley Cohen 
argues:  
[each] system of thought is connected with a corresponding system of 
power. That is to say, the stuff of what the theory speaks, represents 
certain real social ‘deposits’. The metaphor of a deposit […] conveys a 
dual meaning: it is something which is left behind and something which 
is drawn upon (Cohen 1985:89).  
The descriptions, definitions of problems and consequent solutions in the 
theoretical model of cognitive behavioural programmes thus leave ‘something’ 
behind and draw upon ‘something’, and the ‘something’ is a particular 
understanding of criminal behaviour or ‘criminal’ thought processes. In this 
particular framework, which partially draws on rational choice theory, crime occurs 
because of choice, the opportunity to commit crimes, and low levels of social and 
self-control (Hannah-Moffat & Shaw 2000). This narrative and the consequent 
practices leave behind many other explanations that are of great interest to me, and 
that are examined thoroughly in the four articles and also in the different theoretical 
and analytical concepts presented in this dissertation. My aim is to analyse how 
cognitive behavioural programmes are experienced, used, challenged, and rejected 
and/or accepted. The empirical foundation for this analysis is my ethnographic 
fieldwork in Cognitive Skills and Anger Management in three Danish prisons and 
focus group, as well as individual interviews with participants and instructors in 
these programmes. Before I move on to present the research questions, I will briefly 
present the wider framework for this dissertation.  
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My PhD project is embedded in a larger research project called Education in Social 
Skills and Emotional Training
4
 (ESSET) financed by The Danish Council for 
Independent Research | Social Sciences. In ESSET, we examine new tendencies 
related to the normative regulation of social interaction, and, in particular, 
educational efforts aimed at developing social skills and preventing or stopping 
behaviour that is considered antisocial (Prieur 2012). Cognitive behavioural 
programmes, or at least manual-based programmes developed to improve social 
skills and prevent ‘anti-social’ behaviour are not just used in the Danish Prison and 
Probation Service, but can be seen across a range of different fields investigated in 
ESSET. Thus, a central interest in ESSET as well as in this dissertation is what we 
understand as a new ‘specific outlook at behaviour, interaction and handling of 
emotions, followed by an invitation to self-surveillance and by new technologies for 
surveillance’ (Prieur 2012:2). The project is divided into four sub-projects and 
draws on document analysis, interviews and ethnographic fieldwork.
5
  
Professor Annick Prieur has conducted a genealogy of the concept of social skills, 
and examines them in police work; she has also made a study of professionals’ 
judgements of the social skills of children and young people. Furthermore, assistant 
professor Oline Pedersen examines manual-based programmes in kindergartens and 
schools, while associate professor Sune Qvotrup Jensen examines agencies 
preparing the unemployed for work. The collaboration in ESSET has so far led to 
several publications (Laursen 2015; Jensen & Prieur 2015a; Pedersen forthcoming; 
Prieur et al. forthcoming; Prieur 2015), with several other publications in process. 
One of the forthcoming articles is a collaboration between Oline Pedersen and me 
                                                          
4 See the full project description for ESSET here: 
http://www.esset.aau.dk/digitalAssets/150/150778_essetendelig_beskrivelse._annick.pdf 
5 The research questions for ESSET are:  
1. How has the idea of the importance of social skills (and the related notions of cognitive and 
communicative skills) emerged and gained importance?  
2. What kinds of behaviour are found appropriate and inappropriate today, and for whom are they 
appropriate or not (depending on age, gender, class, ethnicity etc.)? 
 3. What is demanded of the self in the literature about social skills and in training programmes? What is 
the balance between care for oneself and care for others? What is the balance between emotional control 
and expression of individuality?  
4. How can the social demands be related to gender, class and ethnicity? Are ideas about social skills 
biased towards the feminine (e.g. in the understanding of emotions), towards middle-class standards (e.g. 
in emphasis on verbalization), or towards the ethnic majority (e.g. in individualistic ideals)? Are social 
skills a new form of cultural capital?  
5. Does training in social skills lead to inclusion or to exclusion of the socially vulnerable? 
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in which we discuss a curious finding, namely that our very different fields of study 
yield similar findings. We analyse how manual-based programmes in kindergartens 
and schools share some of the logic, characteristics and goals of the cognitive 
behavioural programmes in the Danish Prison and Probation Service. We show how 
newer programmatic efforts aimed at regulating behaviour seem to have merged 
with older ideals in both settings, and discuss how these play out in practice and 
how they are experienced by the children and the prisoners. The PhD project has 
thus been a truly collaborative effort in the sense that we have discussed our 
findings, analysis and writings as a research group. However, my PhD project, and 
thus this dissertation, stands alone and has its own research questions, which I will 
present in the following. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Since I am not conducting an evaluation of cognitive behavioural programmes, I am 
not particularly interested in forming an evidence-based view of whether they 
‘work’ or not. Rather, I am interested in the content and concrete workings of the 
programmes. I have consequently examined the following: the messages that the 
programme instructors send and the messages that the participants receive; the 
normative implications of the programmes; the values that are communicated; and 
the conceptions of social competencies that are highlighted and valued in the 
programmes. Mirroring the above, the following research questions are divided into 
one overarching question and four sub-questions. This dissertation consists of an 
introductory frame plus four articles which have their own sub-themes, and these 
sub-themes are reflected in the four sub-questions below. While my overarching 
aim was to examine ‘what goes on’ in the cognitive behavioural programmes, 
narrower central concepts and ideas grew from the empirical material. These 
concepts and ideas are described in the following to give the reader a sense of how 
the following research questions reflect these findings. A fuller elaboration of the 
data analysis process can be found in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
Even though there has been a wealth of quantitative meta-analyses of cognitive 
behavioural programmes, ‘in all of the meta-analytic number-crunching […] 
readers rarely get a glimpse of what ‘actually’ goes on in rehabilitation programs 
themselves’ (Ward & Maruna 2007:18). My aim is, thus, to show ‘what goes on’ in 
Cognitive Skills and Anger Management and how the instructors and, especially, 
the participants resist as well as invest in or interpret these. My main research 
question is: How do prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes' problem 
definitions and suggested solutions play out in concrete practice? 
While there have been claims that neoliberal policies hinder a close relationship 
between staff and prisoners (Crewe 2011:464), no Scandinavian research has been 
conducted on the implementation of cognitive behavioural programmes or the 
possible changing relationships between correctional professionals and prisoners. I 
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became interested in exploring the instructors’ work trajectories, motivations, 
practices, sentiments and self-understanding in order to discuss whether we could 
observe a tension between older and newer rehabilitative ideals in their practices 
and self-understanding. Using the narratives and practices as a point of departure, it 
became possible to tease out and point to the wider implications of the tensions 
between neoliberal rehabilitation and the penal-welfare state. The first sub-question 
thus asks: How do cognitive behavioural programmes affect and transform the 
instructors’ self-perceptions, work-trajectories and their understanding of the 
programmatic goals? 
After the analysis of the instructors’ practices, it became clear that a central point of 
analytical interest to me was the participants’ reception of the programmes. This 
interest resulted in an attempt to analyse the understanding, interpretation and 
negotiation of violence and choice that is embedded in the programmes, particularly 
in Anger Management. There seemed to be an insurmountable divide between the 
instructors’ cognitive-psychological understandings of violence, and the 
participants’ which was grounded in social and contextual explanations. I thus seek 
to investigate how this tension results in ongoing clashes of horizons between the 
two parties and how a rational choice model of behaviour potentially fails to take 
the context and sociality of violence and choice into account. My analytical interest 
in these themes led to the second sub-question: How is criminality explained and 
rationality and choice understood, negotiated and interpreted in the cognitive 
behavioural programmes? 
When analysing the participants’ social, contextual and structural explanations for 
their behaviour, as laid out above, it became clear that respect and honour were 
central and important concepts or values to them. I was interested in exploring these 
moral concepts and situating them in the subcultural context to which they seemed 
to belong. However, the participants’ expressions of the value of honour and respect 
seemed to be interpreted as ‘cognitive distortions’ by the instructors. While these 
concepts are important to the participants and thus influence the lessons, they also 
seem to obstruct the programmatic goals. These observations resulted in the third 
sub-question: How do the participants’ subcultural belonging influence the working 
of the programmes? 
The obstruction and interruption of lessons has been a continual theme in my field 
notes and interviews. Some of these interruptions present themselves as humorous 
interactions between the participants and, in some cases, between the participants 
and the instructors. It surprised me that humour seemed to saturate the lessons, and 
I became interested in the uses and abuses of humour and, in particular, how 
humour was a tool for boundary-making between the participants and, though more 
rarely, the creation of positive relationships between the participants and the 
instructors. This interest resulted in the fourth sub-question: How does humour 
saturate the lessons and what uses does humour have in the programmes?        
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The above analytical themes and research questions serve as the analytical 
framework for this dissertation and as such they have guided the theoretical 
framework as well. 
STRUCTURE 
The introductory frame of this dissertation is structured as follows. In the following 
chapter, Chapter 2, I will present the theoretical framework for the dissertation, and 
supplementary analytical concepts of importance to this dissertation. The format of 
the articles does not allow for detailed explanations of theories, and for this reason 
the broader theoretical inspiration of the articles are presented here. Chapter 3 
describes the present-day Danish Prison Service and its rehabilitative ideals, and 
situates these in a historical context. This chapter thus provides a contextual frame 
for this dissertation. Chapter 4 presents the origins of cognitive behavioural 
programmes internationally as well as in the Danish context. Here, the Cognitive 
Skills and Anger Management programmes are described, as well as the selection 
and screening of instructors and participants. In Chapter 5, I present previous 
Anglophone and Scandinavian research on cognitive behavioural programmes. This 
research is divided into three subgroups; research that asks whether the programmes 
work, research that asks how the programmes are experienced, and lastly, a 
scholarship that asks how we can or should understand this phenomenon in relation 
to overall societal trends and transformations. Chapter 6 introduces the 
methodology and methods. The methods, which were mainly ethnographic 
fieldwork and qualitative interviews, will be presented and discussed, together with 
ethical considerations that arose throughout the research process, and the ways in 
which the data were analysed. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes, concludes and 
discusses the core findings of the dissertation. 
The four articles are presented in the Appendices of this dissertation. Appendix 1 
presents the first empirical study in which I explore the practices and self-
understanding of the instructors, who are, I argue, caught between soft power and 
neoliberal punitiveness. The second empirical study, Appendix 2, explores how 
violence is understood and interpreted in Anger Management. As will be clear, the 
participants’ and instructors’ perspectives, understandings and rationales about 
violence diverge in significant ways. These discrepancies, and the participants’ 
norms for masculine respect, result in ongoing clashes of horizons, and struggles in 
which the rationality of violence is at play. The third empirical study, Appendix 3, 
focuses on perceptions of honour and respect in cognitive behavioural programmes. 
The study elucidates how, by attempting to create accountable and rational actors 
who can self-manage in an efficient manner, the therapeutic ethos neglects 
participants’ contextualized conceptions of their lives. The expression of moral 
values such as honour and respect are deemed to be an example of a cognitive 
distortion which the instructors seek to modify into efficient and ‘correct’ thinking 
styles. The fourth empirical study, Appendix 4, illustrates the function of humour in 
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cognitive behavioural programmes in particular, and in prison-based rehabilitation 
more broadly. I show how humorous interactions and jocular stories sometimes 
serve as a lubricant and a tool for nurturing positive relationships between the 
instructors and the participants, but that they also function as disruptions and 
boundary-making for the participants. To that end humour becomes a medium and a 
tool for prisoners to preserve their autonomy and dignity when faced with the 
infantilizing nature of the programme curriculum. Appendix 5 is a translation of 
article number two into English and Appendices 6, 7 and 8 are interview guides.   
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The following should be seen as an overarching meta-theoretical framework that 
corresponds to the analytic aspects of the different articles. The format of the 
articles does not allow for detailed explanations of theories, and for this reason the 
broader theoretical inspiration of the articles often remains implicit. Two theoretical 
frameworks are needed in this dissertation, namely a broad explanatory framework 
that considers the larger societal changes, trends, and formations, and a meso-level 
framework that is able to grasp and explain the participants’ reception of cognitive 
behavioural programmes. I draw on theories of social control, punitiveness 
discipline and governmentality in the following. The relevance of these concepts is 
teased out afterwards, and I also point out some problems. While it is important to 
situate the programmes in larger societal developments, they are applied in specific 
contexts, prisons, which has consequences for the way in which they are received. 
In order to analyse the context for, and the reception of, the cognitive behavioural 
programmes, I draw on three supplementary concepts below: cultures of prisons, 
subcultural capital, and resistance or friction. These concepts can help to 
understand the context in which the programmes play out, while the cultures upon 
which prisoners draw and in which they navigate can help shed light on the way the 
programmes are received. For instance, prisoners’ efforts to ‘maintain autonomy 
and self-esteem … [are] often reactions to, or coping mechanisms for dealing with, 
the prison environment’ (Brown and Clare 2005:59). The concept of friction is 
beneficial because it can shed light on individuals’ actions that render power 
incomplete (Rubin 2015). Friction illustrates the many ways in which participants 
reject the programmatic goals and attach value to their own self-perceptions and 
understandings of ‘proper’ behaviour.      
SOCIAL CONTROL AND PUNITIVENESS 
Foucault’s genealogies of the mentalities of government that arose in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries – and the rationalities and technologies that shaped our 
present – have influenced prisons scholars as well as the broader social sciences 
immensely (Garland 1997:195).
6
 Foucault describes how a central feature of 
modern prisons was that they replaced psychical punishment. In the short time span 
between 1750 and 1825 ‘the entire economy of punishment changed’ and went 
                                                          
6 However, see Smith (2003:39) for a critique of Foucault’s history writing and selective use 
of historical sources. For a more general critique, see Garland (1997:193, 194) for a critical 
discussion of unclear and problematic concepts in Foucault’s and his followers’ writing.  
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from public torturous punishment to a highly disciplined prison regime (Foucault 
1991:7). For Foucault, society became saturated with the disciplining techniques 
that the prison cultivates; like surveillance and with it, normalization became one of 
the great instruments of power in the end of the classical age:  
The art of punishment, in the régime of disciplining power, […] brings 
five quite distinct operations into play […]. The perpetual penality that 
traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary 
institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes homogenizes, 
excludes. In short, it normalizes’ (Foucault 1991:182,183). 
Here, a scale of disciplining techniques which unfolds across a wealth of otherwise 
diverse fields (e.g. poorhouses, asylums, schools, hospitals and factories) - creates 
simultaneously a scale of deviancy. This close-knit net across a range of societal 
fields also helps explains why the prison, despite its shortcomings and flaws, is 
such a solid institution. Prisons produce differentiated and specified types of 
deviance which serves to legitimize it practices despite the fact that punishment in 
the shape of imprisonment is inefficient; prisons do not work and do not reduce 
recidivism. On the contrary the conditions to which the free prisoners are subjected 
necessarily condemn them to recidivism because they are under the surveillance of 
the police and have great difficulty in obtaining a livelihood when released 
(Foucault 1991:265-268). Prison, in fact, produce delinquents because it ‘makes 
possible, even encourages, the organization of a milieu of delinquents, loyal to one 
another, hierarchized, ready to aid and abet any future criminal act’ (Foucault 
1991:267). 
In the late 1970s, Foucault moved from a focus on discipline and punishment to a 
focus on the government of others and the government of self. Central for Foucault 
is power – and its relationship to the subject. Foucault (1978) theorizes power not 
as something to be possessed, but as a relation. It is not held, but is ‘exercised from 
innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations’ 
(Foucault 1978:94). Power is productive, flowing through the language we use, how 
we come to understand ourselves and the practices of governance (Raby 2005:160). 
Foucault analysed two poles of governance, namely the form of rule used by 
authorities to govern populations, and the self-technologies deployed by individuals 
to shape their own subjectivity (Garland 1997:175). Foucault is thus concerned with 
a particular form of power that: 
[…] applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own 
identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and 
which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which 
makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word subject: 
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subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own 
identity by a conscience or self-knowledge (Foucault 1982:781). 
Governmental power is thus not objectifying, but subjectifying because it is 
exercised through an active subject. Foucault analyses three types of struggles 
against power or subjectification; first, a struggle against domination, secondly a 
struggle against exploitation and lastly, a struggle against subjection and forms of 
subjectivity and submission. The third is of most interest in this context as it 
concerns struggles of power that ‘ties the individual to himself and submits him to 
others in this way’ (Foucault 1982:781). 
Following Foucault, Cohen describes a dispersal of social control ‘through 
“hundreds of tiny theatres of punishment”’ where the offender is ‘observed, judged, 
normalized’ (1985:85). Cohen describes how a psychology of classification have 
emerged in which the ‘mind, not the body, the actor, not the act becomes the 
judicial object. The offender is examined, assessed and normalised – his “soul” is 
brought before the court’ (1985:194). This involves a process of professional 
expansion, namely the creation of new categories of deviance and social problems 
which defines more people as belonging to a special population. Drawing on 
Bottoms (1977), Stanley Cohen analyses the bifurcation of crime control: 
From the foundation of the control system, a single principle has 
governed every form of classification, screening, selection, diagnosis, 
prediction, typology and policy. This is the structural principle of binary 
opposition: how to sort the good from the bad, the elect from the 
damned, the sheep from the goats, the amenable from the non-amenable, 
the treatable from the non-treatable, the good risks from the bad risks, 
the high prediction scorers from the low prediction scorers; how to know 
who belongs in the deep end, who in the shallow end, who is hard and 
who is soft (Cohen 1985:86). 
Each individual in the above system represents and creates the principle of 
bifurcation. Cohen argues that in the ‘heart of the “what works” debate and real 
ideology of system expansion, lies in the ideology of classification […] where 
results ‘would be better if only we could find the right match between type of 
offender, type of treatment method, type of treatment setting and type of 
professional’ (Cohen 1985:182). Cohen foresaw a change in the methodology and 
philosophy of rehabilitation; a move away from a Freud-inspired style of 
rehabilitation into a style of rehabilitation resting on behavioural modification. He 
explained this development by highlighting the virtue of the lesser ambitions of the 
latter style, and its probable superior efficiency wherein ‘economically feasible, 
quick and administratively efficient’ interventions would produce ‘sullen citizens, 
performing their duties, functioning with social skills’, but without any insight 
(Cohen 1985:144,151). Here, there is ‘no reason to view the inmate as a poor, sick 
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person who needed love, care, warmth or understanding’, but importantly, no need 
for a harsh regime in its own sake. Instead, a ‘scientifically managed programme of 
behavioural change’ (Cohen 1985:144) was needed. Cohen understands the new 
behaviourism as ‘an uneven move away from internal states to external behaviour, 
from causes to consequences, from individuals to categories or environments’ 
(1985:154).   
Rose (e.g. 2000; Miller & Rose 2008; Rose & Miller 1992) has restated and 
developed Foucault’s ideas in a range of fields including crime and control. Rose is 
largely occupied with analyses of governing-at-a-distance, and a major topic here is 
neoliberalism and the way this particular type of governance shapes behaviour 
(Garland 1997:183). Rose argues that a governmentality approach to crime and 
control enables the identification of new languages of description that make certain 
problems thinkable and governable, thus creating new models of the individuals to 
be governed:  
[…] the pervasive image of the perpetrator of crime is not one of the 
juridical subject of the rule of law, nor that of the bio-psychological 
subject of positivist criminology, but of the responsible subject of moral 
community guided – or misguided – by ethical self-steering mechanisms 
(Rose 2000:321). 
Rose argues that cognitive behavioural programmes can be understood as a therapy 
of normality and that ‘behavior modification, once the bête noire of progressives, 
thus becomes consonant with the liberating theologies of self assertion’ (Rose 
2000:241). Prisoners are thus expected to become ‘subjects of responsibility, 
autonomy and choice’ (Rose 1996 in Hannah-Moffat 2000:511). Rose (2000) has 
suggested that, in order to bring about this self-regulation, the allied discourses of 
‘choice’ and ‘empowerment’ are consistently mobilized. As Rose sees it, the beauty 
of this type of empowerment is:  
[…] that it appears to reject the logics of patronizing dependency that 
infused earlier welfare modes of expertise […]. Autonomy is now 
represented in terms of personal power and the capacity to accept 
responsibility (Rose 2000:202). 
The essential feature of this type of empowerment is to learn not to blame others 
but to recognize one’s own collusion and flaws. In this line of reasoning the task is 
thus to realize one’s shortcomings and to overcome them, whereafter it allegedly 
becomes possible to achieve responsible autonomy and personal power.  
David Garland (2001:179) describes a paradigmatic change in penal fields wherein 
control theories have come to shaped official thinking and action. Penal welfarism, 
characterized as community based solutions to crime, treatment programs, 
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indeterminate sentences and individualized sentencing, was dominating in the 
Western world from the 1890s and especially after World War Two up until the 
1970s (2001:28). However, a governmental style organized around economic forms 
of reasoning – in contrast to legal and social forms otherwise domination most of 
the 20
th
 century – has become dominant. This economic rationality relies on ‘an 
analytical language of risk and rewards, rationality, choice, probability, targeting 
and the demand for supply and opportunities’ (Garland 1997:185). Garland 
suggests that the governmentality literature offers a powerful framework for 
analysing how crime is problematized and controlled because: 
It is focused upon the present, and particularly upon the shift from 
‘welfarist’ to ‘neo-liberal’ politics […]. It aims to anatomize 
contemporary practices, revealing the ways in which their modes of 
exercising power depend upon specific ways of thinking (rationalities) 
and specific ways of acting (technologies), as well as upon specific ways 
of ‘subjectifying’ individuals and governing individuals (Garland 
1997:175).   
Governmentality studies often aim to subject contemporary practices, for instance 
in relation to crime and control, to a genealogical analysis that traces their historical 
lineage and in effect problematizes their apparent ‘naturalness’. Nowadays, crime 
and delinquency are seen as problems not of deprivation, but of inadequate control 
(social, situational, self-control), which has led to a view of the offender as ‘more 
and more abstract, more and more stereotypical, more and more a projected image 
rather than an individuated person’ (Garland 2001:179). Neoliberalism and the 
governmentality of crime control have resulted in a rethinking of the dynamics of 
crime and punishment in pseudo-economic terms, organized around economic 
forms of reasoning (Garland 1997:185). This has led to a changed view of the 
rehabilitation of offenders:  
The rehabilitation of offenders is no longer viewed as a general all-
purpose prescription, but instead as a specific intervention targeted 
towards those individuals most likely to make cost-effective use of this 
expensive service. […] If the official aim of penal-welfare was the 
promotion of social welfare the overriding concern today is, quite 
unashamedly, the efficient enhancement of social control (Garland 
2001:176).  
According to Garland, the prison regime characterizes the criminal subject as an 
entrepreneurial character, and makes a determined effort to assimilate individual 
prisoners by means of new ‘technologies of the self’, insisting that the individual 
must address his/her criminal actions and take responsibility for them. Garland 
further argues that:  
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instead of assuming that all adult individuals are ‘naturally’ capable of 
responsible, self-directed action and moral agency, contemporary penal 
regimes treat this as a problem to be remedied by procedures that 
actively seek to ‘subjectify’ and to ‘responsibilize’ individuals (Garland 
1997:191).   
In this line of reasoning, governmentality rests upon the willingness of individuals 
to exercise a ‘“responsibilized” autonomy’. Hence, they are governed to pursue 
their interest and desires in ways which are socially approved and legally 
sanctioned (Garland 1997:180). 
In order to tease out the relevance of the above theoretical perspectives for this 
dissertation, I will turn to Garland. He argues that a Foucauldian approach enables 
us to address the substances of discourses and the practical programmes they 
support, by carefully examining what they say, how they say it, and what makes it 
‘sayable’ in the first place. Such an analysis is a critical, sociological account of 
contemporary practices and of how the agents, knowledges, powers and techniques 
are assembled into a specific apparatus that makes new ways of thinking into 
practical ways of acting (Garland 1997:186). Put more simply, I am inspired by 
Foucault’s genealogical approaches to the ‘history of the present’ and his ideas of 
power and subjectification. I also draw on Foucault in the fourth article, where I 
critically examine the limits of ‘soft power’, which does not constrain, command or 
suppress the individual as much as stimulate subjectification. The first article draws 
on Garland’s call to examine configurations in the penal field, and ‘new 
technologies of the self’ in present-day rehabilitation. I will draw on Rose 
throughout the dissertation to describe and analyse how responsible and 
autonomous subjects are produced and desired, but this interest is especially present 
in the second article. I am inspired by Cohen’s analysis of the expansion of social 
control and his focus upon new behaviourist modes of treating deviants.            
Notwithstanding the importance of the above perspectives, and bearing in mind that 
all analytical frameworks are partial and cannot (and should not) explain 
everything, there are some problems embedded in these ideas. For instance, there is 
a vast difference between the behavioural methods that Cohen described and the 
cognitive behavioural methods deployed today, which have an explicit focus on the 
morality, thoughts and values of offenders as opposed to their behaviour alone 
(Robinson 2008:437). Also, Foucault has been criticized for lacking an agentic 
perspective, or, as Cohen (1985:10) puts it, ‘his structuralist denial of human 
agency’. Foucault also tends to treat resistance as a black box that is only 
considered at a conceptual level in relation to power (Brownlie 2004:516). Garland 
points to another problem embedded in the governmentality literature, namely that 
it has:  
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[…] little to say about the question of how particular personal styles 
come to be adopted by particular social groups […]. The 
governmentality literature doesn’t tell us much about who ‘chooses’ 
particular identities, and why, or about the process of ‘choosing’ and the 
limits of choice. Nor does it have anything to say about the durability of 
these internalized dispositions in the absence of the external rituals and 
processes that sanction and reinforce them (1997:198). 
Garland points to the need to analyse messy implementation and possible 
corruption in practice. Thus, we need to study ‘the pragmatics of programme-
implementation and the process through which rationalities come to be realized (or 
not) as actual practices’ if we want to understand the penal field (Garland 
1997:200). Ironically, Garland (as well as Rose) has been criticized for presenting 
too sweeping an image of punishment and social control, where ‘bulldozer’ 
concepts such as governmentality tell us little about everyday life on prison 
landings (Crewe 2015). Garland has also been criticized for presenting a ‘dystopia’ 
in his version of the punitive turn (Zedner 2002).   
CULTURES OF PRISONS  
Arguably, and as pointed out by Sparks and colleagues (1996 in Crewe 2009:4), no 
such thing as ‘The Prison’ or, I may add, ‘The Prison Culture’ exists. Nonetheless, 
‘imprisonment entails some more-or-less “intrinsic” pains, deprivations and 
conditions, and these factors influence the prison’s culture and social organization’ 
(Crewe 2009:4). I begin with classic studies on prisoner roles, norms and 
leadership, while side-stepping the fierce debates in the sociological study of 
prisons between proponents of the ‘deprivation theory’ (Sykes 1958; Sykes & 
Messinger 1960), in which behaviour is a reaction to the pains of imprisonment, 
and proponents of the ‘importation theory’ (Irwin 1970; Irwin & Cressey 1962) in 
which prisoners’ pre-carceral identities and socio-demographic characteristics 
shape their conduct (Rubin 2015:28). In the context of current concerns, it is 
sufficient to argue that prisoners do ‘import’ street-based notions of proper conduct, 
while the meanings of this conduct are inseparable from the social context and 
culture of the prison.  
Donald Clemmer’s The Prison Community ([1940] 1958), was a pioneering book in 
the realm of prison research. From empirical material collected over a three-year 
period in an American prison, Clemmer observed a certain process through which 
the prisoners went in the course of their imprisonment, and he coined this 
prisonization. He defines prisonization as: ‘The taking on in greater or lesser degree 
of the folkways, mores, customs and general culture of the penitentiary’ (Clemmer 
1958:299). Clemmer thus sees prisonization as a process in which the prisoners 
adapt to certain norms or rules of the prisoner culture (such as avoiding ‘snitching’, 
doing your ‘own’ time, being a ‘proper’ man, etc.). Even though Clemmer 
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described these norms or rules as fluctuating and non-universal, he nonetheless 
described a stable set of norms between the prisoners to which they learn to adhere. 
For Clemmer, prisonization does not only affect people when they are imprisoned, 
but reaches beyond the punishment as well, and thus affects the possibilities for 
rehabilitation and a life without crime when released (1958:315). Following 
Clemmer, Stanton Wheeler (1961) published an influential quantification of 
prisonization. Wheeler found a ‘U-curve’ in the prisonization process, according to 
which prisoners adhere strongly to conventional values at the beginning of their 
sentences, least strongly in the middle phases of their imprisonment, and strongly 
near the end of their sentences. Wheeler copied this study in fifteen Scandinavian 
prisons, but found no evidence of a U-curve there (Cline & Wheeler 1968).   
Gresham Sykes’ seminal and still widely influential book The Society of Captives 
(1958) represents a structural-functional theoretical lens on imprisonment. Sykes 
coined five pains of imprisonment: 1) deprivation of liberty, 2) deprivation of goods 
and services, 3) deprivation of heterosexual relationships, 4) deprivation of 
autonomy, and 5) deprivation of security. Sykes argued that the pains of 
imprisonment ‘carry a more profound hurt as a set of threats or attacks which are 
directed against the very foundations of the prisoner’s being’ (Sykes 1958:79). 
Sykes argued that prisoners developed subcultural norms and values as resistance 
and protection against these pains. Sykes’ insights relate to the flow and defects of 
power in prison, the structure of social relationships, the problems of balance and 
equilibrium, and the role of dynamic security (Liebling 2015:6). Sykes also 
illustrated the tensions embedded in the prison culture and discussed how prisons 
might be superficially calm, but highly charged (Crewe 2011:484) social contexts 
because of the forced interactions between prisoners: 
The society of prisoners […] is not only physically compressed; it is 
psychologically compressed as well, since prisoners live in an enforced 
intimacy where each man’s behaviour is subject both to the constant 
scrutiny of his fellow captives and the surveillance of the custodians. It 
is not solitude that plagues the prisoner but life en masse (Sykes 
1958:4). 
Sykes showed that the most respected prisoner in this context is he who remains 
loyal, generous and tough without being provocative. Sykes’s conceptualizations of 
‘the pains of imprisonment’ have shed light on a dialectical relationship between 
conditions and culture in the context of imprisonment (Young 2011:85) and 
continue to inspire prisons scholars (e.g. Crewe 2011; Shammas 2014). 
Stanley Cohen and Laurie Taylor authored the classic book Psychological Survival 
– The Experience of Long-Term Imprisonment (1972:58) on a longitudinal study of 
the psychological reactions of a small group of prisoners in a high-security 
environment in the United Kingdom. Their interest lies in ‘how, under extreme 
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conditions, people cope with universes changing, machineries being sabotaged and 
pictures being blurred or wholly obliterated’. Cohen and Taylor’s work could be 
seen as a critical response to otherwise functionalistic theories of the inner life of 
prisons because they ‘stress the conscious, creative nature of the subculture rather 
than seeing it simply as a set of prescriptions or a network of roles’ (Cohen & 
Taylor 1972:57). Cohen and Taylor (1972:72) argue that in prison ‘there is little 
role segregation, little opportunity for the presentation of different selves in 
different contexts’, which carries profound implications for sociality in prison. 
Despite beliefs to the contrary about highly controlled maximum-security wings, 
Cohen and Taylor were able to identify five distinct forms of prisoner resistance, 
namely; 1) self-protection, 2) campaigning, 3) escaping (or talking about escaping), 
4) striking and 5) confronting. Self-protection is of particular interest to me as it 
encompasses the ways ‘the inmate beats off the unfavourable definitions offered to 
him’ (Cohen & Taylor 1972:135). The concept of self-protection mirrors 
Goffman’s (1961) ideas on the ‘secondary adjustments’ which inmates in ‘total 
institutions’ deploy in order to protect a sense of self which is ‘systematically, if 
often unintentionally, mortified’ (Goffman 1961:23). The inmates deploy an 
informal economy of behaviour that does not directly challenge the staff, but grants 
access to forbidden goods or allowed goods by forbidden means. Secondary 
adjustments are thus meaningful attempts to fight off contradicting or not 
corresponding institutional selves in order to preserve previous self-conceptions.        
As the reader will notice, there is a time gap between the publication of the classics 
and the present day. Wacquant (2002a:385) has described how, just when it was 
most needed because of the unprecedented rise in incarceration rates, prison 
ethnography went into an eclipse. In 2009, Ben Crewe revived and contributed to 
prison ethnography with his study of The Prisoner Society, based upon fieldwork in 
a medium-security English prison. Crewe (2009:3) examines power and adaption in 
this specific context. Crewe examines how power is deployed by the institution and 
how it is experienced by the prisoners, but he does not assume that the prisoners are 
rendered docile despite the potency of power. Instead he points to a ‘struggle by the 
one side for order and compliance and by the other for autonomy, influence and 
self-assertion’ (Crewe 2009:7). Thus, he investigates the adaptation of prisoners, 
and how their behaviour is shaped by both the institution and the values and 
orientations that they carry with them (Crewe 2009: 8). Crewe aims to investigate a 
particular point in time from the viewpoint of prisoners and staff, namely the ‘late-
modern’ or ‘managerial’ era of prison governance, and because of this he follows 
recent accounts of modern penality (Garland 2001, Pratt 2002, Wacquant 2000, 
2001 in Crewe 2009:9). Crewe points to the fact that the prisoners nowadays have 
to participate in their own ‘carceral management’, something they find ‘deeply 
oppressive’. As one prisoner explains:  
In the old days, they could fuck you up with their fists. Now they can 
fuck you up with their pen. […] The power of the pen is really mighty in 
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prison nowadays. Psychologists have taken over prisons (Prisoner in 
Crewe 2009:115).   
I take a leap from the above studies to the Nordic context. Thomas Mathiesen’s 
(1965) pioneering ethnographic examination of everyday life in the Ila psychiatric 
prison in Norway has become a classic. Drawing on Sykes (1958) and other 
structural-functionalist examinations of life in prison, Mathiesen points to a range 
of ‘defences of the weak’, and thus seeks to investigate the opportunities for weak 
groups to defend themselves in prison. Despite a widespread belief that weak or 
oppressed groups would show peer solidarity among themselves, Mathiesen found 
that this was not the case. One reason for this lack of peer solidarity can be ascribed 
to the special population of Ila prison, where prisoners did not sympathize or 
readily identify with their fellow prisoners’ crimes. Mathiesen analyses how 
‘censoriousness’ was a functional alternative to peer solidarity (1965:14). He 
understands censoriousness as a ‘defence of the weak’, a weapon against the staff’s 
distribution of important benefits and burdens, including legitimate rewards and 
punishments. For instance, Mathiesen shows (1965:148) how humour is embedded 
in the ‘defences of the weak’ and may help to alleviate the pains of imprisonment. 
Thus, humour in prison may serve to release tensions, avoid aggression and create 
an easier life day-to-day. Despite the impact of this ethnography, fifty years were to 
pass before another ethnographic examination of everyday life in a Norwegian 
prison would be published, in the shape of Thomas Ugelvik’s (2014) rewriting of 
his doctoral dissertation into the book ‘Power and Resistance in Prison - Doing 
Time, Doing Freedom’. As the title implies, and with inspiration from Foucault, 
Ugelvik analyses power and resistance in a remand wing in Oslo prison. He is 
interested in the various ways that prisoners resist and object to being subjugated, 
and he examines small but significant acts of resistance such as illicit food practices 
and decorations of cells to make them fit better with subjective standards of what a 
‘home’ should look and feel like. Ugelvik shows that everyday resistance in this 
prison should be understood as identity work for the prisoners; by ‘doing’ decent 
fatherhood, cooking a particularly sophisticated dish in the cell, resisting rules and 
regulations or working out in order to shape strong and ‘capable’ bodies, they 
actively tackle the challenges embedded in their predicaments as prisoners.        
The culture of prisons in Denmark might be different from the culture in other penal 
fields because, among other reasons that will be explored in Chapter 3, there is an 
emphasis on positive relationships between prisoners and officers, and a strong 
emphasis on dynamic security. The training of Danish prison officers (which lasts 
three years) puts a strong emphasis on teaching the prospective officers 
communication, psychology and conflict resolution. The latest survey of general 
satisfaction
7
 amongst Danish prisoners (Lindstad 2016:30ff) also points to a 
positive relationship between staff and prisoners although the survey also shows 
                                                          
7 The response rate was 64 per cent. 
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some contradictory results. According to this survey, 78 per cent of prisoners in 
open prisons and 71 per cent in closed prisons state that they have a positive 
relationship with staff in their own wings. 86 per cent of prisoners report that they 
have a good relationship with other prisoners and 79 per cent feels safe when they 
are in association areas of the prison. However, the survey also yields more bleak 
results. For instance over half of the prisoners in closed prisons (58 per cent) and 70 
per cent of prisoners in open prisons have been threatened by fellow prisoners 
(Lindstad 2016:43) while 19 per cent in closed prisons have 
‘rarely/sometimes/often’ been assaulted by staff in comparison to 10 per cent in 
open prisons. Most (78 per cent) of the prisoners have not reported this. 55 per cent 
of the prisoners across regimes disagree with the statement ‘if I am assaulted by 
another prisoner, I will report it to staff’ while 68 per cent agrees that ‘if I report it, 
I will be called a snitch’ (Lindstad 2016:43, own translation). As explored below, 
Minke (2012ab) and Nielsen’s (2012) work point to the fact that, despite the 
positive characteristics of Danish prisons, they display the same ‘pains’ and 
frustrations as those elsewhere. 
Danish prison ethnography has been characterized by its scarcity. However, 
Mathiassen (2004) has examined subjective experiences of incarceration in the 
Herstedvester psychiatric prison, and female prisoners’ experiences of incarceration 
(e.g. Mathiassen 2015). Kolind and colleagues have conducted many studies of 
drug rehabilitation and treatment wings in Danish prisons (e.g. Kolind et al. 2015). 
Ulla Bondeson has studied common normative codes and prisoner argot in Sweden 
(1968) and across Scandinavia (1989). She draws upon Clemmer (1940) in order to 
discuss argot knowledge, which she argues can be an indicator of criminal 
socialization. Bondeson (1989) confirmed her hypothesis that there is no difference 
in the detrimental effects across types of prisons (minimum- or maximum- 
security), but that the damaging effect of prison is caused by stigmatization, 
alienation and the deterioration of the prisoner’s life outside the prison, and drug 
abuse and criminality inside. Bondeson (1989) shows that prisoners with the most 
argot knowledge (and thereby the most ‘prisonized’) had higher rates of recidivism 
than the control group.  
Much later, Linda Kjær Minke (2012a, 2012b) carried out an ethnographic study of 
prisonization processes in a Danish prison, and a cross-sectional quantitative survey 
in twelve Danish prisons. Minke found that prisoners are socialized into a prison 
culture that emphasizes a conflicting attitude towards officialdom and society in 
general. She emphasizes that this prisonization is a consequence of the 
imprisonment in itself and occurs in both open and closed prisons (2012b:42). She 
analysed how prisoners’ attempts to avoid ‘snitching’ are a result of fear of 
collective punishment by the whole wing or prisoner group. However, avoiding 
telling the officers when one had witnessed violence, for example, resulted in an 
emotional ‘numbing’ of the prisoners (Minke 2012, see also Liem & Kunst 
2013:335).  
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Malene Molding Nielsen (2010, 2011, 2012) has examined humour, ontological 
insecurity and staff–prisoner relationships in Danish prisons from an 
anthropological perspective. She examines prisoners’ adaptive strategies vis-à-vis 
institutional routines, aims and expectations, and shows that everyday life in a 
Danish prison is painful, uncertain and difficult to navigate. She shows how both 
prisoners and staff are aware of, accept and act accordingly in regards to the 
importance of creating respect and defending a certain position and reputation in the 
prisoner social hierarchy (Nielsen 2012:137). This means that while ‘penal 
institutional life clearly is sought to stimulate individuals to proactively take 
responsibility for their own development and improved moral performance, the 
stimulation mostly, does not imply moral or normative compliance. Prisoners rather 
use available stimuli as means to other ends’ such as securing a livelihood after 
release or establishing strong social networks inside prison in order to stay safe 
(Nielsen 2012:137). 
While the ‘pains of imprisonment’ seems present across diverse penal fields, some 
of the drivers behind cognitive behavioural programmes have been quite critical of 
the ‘outrageous promotion of sociology and the disregard for evidence so apparent 
in mainstream criminology’ (Andrews & Bonta 1994:iv; Zamble & Porporino 
1990). Bonta and Gendreau (1990:366) criticize classic prison studies (such as 
Cohen & Taylor 1972; Goffman 1961; Irwin & Cressey 1962; Sykes 1958) for their 
‘methodological simplicity’ and for only studying the ‘informal organization’ of 
prisons and not their effects (Bonta & Gendreau 1990:348). For instance, they find 
that Goffman provides no evidence for the consequences of the ‘total institution’ in 
regards to an inmate’s self, and that Cohen and Taylor fail to provide empirical 
evidence for psychological or behavioural deterioration (Bonta & Gendreau 
1990:348). The authors are not convinced that imprisonment is universally painful, 
and suggest that a ‘variety of cognitive-behavioral and/or skills training programs 
could assist prisoners in dealing with their experiences in the most constructive 
manner possible’ (1990:355). However, and as we shall see below, most prison 
scholars agree that imprisonment indeed entails certain ‘pains’, and that these foster 
specific prison cultures that may work as a strong force against cognitive 
behavioural programmes. As argued by Haney (who took part in the classic 
Stanford Prison Experiment, see Haney & Zimbardo, 1998):  
Prison is itself a powerful social context that can have destructive, even 
criminogenic, consequences on the persons confined there. The failure 
to fully appreciate these negative effects is one of the unfortunate 
legacies of psychological individualism and the belief that, just as they 
would be in the freeworld, prisoners are fully autonomous free agents 
who are largely impervious to their surroundings (Haney 2009:161). 
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In this regard, ‘the “normal adaptations” employed to counter the “abnormal” 
prison environment may have adverse effects’ (Haney 2003 in Hulley et al. 
2015:21). 
This dissertation contributes to the above studies by examining a particular 
phenomenon, namely prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes. However, 
my examination also goes beyond the particularity of these programmes, and in the 
first article contributes to debates about ‘late-modern’ penal policies and their 
influence on professionals and the prison context, where I am particularly inspired 
by Kolind and colleagues (2015) as well as Crewe (2011). The second article draws 
(more or less implicitly) on all of the above studies in order to provide a framework 
for analysing violence and conflict in prison. The third article particularly 
contributes to debates about the cultures of prisons and how the subcultures of the 
prisoners shape and influence their experiences in the programmes. The fourth 
article draws on Sykes (1958), Mathiesen (1965) and Crewe (2011) in order to 
show how humour can be interpreted as a ‘defence of the weak’ and as a weapon 
against the pains of imprisonment and the soft power embedded in cognitive 
behavioural programmes. I will thus continuously, but not exclusively, draw on the 
above ethnographies of the culture of prison in the four articles.  
SUBCULTURAL CAPITAL 
The lineage of subcultural theory can be traced through the Chicago School of the 
1930s, which emphasized that people’s behaviour is shaped by their surroundings 
(Prieur 1994:33). Chicago was growing rapidly at that time, with a heterogeneous 
population and many deprived areas as a consequence. Thrasher’s (1927) 
pioneering studies of gangs showed how youths were left to fend for themselves 
and thus formed gangs or street-based cultures based upon shared values. In this 
respect, Thrasher saw conflicting values or a lack of opportunities to obtain 
mainstream values as the drivers behind the formation of gangs (Prieur 1994:34). 
However, subcultural theory was established in earnest with Albert Cohen’s ([1955] 
2005) book Delinquent Boys (Jensen 2010). Cohen argued that the middle classes 
defined the values to which the working classes were supposed to aspire, but that 
the working classes reject these values out of a sense of exclusion from them. In 
this perspective, deviance is seen as a meaningful attempt to solve problems faced 
by the group or the individual, and is thus not understood as meaningless pathology: 
Status problems are problems of achieving respect in the eyes of one’s 
fellows. […] If we lack the characteristics of capacities which give 
status in terms of these criteria, we are beset by one of the most typical 
and yet distressing of human problems of adjustment. One solution is for 
individuals who share such problems to gravitate towards one another 
and jointly to establish new norms, new criteria of status which define as 
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meritorious the characteristics they do possess, the kinds of conduct of 
which they are capable’ (Cohen [1955] 2005:55).      
Departing from American classics8, the Birmingham School (e.g. Cohen 1972; Hall 
& Jefferson 1975; Willis 1978) developed British subcultural criminology in the 
1970s and 1980s from a Marxist and hence antagonistic view of society. The 
Birmingham school understood subcultures of the working class as both resistance 
and cultural ‘answers’ or ‘solutions’ to class and generational problems (Jensen 
2010:5). A new strand of subcultural theories known as post-subcultural studies has 
criticized the Birmingham school for painting too static a picture of subcultures and 
failing to take subjective understandings and experiences seriously (Muggleton 
2010 in Jensen 2010). Stanley Cohen (1972) was also sceptical of the Birmingham 
school’s implicit functionalistic theoretical foundation inherited from earlier 
American subcultural theorists. Post-subcultural studies thus suggest that cultures 
should be viewed as non-static; ‘they are not an essence to be enacted, rather they 
are heterogeneous, they blur, change, cross boundaries and hybridize’ (Young 
2011:86). However, soon a ‘critique of critiques’ emerged and the postmodern post-
subcultural studies were criticized for neglecting issues of power and structural 
inequality in their analyses (Jensen 2010:7). More recent developments of 
subcultural theory, especially in relation to subcultural capital, are examined below.  
The concept of subcultural capital latches onto the previous concept of the culture 
of prison, but also expands this by shedding light on the participants’ reception of 
and resistance to cognitive behavioural programmes. Central features of subcultural 
theory are introduced in order to grasp some of the defining values in the culture of 
prison and how some of these resemble those of the subcultures outside prison, in 
order to analyse how they influence prisoners’ reception of cognitive behavioural 
programmes. As an example, standing up for yourself rather than backing down 
when a fight is inevitable, whether the fight is then lost or won, avoids an instant 
loss of credibility and could be seen as a reproduction of masculine credibility from 
the streets (Crewe 2009:251). The cognitive behavioural programmes draw on 
rational choice theory that suggests that crime occurs because of choice, the 
availability of opportunity to commit crimes, and low levels of social (and self) 
control. Young (2012:105) calls this ‘a desperately thin narrative, a rationality of 
choice where intensity of motivation, feelings of humiliation, anger and rage – as 
well as love and solidarity – are foresworn’. By treating poverty, for example, as an 
                                                          
8 In a development of the Chicago School’s ideas, Merton (1938) draws upon Durkheim’s 
theory of criminality as a result of anomie; the discrepancy between means and goals in an 
American society stratified by class and social background (see also Cloward & Ohlin 1960). 
New deviance and labelling theories emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in which subcultural 
theory gave meaning to deviant behaviour and was supplemented by the radical 
phenomenological tradition of Becker, Kitsuse and Lemert backed by Berger and Luckmann 
(Young 2012:104). 
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act of exclusion and the ultimate humiliation in an affluent society, cultural 
criminology stand in contrast to the theoretical framework of rational choice theory, 
which promotes a narrative in which people simply take the available opportunities 
to acquire desirable goods.  
Cultural capital constitutes the embodied dispositions, objectified resources, and 
institutionalized qualifications that produce success in legitimate culture (Bourdieu 
1986 in Shammas & Sandberg 2016). Thornton (1995) developed the concept of 
subcultural capital to capture the competencies and resources mobilized by 
participants in the dance club scene of the 1990s. I draw on Sandberg’s (2008) 
definition of street capital as the cultural capital of street culture: the skills, 
competencies, and bodily postures that produce success there (Shammas & 
Sandberg 2016:206). Street capital is thus a complex set of resources and 
dispositions that allow successful manoeuvring in the street culture. In an attempt to 
bring Bourdieu’s concept of the field into play in criminology, Shammas and 
Sandberg (2016:196) developed the concept of the ‘street field, an arena that 
contains criminal deviance and street culture as its focal points’ with ‘a set of 
particular competencies, values, and norms that come to be valued’. People do not 
pass through the street field unchanged: they are shaped and modified by it. Here, 
Shammas and Sandberg draw on Bourdieu’s definition of habitus and Wacquant’s 
(2002b:1493) notion of ‘the relatively permanent and sometimes unconscious 
dispositions of individuals in the street economy that is at once valorized and 
produced by time spent in the field’(Shammas & Sandberg 2016:205). This has 
important implications for members of the street field who attempt to ‘go straight’, 
because ‘there may be a mismatch between, on the one hand, field-specific bodily 
stances and modes of cognition and, on the other hand, expectations they encounter 
beyond the field’ (Shammas & Sandberg 2016:205). The authors point to three 
types of street capital, namely dispositional (uses and restraints from violence and 
drugs, and a shared notion of what crimes are seen as legitimate), objectified (e.g. 
material objects, commodities, weapons, paraphernalia, and tattoos that are seen as 
belonging to and as signs of success in the field) and lastly institutionalized 
(recognition by official agencies as people set apart from a world of legitimacy that 
includes criminal records, imprisonment, etc.) (Shammas & Sandberg 2016:206). 
Drawing on Bourdieu (1986), Shammas and Sandberg defines street social capital 
as the ‘street version’ of what Bourdieu understands ‘as a measure of the beneficial 
aggregate effects produced by relations to family, friends, and acquaintances’ 
(Bourdieu 1986). 
Importantly, street social capital is devalorized in broader social space. 
An investment in street social capital is simultaneously a disinvestment 
in honorable and valuable social networks in broader social space. For 
instance, street social capital may promote one’s chances of carrying out 
a successful burglary but it comes at the expense of investments in the 
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kind of social capital that is helpful in other parts of society (Shammas 
& Sandberg 2016:206). 
In essence, street capital unfolds in a specific context shared by social agents and 
draws upon rational and meaningful behaviour shared by the subculture. Thus, 
‘subcultural responses are jointly elaborated solutions to collectively experienced 
problems’ (Young 2011:87). Participants in street fields draw on different 
resources: ‘the savoir faire of the street world – knowing how to deal coolly with 
people, how to move, look, act, dress – is a form of capital, not a form middle-class 
people would respect, but capital that can nonetheless be cashed in’ (Anderson 
1999:134). While subcultures can transform stigma into pride, humiliation into 
resistance, and adversity into success, subcultures can also trap ‘lads’ into working-
class jobs (Willis 1978), or both free and imprison young Puerto Rican men in a 
search for respect (Bourgois 2003). Subcultural capital can also help to shed light 
on the many negotiations between participants and instructors in cognitive 
behavioural programmes and help to explain the friction between the problem 
definitions of the two parties. In order to grasp these clashes of horizons, I will 
briefly introduce the concept of resistance and friction below.   
RESISTANCE OR FRICTION 
Departing from Foucault’s (1978:95) thesis ‘where there is power, there is 
resistance’, there is a rich scholarship which examines the relationship between 
agency and structure within confinement9 and analyses prisoners’ disruptive actions 
as resistance (e.g. Bosworth & Carrabine 2001; Crewe 2009; Ugelvik 2011, 2014). 
In particular, prisoners’ agentic acts that frustrate the prison’s rules, goals, or 
functions have been analysed, as well as the small, hidden and individually 
performed everyday practices of resistance or friction. Such rule-violating 
behaviour is important for prisoners in maintaining a sense of autonomy, identity 
and self-respect despite their subordination (Mjåland 2015:782). Scott (1990) 
argues that acts and practices that are perceived as offensive and that represent 
‘slights to human dignity’ (1990:7) provide particularly fertile soil for the 
development of resistant and subversive practices.  
Notwithstanding the importance of the studies above, resistance may not be the best 
term to capture the participants’ non-subversive actions. Rubin (2015) argues that 
prison scholars have over- or mis-used the concept of resistance, with the result that 
                                                          
9 An alternative research tradition, which does not take Foucault’s work as its point of 
departure, has been concerned with the issue of legitimacy (Liebling & Arnold 2004; 
Mathiesen 1965; Sparks & Bottoms 1995; Tankebe & Liebling 2013). These theories suggest 
that the degree to which prisoners comply with institutional rules, values and expectations is 
contingent upon how they experience the power to which they are subjected and how they 
perceive its legitimacy (Mjåland 2015:782). 
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the exercise of agency in prison has effectively become synonymous with 
resistance. Rubin argues that the ‘term “resistance” implies consciously disruptive, 
intentionally political actions’ (2015:24), and thereby intent on the resistant 
prisoner’s behalf. She instead makes a case for using friction as a fitting concept to 
describe reactive, creative and subversive behaviours that occur when people find 
themselves in highly controlled environments (2015:24). Rubin draws on archival 
data from the American Eastern State Penitentiary in order to identify three 
frictional activities (a love affair, masturbation and refusal to work). These 
frictional behaviours are characterized by three features: first, they are normal 
human behaviours that happen to take place in prison; secondly, they respond to 
prisoners’ social and physical needs and desires rather than to their understanding 
of autonomy, rights or justice; and lastly, they are largely apolitical and do not 
intentionally challenge the prison regime (Rubin 2015:24). Rubin’s arguments 
resonate well with some of the participants’ behaviour in the cognitive behavioural 
programmes, for example in regard to their use of humour and their horseplay in the 
lessons. These jocular disruptions are not necessarily politically inspired, but, 
rather, they are small acts of creativity and subversion enacted as a response to 
being in a highly controlled environment while wishing to continue to live one’s 
life as one wants.      
In order to supplement the above perspectives on frictional behaviour and in an 
attempt to explain why the participants do not always seem to internalize the 
programmatic teachings, I will draw upon Beverley Skeggs (2004, 2011) in the 
following. Skeggs is sceptical about the reach of governmental power, and argues 
that people resist negative categorizations and attribute value to their life forms in 
spite of negative discourses (Skeggs 2004, 2011 in Prieur 2012). Skeggs (2011) 
argues that theories of the good and proper self (the governmental normative 
subject) rely on ideas about self-interest, investment and/or ‘playing the game’. She 
strives to develop a different perspective on value by analysing autonomist 
working-class sociality. Skeggs is interested in:  
those who do not have access to the dominant symbolic circuits of 
personhood legitimation from where they can attach dominant symbolic 
value to themselves; those not just denied access but positioned as the 
constitutive limit to proper personhood: the abject, the use-less subject 
who only consists of lacks and gaps, voids and deficiencies (2011:503). 
Skeggs shows how working-class women in the United Kingdom try to attach value 
to themselves in order to fight against misrecognition and devaluation, through the 
performance of respectability and by reversing dominant symbolic moral values 
(2011:503). Skeggs’ research respondents are located in different time/space 
vectors and use their energy in a different way from the rational, self-promoting 
actor presented as the governmental ideal. Thus, the working-class women ‘re-
legitimate value practices that have been de-legitimated, entering different, nearly 
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always local circuits of value, and generating alternative values about “what/who 
matters”, “what/who counts” and what is just’(Skeggs 2011:507,508). In doing so, 
they promote different definitions of ‘proper’ personhood and refuse ‘the nomos of 
the normative’ (Skeggs 2011:507). In this context, rationality and the choices 
embedded therein are, in terms of both goals and means, always socially situated 
and normatively constructed (Young 2011:168). Previous research on working-
class selves (see also Duneier 1992; Willis 1978) has thus shed light on a distinct 
moral code focusing on personal integrity and the quality of inter-personal 
relationships, and a very different form of sociability that is generated from 
working conditions (Skeggs 2011:507). The combination of the concept of friction 
and Skeggs’ ideas on how people attach value to their own sentiments and life goals 
is fruitful for exploring the various ways in which participants object to the 
programmatic goals, but also the ways in which they pay lip service in order to 
compete the programmes but then go on to live their lives as they see fit. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE HISTORY OF 
REHABILITATION IN THE DANISH 
PENAL FIELD 
 
In order to situate the following in the proper context, I will present some statistics 
and characteristics of the Danish penal field, as well as central aspects and phases 
of the Danish history of prison-based rehabilitation. Finally, I will point to some of 
the research that has been carried out in the realm of ‘Scandinavian exceptionalism’ 
and the critique thereof that stems from Nordic prison researchers.    
Denmark has thirteen prisons, of which five are closed (maximum-security) and 
eight are open (minimum-security). Besides these, there are 44 remand prisons or 
remand wings, eleven probation departments, and seven pensions. Furthermore, the 
Danish Prison and Probation Service runs institutions for detained asylum seekers, 
with 1,477 such people admitted during 2014 (DfK 2014:6). The incarceration rate 
is 67 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, with 12,500 new admissions per year. 
Danish prison sentences are relatively short: 59 per cent of Danish prisoners serve 
sentences of less than four months. The maximum capacity of the state and local 
prisons is 4,020 prisoners. There were 2,330 prisoners serving a sentence on a given 
day in December 2014, and 1,454 prisoners on remand. Of these, 161 were female 
prisoners and nine were young offenders under the age of eighteen. 41 per cent of 
the prisoners have an ethnic background other than Danish (DfK 2015; Kolind 
2015:800). Denmark has traditionally had strong structural and ideological ties 
between the welfare state and the utility-oriented criminal justice policy (Balvig 
2005:180). The Danish penal system could thus be termed penal-welfarism 
(Garland 1985), having traditionally sought to respond to crime with measures 
aimed at improving the offender and thereby striving towards his or her reformation 
and reintegration into society. In the modern, rationally-oriented welfare state, the 
general explanation for crime has been social deprivation, that is, a lack of 
opportunities (Balvig 2005:179). This has resulted in humane prison practices and 
the extensive use of so-called ‘open’ prisons where the regime is relatively liberal. 
Prisoners, ideally, serve time in penal institutions located in relative proximity to 
their home towns in order to facilitate the possibility of contact with their families 
and social networks (Nielsen 2012:136). Danish prisons are also renowned (or 
infamous, depending on the eye of the beholder) for conjugal visits, which are 
allowed throughout the prison system. This means that small rooms are available 
for family visits. Another feature of Danish prisons is the possibility of catering for 
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oneself. Throughout the prison system, one finds grocery stores and kitchens, which 
allow the prisoners to cook their own meals (Engbo & Smith 2012).   
The history of rehabilitation in the Danish penal field has been shaped by 
continuous inspiration from Anglo-American penal policies from the nineteenth 
century onwards and the development of the welfare state in the twentieth century. 
The historian Peter Scharff Smith (2003) describes how the leaders of the Danish 
Prison Service at the beginning of the nineteenth century were keen to follow their 
American forerunners in prison architecture and philosophy. This led to the 
construction of several new Danish prisons that were inspired by the so-called 
Pennsylvania system in Philadelphia and the Auburn prison system. These ‘state-of-
the-art’ prisons were significant and unusual precisely because they were aimed at 
treating offenders as opposed to just warehousing them. The objects of change in 
the Pennsylvania system were the mind, thought and actor,
10
 as opposed to the 
body, behaviour and act of the Auburn system. Inspired by the Pennsylvania 
system, the Danish authorities opened Vridsløselille prison in 1859, with the telling 
nickname ‘the moral hospital’. Vridsløselille prison operated on the principles of 
intense isolation, meticulous punctuality, discipline and heavy labour, as these 
features were seen as essential for the improvement of the prisoners (Smith 
2003:29). To further strengthen the rehabilitative ideals in the Danish prison 
system, especially in relation to young offenders, Nyborg State prison opened in 
1913 as an ‘institution of improvement’ [Forbedringshus], and in 1933 the first 
Danish juvenile prison, Søbysøgård, opened (Engbo & Smith 2012:68).   
However, the idea of rehabilitation was introduced in earnest with the passing of the 
Danish Penal Code in 1930 (Balvig 2005:170). This effectively moved the aim of 
Danish penal policies and laws from generalized prevention to specialized 
prevention in the penal field (Engbo & Smith 2012:69). With this development, 
rehabilitation became both a means to an end (decreasing recidivism and increasing 
employability) and an end in itself (with hopes of improving the health, satisfaction 
and happiness of the individual offender) (Robinson 2008:430). This ideology 
resulted in a series of new measures that were ‘directed at certain groups of 
offenders, juveniles, mental patients, recidivists, substance abusers, etc., who were 
believed to be in need of special treatment aimed at preventing further offending’ 
(Balvig 2005:175). These measures were quite harsh, and included:  
Juvenile prisons (with partly indeterminate sentences), alcohol treatment 
facilities (with partly indeterminate sentences), safety confinement 
                                                          
10 Sociologist Torsten Sellin (1993:101, quoted in Haney 2006:44) describes ‘the struggle for 
the individualization of penal treatment’, which focused on the inner workings of the 
offender rather than the nature of the offence, as ‘one of the most dramatic in the history of 
thought’. 
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(indeterminate sentences, apart from mandatory minimum sentences), 
confinement for psychopaths (indeterminate sentences), and special 
prisons (fixed sentences) (Balvig 2005:175).  
Even though these measures were far from always used in actual sentences, they 
were seen as an essential representation of the new punishment ideology and 
practice. Thus in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, 50 per cent of the Danish prison 
population participated (or were at least supposed to participate) in treatment 
programmes for alcoholism, psychiatric illnesses, prostitution, etc.11 (Kolind et al. 
2012). The idea of punishment representing utility and rehabilitation resonated 
deeply with the emergence of the welfare state. It prompted an understanding of 
crime as a kind of disease that was curable through methods that were constantly 
being refined and developed by experts. This understanding was central to the 
criminal justice policy of the welfare state, and thrived in the general belief in social 
engineering after World War Two (Engbo & Smith 2012:68; Prieur 2015:258).  
However, Balvig (2005:176) shows how the indeterminate sentences were 
increasingly debated and criticized from the 1960s onwards, because of three 
particular factors. First, prisoners would often serve much more time with an 
indeterminate sentence than a fixed sentence, even for rather petty crimes. Some 
offenders were held in ‘psychopath custody’ for years because they were classified 
by psychiatric experts as being at high risk of recidivism. Second, the length of 
punishment did not necessarily correspond with the crime committed, but was more 
likely to be a result of predictions/evaluations/judgments made by psychiatric 
experts regarding the possible future criminality of the offender. Third, and most 
importantly, evaluations of the indeterminate sentences showed that they did not 
lead to lower recidivism rates. This critique was expanded to encompass the idea of 
imprisonment itself. Prisons were soon seen as ‘crime schools rather than 
reformatory institutions’ (Balvig 2005:176), and for this reason it became difficult 
to justify imprisonment. In 1967, a former Director General of the Danish Prison 
and Probation service, Lars Nordskov Nielsen, introduced a process of 
‘normalization’12 according to which ‘using incarceration as punishment means that 
                                                          
11 The Danish welfare state is also infamous for its ‘progressive’ handling of certain groups. 
With the passing of the Social Reform Act in 1933, the Danish social service [Forsorgen] 
took over the responsibility for a whole range of people including the mentally ill, the 
mentally handicapped, foster children etc. This led to a whole range of what now appears to 
be inhuman and degrading treatment, such as an excessive use of lobotomies, forced 
sterilization, harsh methods of treating the mentally ill, children being put in foster care in 
dire conditions, and the placement of ‘anti-social’ mentally handicapped people on remote 
Danish islands (Kragh et al. 2015).  
12 ‘Normalization’ should not be understood in the Foucauldian sense here, but rather as the 
aim to make sure ‘life behind bars reflects life outside to as great extent as possible’ (Nowak 
2009:2).  
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it is the deprivation of freedom itself that constitutes the punishment’ (Balvig 
2005:178). Thus, all measures and hindrances that were not a necessary part of 
depriving prisoners of their freedom were to be removed, in order to make life on 
the inside resemble life on the outside as much as possible (Balvig 2005:178). 
‘Normalization’ replaced ‘rehabilitation’ as the core content of incarceration, and 
the incarceration rates went down, with the 2,747 prisoners in 1977 representing the 
lowest level since World War Two (Balvig 2005:178). 
Although the incarceration rates continued to drop, they did not reach the low level 
that experts anticipated, and they then began to rise again. In fact, Balvig (2005) is 
astonished about the developments during the late 1990s and the early years of the 
twenty-first century in the Danish penal field, and writes that ‘given the strong 
structural and ideological ties between the welfare state and the utility-oriented 
criminal justice policy, it is hard to fathom the short time it took for things to 
change radically’ (Balvig 2005:180). He shows how punitive trends internationally 
during the 1980s and 1990s influenced Danish politicians and policy-makers, 
resulting in harsher punishment, ‘law and order’ rhetoric and a move away from the 
welfare-oriented penal policies of earlier days. Corresponding to international 
trends, the increased length of sentences, harsher punishments and punitive public 
debate did not reflect increasing crime rates. On the contrary, Danish crime rates 
have been fairly stable or have even fallen since the 1980s (Balvig 2005:170). 
Besides this rise in punitive measures, there has been a paradigmatic change 
regarding the governance of daily life in prison (Philip 2006 in Engbo & Smith 
2012:64). For example, there has been an unprecedented tendency for Danish 
politicians to get involved with the practicalities of prison life, regarding such 
matters as the weightlifting materials that prisoners are allowed to have, and, most 
recently, discussions have arisen over the control of and punishment for the use of 
mobile phones in Danish prisons13 (Engbo & Smith 2012:64).  
Despite the changes discussed above, the idea of rehabilitation has never been 
abandoned in Denmark. Corresponding to changes during the 1990s in the Danish 
welfare state, in which economic thinking and New Public Management began to 
influence policy developments, the Danish prison service also began to manage, 
monitor and evaluate its services in order to judge their effectiveness and to 
estimate their economic costs (Kolind et al. 2012:555). One of the consequences of 
this was the launch of an accreditation panel of six external experts in 2004. This 
panel is charged with evaluating and streamlining all prison drug treatment and 
some of the cognitive behavioural treatment programmes (Kolind et al. 2012:556). 
As approximately 55-60 per cent of Danish prisoners are defined as ‘drug abusers’ 
(Kramp et al. 2001), drug treatment is also widely used in the Danish prison system, 
                                                          
13http://politiken.dk/indland/fokus_danmark/fokus_terror/ECE3100228/kriminalforsorgsfore
ningen-straf-for-mobiler-er-hul-i-hovedet/  
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which ‘operates drug treatment wings, individual counselling, cannabis and cocaine 
treatment, substitution treatment, drug-free wings, detoxification, post treatment 
and motivational programmes’14 (Kolind et al. 2012:547). Besides drug treatment 
and cognitive behavioural programmes, Danish prisoners can also choose to 
participate in ‘Breathe Smart – Stress Management and Rehabilitation Training’, 
which is a privately-run programme available in three different prisons and in the 
probation service. Breathe Smart consists of yoga classes, breathing exercises and 
meditation, as well as group conversations.15 From 2004, a new penal policy has 
meant that prisoners are rewarded with an early release, that is, they only serve half 
their sentence, if they demonstrate that they are making a special effort (such as 
engaging in cognitive behavioural programmes or drug treatment) to start afresh 
without crime16 (Nielsen 2012:139). Besides the above measures, the Danish 
government has introduced new forms of non-custodial sanctions and measures. For 
instance, in 2001 it launched a youth sanction [Ungdomssanktion], which is a two-
year-long social pedagogical alternative to imprisonment for young people aged 
between 15 and 17 years who have committed a serious crime. Furthermore, the 
possibility of serving one’s sentence with electronic tagging was made available in 
2005. The reasoning behind this was that this type of sanction would improve 
resocialization, because the offenders would be able to continue their employment 
or education (Jensen & Prieur 2015b:156). With reference to the hope of reduced 
                                                          
14 Kolind and colleagues argue that prison-based drug treatment is framed as a cost-efficient 
solution ‘meta-narrative for the solving of drug and crime problems in prisons’, which results 
in a situation in which the ‘political focus has moved away from the individual as a socially, 
financially and often psychologically deprived person in need of help and welfare services’ 
(2012:555). However, the authors do not discuss the previous harsh indeterminate sentences, 
which were a previous result of a ‘helping’ welfare state. 
15 Breathe Smart has been evaluated with positive results. The evaluation consisted of 
participant observation in a five-day course and interviews with 15 participants. Several of 
the participants in Breathe Smart have previously been engaged in cognitive behavioural 
programmes (mostly Anger Management) and they feel that Breathe Smart helps them in a 
more efficient and long-lasting way (see Ahlmark 2015:18).  
16 However, a prisoner is not guaranteed early release. As an example, relating to the 
previous practice of granting early release after a prisoner had served two-thirds of his or her 
sentence, Engbo and Smith (2012:66) show how the number of prisoners who are denied 
early release had increased remarkably: 9 per cent of prisoners were denied early release after 
serving two-thirds of their sentence in 1985, 15 per cent in 1995, 21 per cent in 2000, 25 per 
cent in 2005 and 28 per cent in 2009.   
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recidivism, the government brought in mediation boards [Konfliktråd] across 
Denmark in 2010.17  
Despite the somewhat mixed picture portrayed above, Nordic social democratic 
welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990) present themselves as exceptional with 
regard to many facets of their penal systems, including low incarceration rates. In 
general, the Danish prison regime is internationally renowned for being humane and 
fair, with a large emphasis on so-called ‘dynamic security’ in which a positive 
relationship between officers and prisoners is highly valued. The official aim of the 
Danish Prison Service is to strive continuously for a balance between, on the one 
hand, control and security and, on the other, support and motivation
18
 (Smith 
2003:327). The Danish Prison Service is guided by the following six principles: 1) 
Normalization 2) Openness 3) Responsibility 4) Security 5) Least possible 
intervention 6) Optimum use of resources (DfK 2014). A former Director General 
of the Danish Prison Service, Hans Jørgen Engbo, describes how prisoners should 
ideally have access to carry out their civil rights, so far as their restricted movement 
allows. Prisoners have a right and a duty to carry out work, educational or other 
activities while they are imprisoned (Minke 2012b) Furthermore, the Danish prison 
system has historically been keen to emphasize that visits, privileges and fair 
treatment should not be enforced with reference to instrumental goals such as 
reducing recidivism, but as rights in themselves (Engbo 1997:8). This stands in 
stark contrast to the prison system in the United Kingdom, for example, where a 
rather strict ‘incentives and earned privileges’ scheme is used as a behavioural tool 
according to which prisoners ‘earn’ visitation rights, for example, if they conduct 
themselves appropriately (Liebling 2008). 
International scholars and practitioners have taken an interest in ‘Scandinavian 
exceptionalism’. Based on research from Finland, Sweden and Norway, John Pratt 
(2008a, 2008b) published his widely influential two-part article on ‘Scandinavian 
exceptionalism in an era of penal excess’. Pratt describes a particular ‘Nordic 
culture of control’ resulting in Scandinavian exceptionalism, with consistently low 
imprisonment rates, humane prison conditions, an emphasis on normalization and 
rights, plus a high level of social solidarity. The roots of this, according to Pratt, 
‘are to be found in the highly egalitarian cultural values and social structures of 
these societies’ (2008a:120). Furthermore, Pratt sees the Nordic penal field as an 
example of expert-dominated policymaking and as being well insulated from the 
drivers of punitive excess. Penal and prison policies thus diverged sharply from the 
                                                          
17 Kyvsgaard (2016) has conducted an evaluation of Danish mediation boards. She has found 
no effect on the recidivism of offenders who participated in these.  
18 Following Stanley Cohen (1985:114), this balance or paradox could be seen as an example 
of the essence of a humanistic civilization: to exert power and to do good at the same time.  
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Anglo-American countries, especially after World War Two.19 However, Nordic 
scholars have challenged Pratt’s Scandinavian exceptionalism thesis. For instance, 
Smith (2012:48) points to the ‘peculiar Scandinavian’ phenomenon of solitary pre-
trial confinement that is practised widely in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. In 
Norway, Mathiesen (2006) sees a controlling system with moral, technical and 
theoretical shortcomings, while Christie understood Norwegian prisons as part of a 
governmental system of legitimized delivery of pain (Christie 1981). Shammas 
(2014) describes the ‘pains of uncertainty’ on the Norwegian prison island Bastøy, 
which is otherwise internationally renowned and portrayed as a true exemplar20 of 
Scandinavian exceptionalism. Vanessa Barker (2013:5) uses the phrase ‘Janus-
faced’ for the Swedish penal regime: benign and mild on the one side, and intrusive, 
disciplining and oppressive on the other. Barkers shows how only some citizens of 
the welfare state are granted rights, the promotion of individual well-being and 
protection, whereas criminal aliens, criminals and drug offenders, and ‘perceived 
“others”, particularly foreign nationals, [are] vulnerable to deprivation and 
exclusion’. Thomas Ugelvik and Jane Dullum (2012) have edited a volume on 
Scandinavian exceptionalism in which Nordic scholars challenge Pratt’s (2008a) 
thesis. Among the many important questions they raise is one of particular interest 
to this dissertation, namely whether it is ‘even possible to talk of a specifically 
Nordic penal model, bearing in mind the way prison service bureaucrats have 
eagerly imported policies, practices and programmes from the various Anglo-
American jurisdictions over the last decades’(Dullum & Ugelvik 2012:2).   
The next chapter aims to shed light on the programme implementation, and to give 
descriptions of Cognitive Skills and Anger Management, the screening and 
selection of instructors and participants, and the prisoners’ motivations for, and the 
practical consequences for them of, participating in cognitive behavioural 
programmes.  
                                                          
19 However, in part two of the article, Pratt (2008b:275) examines changes in the 
incarceration rates in the aforementioned countries (rising, albeit from a low base) and he 
points to new penal values attached to crime as drivers behind this. Pratt points to the same 
mechanisms as Balvig (2005), which are outlined above, namely ‘that erosions of security 
and egalitarianism, of homogeneity and solidarity – the foundation stones on which 
Scandinavian exceptionalism had been built – are producing this effect’ (Pratt 2008b:277). 
20 As exemplified in the chef Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall’s ‘Scandimania’ TV show in 
which he visits Bastøy prison and in a series of articles in the Guardian: 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/feb/25/norwegian-prison-inmates-treated-like-
people. However, Bastøy prison is also represented with a more disapproving undertone: 
http://www.theplaidzebra.com/norways-prison-island-is-treats-inmates-like-theyre-at-a-
resort/ 
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CHAPTER 4. COGNITIVE 
BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES 
THE ORIGINS OF COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES 
Cognitive behavioural programmes are borne out of the renaissance of 
rehabilitation: the great story of rise and fall and rise again (Ward & Maruna 2007). 
The following paragraph traces the theoretical foundations of cognitive behavioural 
programmes and situates them in their societal and theoretical context.  
The context for the emergence of cognitive behavioural programmes is embedded 
in the fall of rehabilitation, which began in earnest with Robert Martinson’s 
infamous 1974 article: What works?—Questions and answers about prison reform. 
This article has become a symbol of the abandonment of incarceration and 
rehabilitation of offenders in the late 1970’s and the beginning of the ‘Nothing 
Works’ era. Martinson did not unequivocally state that nothing worked, but he did 
show strong scepticism about the effectiveness of prison-based rehabilitation when 
he wrote that ‘with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have 
been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism’ (1974:157). As 
Cohen points out, these results were not so different from those of many other 
evaluation studies in the criminological field, and Martinson mostly said that ‘most 
things work just as well as each other’ (Cohen 1985:178). However, the 
consequences of Martinson’s article were wide-ranging. Both the legitimacy and 
the possibility of rehabilitation became seriously questioned (Robinson 1999). 
Thus, it became difficult to legitimize incarceration as a means to rehabilitation, and 
hence incarceration rates went down all over the Western world. Curiously, the 
lower incarceration rates were short-lived, and soon the unforeseen rise of 
incarceration in the United States and other Western countries began. O’Malley 
(1999) argues that two discernible currents emerged in this period, namely a 
neoliberal one and a neoconservative one. Whereas the neoliberal current in the 
penal field stresses individual responsibility, enterprise, accountability and 
efficiency, the neoconservative one stresses discipline, punishment and state 
authority. The friction between these currents offers some explanation for the 
volatile and rather unpredictable nature of penal policies, and, importantly, leaves 
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room for alternative forms of penal practices, such as rehabilitation21 (Crewe 
2009:19). Thus it was still possible to promote rehabilitation, and the treatment 
paradigm in many countries including the Nordic ones began to be aligned with the 
‘What Works’ movement (Smith 2003).  
Cognitive behavioural programmes were first developed in Canada. The Canadian 
research on the connections between cognitive skills and crime appears to originate 
with Gendreau and Ross (1979; Ross & Gendreau 1980), Ross and Fabiano (1985), 
Ross, Fabiano and Ewles (1988) and subsequently Andrews et al. (1990) and 
Fabiano et al. (1991). The Canadian psychologist Robert Ross was the founding 
father (Kendall 2011:71; Shaw & Hannah-Moffat 2011:113). With substantial 
backing from the Canadian Correctional Service, these efforts led to pre-packaged 
modules to be delivered by prison staff (Kendall 2011:71).The theoretical 
framework for the cognitive behavioural programmes is fairly difficult to trace. For 
instance, when describing the forerunner programme, Reasoning and 
Rehabilitation, Ross, Fabiano and Ewles (1988) base their own conceptual approach 
to criminality and rehabilitation on ‘four decades of research literature’. However, 
they do not provide references to this scholarship, thus disabling anyone who is 
interested in reviewing this theoretical foundation for themselves. As argued by 
Polaschek, the underlying theoretical base of the programmes remains implicit and 
opaque, beyond their description as cognitive behavioural and as adhering to the 
Risk-Need-Responsivity model (Polaschek & Collie 2004). This latter model is 
underpinned by a large body of empirical support (Andrews et al 1990; Dowden & 
Andrews 1999; Cullen & Gendrau 2000), but it still remains difficult to trace its 
theoretical foundations (Ward & Maruna 2007). Despite these difficulties, I have 
been able to identity certain theoretical concepts and ideas that have inspired the 
developers of cognitive behavioural programmes; these are described below.   
The Canadian programme developers were inspired by research and meta-analyses 
of large numbers of treatment programmes conducted from the 1960s to the 1980s 
in North America (Andrews, Bonta & Hoge 1990; Andrews et al. 1990; Ross, 
Fabiano & Ewles 1988). An example of this theoretical inspiration are the book by 
the North Americans Yochelson and Samenow entitled The Criminal Personality 
(1976), which have been a great inspiration to the ‘What Works’ movement (see 
                                                          
21 As laid out in the somewhat grandly titled Presidential Address to the American Society of 
Criminology ‘The twelve people who saved rehabilitation: How the science of criminology 
made a difference’ by Francis Cullen (2005), a few scholars helped ‘save rehabilitation’. 
Cullen (2005:12) warned that the alternative to rehabilitation – the embrace of punishment as 
the goal of corrections – was dangerous. Cullen also shows how the advocacy of new 
rehabilitative interventions proved to be a counterattack on control and deterrence-style 
programmes or boot-camps that were likely to be theoretically flawed and, in practice, 
ineffective. 
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Fox 1999b:440). Yochelson and Samenow held therapeutic group sessions for 
‘criminals’ in which they discovered that there seemed to be certain patterns in the 
way the members of the group made excuses and blamed others for their 
criminality. The authors wanted to move away from ‘psychological and 
sociological excuses’, and preferred to assume a ‘firm, directed stance based on a 
considerable body of knowledge about the criminal mind’ (Yochelson & Samenow 
1976:35). As a result of this, Yochelson and Samenow stopped treating the group 
members as ‘sick’ and instead began to work with their minds, while arguing that 
they ‘cared more about the fabric of mind and less about causes for criminality’ 
(1976:24). They asked the group members to write a ‘phenomenological report’ on 
their ‘every thought’, and thereafter they began to recognize the element of choice 
in criminal behaviour. They came to conclude that a focus on the personal 
deficiencies of the ‘criminals’ would be more constructive than a focus on their 
personal assets. Yochelson and Samenow had now established ‘that a criminal act 
was the end product of specific thinking processes and personal characteristics’ 
(1976:28) and that what was needed was to teach ‘the criminal a new set of thinking 
processes as correctives to his thinking errors’ (Yochelson & Samenow 1976:49). 
Yochelson and Samenow argue that the social sciences had failed by placing so 
much weight on environmental explanations for crime, and argue that ‘a criminal is 
not a victim of circumstances’ (1976:249). Instead they wish to ‘fractionate the 
criminal’s mind and then synthesize it’ (1976:255). This rather mechanistic and 
highly individualized treatment approach does spill over into the present-day 
cognitive behavioural programmes, but the founders of these programmes do not 
completely disregard the importance of environmental factors, as we shall see 
below.    
The present-day cognitive behavioural theoretical stance seems to represent a 
synthesis between three psychological theories: social learning theory, cognitive 
theory and behaviourism (Kendal 2002:187). The programmes are an example of 
the synthesis between behaviourism, as represented famously by Skinner and 
Pavlov with their respective developments of conditioning theory, and cognitivism, 
which includes subjectivity and the individual’s thoughts. Eysenck was the leading 
figure in developing psychological behaviourism and, as such, was an inspiration to 
later developments in cognitive behavioural psychology (Kendall 2011). The two 
modes for framing, understanding and treating human behaviour and thoughts 
eventually fused in the 1970s to create a variety of programmes and approaches for 
a large number of ‘behavioural problems’, which are widely used in a whole range 
of areas (Kendall 2011:69; Wheeler 1973). As an addendum to earlier, Pavlovian 
stimulus–response theories, social learning theory posits both conditioning and 
operant principles, plus observational learning (McGuire 2006:71). The neo-
behaviourist approach was firmly established with reference to criminal conduct in 
Ross and Fabiano’s (1985) Time to think: A cognitive model of delinquency 
prevention and offender rehabilitation (McGuire 2006:73) and their subsequent 
development of the cognitive behavioural programme Reasoning and 
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Rehabilitation. Ross and Fabiano argued that, as a result of their lack of social 
skills, offenders lack social competence in areas of self-control, critical reasoning, 
cognitive style, interpersonal problem-solving, social perspective-taking, empathy, 
values and meta-cognition (Ross & Fabiano 1985 in Tong & Farrington 2006:5).  
Don Andrews and James Bonta claim to have developed a psychology of criminal 
conduct in which they warn about getting ‘trapped in arguments’ that focus on 
‘unemployment, sexism or racism’ (Andrews & Bonta 1998:363). In opposition to 
this, they have promoted their Risk-Need-Responsivity model (2003). This model 
was seen as an alternative to the dominance of sociological discourses in 
criminology that placed an emphasis on poverty, social disadvantage and 
community in understanding crime (Ward & Maruna 2007). Cognitive behavioural 
programmes build and draw upon the RNR model, and therefore it is interesting to 
examine its content briefly. Andrews and Bonta (2003) developed their RNR model 
on the basis of the claim that there is a ‘general personality and social psychology 
of antisocial behavior’ (Andrews & Bonta 2003:3) that can explain crime. Thus, 
their aim was to identify psychological correlates of offending. In the RNR model, 
Risk means that interventions should be organized according to the level of risk the 
offender poses to society, Need refers to the ‘criminogenic’ needs (e.g. pro-
offending attitudes, antisocial personality, poor problem-solving skills, anger) or 
dynamic risks of the offender, while Responsivity means that the delivery of the 
programme should be matched to the characteristics of the offender (e.g. learning 
styles, motivation, etc.). This ‘correctional model’ of rehabilitation locates the 
causes of offending in individual offenders, rather than in external factors. This 
model is thus:  
principally concerned with effecting change in offenders themselves, 
rather than in their social, economic or physical situation […]. It 
assumes that it is possible to isolate or identify the causes of offending – 
whether they are related to the offender’s character, morality, 
personality, psychological make-up or choices – and then intervene in 
ways which will remove those causes. In short, then, the correctional 
model of rehabilitation seeks to remove or ‘undo’ the causes of 
offending (Raynor & Robinson 2005:6). 
The RNR model was promoted as a radical new intervention because of its 
promises of efficiency in identifying the risks and needs of offenders and thus the 
interventions that are able to address these (Andrews & Bonta 2003).         
However, what was alleged to be radically new in cognitive behavioural 
programmes seemed to have a lot in common with the treatment and rehabilitation 
optimism of the past. Cohen (1985:143) argues that the ‘dichotomies between mind 
and body, thought and behaviour, actor and act, Freudianism and behaviourism, 
positivism and classicism, are of course, hardly novel’. An important difference 
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between the rehabilitative attempts of the nineteenth century and those of the 
current day lies in the clear protestant ethics of the past and the values of the 
present22 (Smith 2006). It is unclear what moral or ethical guidance or grounding, 
other than a firm faith in rational behaviour, the cognitive behavioural programmes 
have. However, Robinson (2008:435) argues that ‘the new rehabilitative 
interventions are characterized by a renewed interest in the moral consequences of 
offending’. Even though the sinner of pre-modern reformative attempts is not re-
invoked, the cognitive behavioural programmes do emphasize personal choice, 
responsibility and recognition of the moral implications of one’s choices 
(2008:438). This means there is an explicit focus on thought processes and attitudes 
that are seen to serve as key mediators of behaviour. As mirrored in the above, the 
offender is not just a passive recipient of treatment, but an active agent and a moral 
actor with capacity to re-evaluate past (anti-social) choices and, importantly, to 
make superior future (pro-social) choices. This is evident in the programme 
manuals, where a central question is: ‘What made you decide to commit current and 
past criminal acts? Did you consider the consequences before you decided to 
commit it?’ (Scheel & Sjöberg 2005:84, own translation & emphasis added). 
Criminality, and the bad choices that led to this, is portrayed here as more a 
‘problem of agency than structure, of will as much as predicament’ (Young 
2007:107). This means that re-moralization or ‘responsibilization’ of offenders has 
a central place in present-day rehabilitation. While Garland (1997:6) has 
emphasized how ‘rehabilitation is necessary for the protection of the public. It is 
future victims who are now “rescued” by rehabilitative work, rather than the 
offenders themselves’, this was not and perhaps still is not strictly the case in 
Denmark. New rehabilitative interventions have perhaps been cushioned by a 
strong welfare state, and it is this mesh of penal policies and the concrete practices 
of them that are explored in this dissertation. 
COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES IN DENMARK 
The Canadian cognitive behavioural forerunner programme, Reasoning and 
Rehabilitation (Ross & Fabiano 1985), was first implemented and renamed as 
‘Cognitive Skills’ in Ringe State prison and two other Danish prisons in 1994. 
Cognitive Skills was partly implemented as a result of the strong ties between the 
Danish Prison Service and the Canadian Prison Service which was run by the Dane 
Ole Ingstrup. One of the ‘founding fathers’ of the programme, Elizabeth Fabiano, 
                                                          
22 Hudson distinguishes between present-day rehabilitation and the reformation of former 
times when she uses the concept ‘reform’ to describe ‘the nineteenth-century development of 
regimes designed to effect change in individuals through educative and contemplative 
techniques, and [….] ‘rehabilitation’ to signify the more individualistic treatment 
programmes that became established during the twentieth century’. (Hudson 2003:27 in 
Raynor & Robinson 2005:7) 
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taught Danish prison officers the principles of the programme, and after this the 
education and supervision of instructors as well as the practical management of the 
cognitive behavioural programme was taken over by the Staff Training Centre of 
the Danish Prison and Probation Service (Philip 1996). Curiously, the decision to 
buy and implement Cognitive Skills does not seem to reflect the same sort of 
overall strategy in the Danish Prison and Probation Service as was seen in the 
United Kingdom, where the ‘What Works’ project was initiated by the Chief 
Inspector of Probation in 1996, leading to numerous conferences on ‘What Works’ 
and being further cemented in two seminal reports (Kemshall 2002:46; Robinson 
1999:424). Instead, it seems that the implementation of Cognitive Skills was 
haphazard and reliant upon the close bonds between the Danish Prison Service and 
the Canadian Prison Service, although the programme implementation corresponds 
well to other changes in the Danish penal field as described previously. Cognitive 
Skills was accredited by an independent accreditation board of academics and 
practitioners, five of them Danish and one Swedish,23 in 2006, after which the 
manual was revised in 2008 (DfK 2012). 
Despite the branding of the programme as a ‘brand new’ approach to rehabilitation, 
Smith (2006:117) shows how five of its allegedly new aspects (thought processes, 
free will, categorizations, self-diagnosis and confessions, and the cultivation of self-
control) have many parallels to past rehabilitative logic in the Danish penal field. 
Smith therefore argues that unreason has ‘always’ been treated with reason and 
morality, ‘criminal’ thoughts are replaced with ‘normal’ thoughts and so forth:  
The prisoners have to learn to debate and reason morally. Nowadays it is 
not the chaplain and religion, but instead scientific psychological tools 
that are used in the name of improvement. An additional parallel to the 
past is that the cognitive treatment project almost rests upon a theory of 
‘a criminal man’ who deviates from a not clearly defined normality as 
he or she lacks certain cognitive skills which manifest themselves in 
anti-social and criminal behaviour. The criminal shows in this respect a 
kind of pathological mental activity which allegedly can be cured 
through the right influence (Smith 2003:328, own translation). 
The cognitive behavioural programmes thus seem to have landed in soil that is 
fertile for ideas on rehabilitation, and successfully intertwined themselves with a 
penal-welfarist emphasis on the needs of the offender. We continue to observe the 
importation and implementation of Canadian developments in the penal field, with 
                                                          
23 file://id.aau.dk/Users/laursen/Downloads/59612_nytfra_kriminal_0607_WEB.pdf   
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the latest being the implementation of the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) tool
24
 
(Andrews & Bonta 2003) throughout the Danish Prison and Probation Service.
25,26
 
This tool connects interventions to the ‘risks’ and ‘needs’ of offenders, and thus is 
used to ‘match strategies to the learning styles and motivations of cases’ (Andrews, 
Bonta & Wormith 2006:7). The tool thus promises to assist with the categorization 
of offenders into risk categories, with the purpose of identifying those individuals 
most likely to benefit from rehabilitative interventions (Robinson 2008:434). Here, 
the Danish Prison and Probation Service is perhaps aligning itself with the 
Anglophone trends of distinguishing between ‘criminogenic’ and ‘non-
criminogenic’ needs27 of offenders or ‘cases’ as they are rather mechanistically 
termed.  
After the restructuring of the Danish Prison and Probation Service in 2015, the 
cognitive behavioural programmes are now administered through the Department 
for Resocialisation. Currently, six different programmes are offered across the 
Prison and Probation Service, which are: Cognitive Skills [det Kognitive 
Færdighedsprogram], Booster (a short follow-up programme to Cognitive Skills), 
Anger Management, New Roads [Nye Veje], Violence Prevention 
                                                          
24 The Danish Prison and Probation Service uses the term LS/RNR (Level of Service/Risk-
Need-Responsivity), but I have chosen to refer to RNR (or the RNR model) in this 
dissertation as this seems to be the most widespread name for essentially the same 
phenomenon.   
25 A supplement or addition to the cognitive behavioural programmes and the RNR tool is 
being developed by the Danish Prison Service’s Department for Resocialisation. The new 
programme is called MOVE (My life, my goals) and is a short cognitive behavioural 
programme intended for all newly inducted prisoners (personal communication with the 
Directorate of the Danish Prison Service 2015). This new generic programme mirrors efforts 
in other penal fields, where generic ‘life skills’ programmes (covering topics like parenting 
skills, controlling anger, personal hygiene, attitudes towards domestic violence, labour skills, 
integration into the community, etc.) have been or are intended to be implemented 
(Porporino, Fabiano & Robinson 1991:248, 249).   
26 An evaluation of the RNR tool is currently being carried out in a collaboration between the 
Danish Prison and Probation Service and the Danish Institute for Local and Regional 
Government Research (KORA). This evaluation aims to investigate whether the RNR tool 
leads to lower recidivism, better management of prisoner intake, and better collaboration 
between different parts of the Danish Prison and Probation Service and the municipalities.  
27 This increased classification and categorization might be useful and beneficial for 
prisoners if it does indeed lead to better courses, training or education. However, Michael 
Ignatieff (1984:11) shows the potential risks of ‘knowing’ the needs of strangers: ‘there are 
few presumptions in human relations more dangerous than the idea that one knows what 
another human being needs better than they do themselves’.  
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[Voldsforebyggelse], and, lastly, Strengthen and Win [Styrk og Vind] 
(http://www.kriminalforsorgen.dk/Kognitive-programmer-5148.aspx). In 2013,28 
657 prisoners and probationers participated in the six different cognitive 
behavioural programmes offered by the Danish Prison and Probation Service, and 
514 completed their programmes (DfK 2013:6). The completion rate is thus 78 per 
cent. Participants are said to drop out from the programmes as a result of several 
factors such as being transferred to other prisons, being released during a 
programme, and personal circumstances such as illness or a lack of motivation 
(DfK 2013:7). Since approximately 4,000 people were in prison and 8,000 were on 
probation/under surveillance in 2013, this may not seem to be a high number, but 
most sentences are too short for prisoners to engage in training programmes, so the 
coverage is actually quite high.
29
   
The cognitive behavioural programmes Cognitive Skills and Anger Management 
follow a similar structure (Scheel & Sjöberg 2005; Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008):  
1) Check-in 
2) Summary of the previous lesson 
3) Agenda for the day 
4) Current lesson 
5) Homework 
6) Round-off 
7) Closing 
8) Evaluation 
This structure is meant to create coherence and ensure programme integrity. 
Another similarity between the programmes is the optimal group sizes; there must 
be no fewer than four and no more than eight participants per group. However, 
Anger Management should ideally have between four and six participants rather 
than the eight for Cognitive Skills. These numbers are seen as optimal in relation to 
group dynamics and discussions, even though it is possible to go through an 
individual Anger Management programme if the instructor finds that the participant 
                                                          
28 As a result of the restructuring of the Danish Prison and Probation Service and the 
consequential reallocation of resources, there have been no recent annual statistical reports in 
regards to the cognitive behavioural programmes. However, it seems plausible to assume that 
the number of participants has gone up as a result of the training of new cognitive 
behavioural instructors and thus an intensification of this particular intervention (personal 
communication with programme consultant Ninnett Haubjerg Madsen of the Department for 
Resocialisation March 2016).   
29 By comparison, 1,689 prisoners went through some sort of cognitive behavioural 
programme in Norway in 2007, where there are 12,000 new admissions every year, which is 
a similar proportion to the Danish statistics (Ugelvik 2014).   
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is unable to participate in a group (DfK 2001 & DfK 2012). Both programmes put a 
strong emphasis on role play, thinking exercises, quizzes and displays of video 
sequences as ideal methods for learning social skills. However, there are differences 
between the two programmes in terms of both length and content, which are 
described in the following.   
COGNITIVE SKILLS 
As described above, the Reasoning and Rehabilitation programme was developed in 
Canada by Elizabeth Fabiano and Robert Ross in 1985 and was bought, renamed 
Cognitive Skills and implemented in the Danish Prison Service in 1994 (Scheel & 
Sjöberg 2005). This programme consists of 38 lessons that are taught over a ten 
week period; the participants are taught for approximately two and a half hours per 
day, four days a week. Cognitive Skills is based upon a cognitive model of criminal 
conduct (Porporino, Fabiano & Robinson 1991:239). The general assumption of the 
programme is that offenders have deficits in their way of thinking, that they lack 
social skills and self-control, and that these skills can be taught later in life. The 
programme builds upon so-called problem-solving steps where the participants 
must acknowledge that they do in fact have a problem before they can move from 
one problem-solving step to another. Problem-solving is thus resolved by thinking 
through various ‘steps’ and engaging in a rational decision-making process in 
which repeated practices of self-assessment are thought of as instilling new habits 
of mind (Bottoms 1994; Cox 2011:601). The programme’s core aim is to change a 
participant’s behaviour through an acknowledgement of his/her problems, which 
allows for a cognitive restructuring of his/her thinking processes (Scheel & Sjöberg 
2005).  
Cognitive Skills consists of nine interdependent modules that are based upon a 
cognitive psychology model of criminal conduct and that build on each other in a 
progressive manner corresponding with stages in the ‘change process’ (DfK 
2012:9). Cognitive Skills aims to teach offenders social skills, lateral thinking, 
critical thinking, values, assertiveness, negotiation skills, interpersonal skills and 
social perspectives (Ross, Fabiano & Ewles 1988). The following is my condensed 
translation of the content of the nine modules as they are described in the Cognitive 
Skills Manual (DfK 2012:11, 16). 
1) Problem-solving: This teaches how to define the essence of a problem, 
how to find alternative solutions to problems, and the consequences of the 
alternative solutions. The participants learn how to distinguish between 
facts and opinions, and also how to gather information in order to be able 
to take a stance on a problem that has occurred. Furthermore, the 
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participants30 and instructors discuss verbal and non-verbal 
communication. 
2) Assertive Communications: In this module the participants and 
instructors discuss how to adjust social interactions in accordance with the 
participants’ own and others’ interpersonal and personal rights and norms. 
The aim is to increase social perceptiveness, trust and social interactional 
skills.  
3) Social skills: The participants are trained in becoming more conscious 
about social aspects of life and, through gaining more social skills, to be 
able to navigate in social relations in a manner that leads to fewer 
problems. 
4) Conflict resolution: The participants are taught to become more aware of 
what a problem really is, to be able to investigate alternatives when faced 
with a problem, to assess consequences and to react in a reasonable 
manner if faced with a conflict.  
5) Creative thinking: The task here is to train one’s brain to think creatively 
and to use one’s imagination in order to avoid choosing simple solutions 
on impulse, which often leads to problems. The participants learn how to 
use seven different tools in order to take into consideration as many 
‘factors’ as possible while learning how to be attentive to consequences 
and causes before they make a decision. 
6) Managing emotions: This module concerns how it feels when a human 
begins to face a problem (the inner and outer signs). What makes us upset, 
and how are these feelings experienced? From this perspective, a range of 
different techniques are explored that can make the participants capable of 
handling strong feelings. The participants are given a journal in which they 
can keep track of the situations that lead to agitation. 
7) Values: This module deals with the different ways in which people think, 
and their different values. Furthermore, the participants are trained in the 
acceptance of other people and their points of view through active 
listening, discussions and the cultivation of an open mind. 
8) Critical thinking: The participants are taught how to assess their own 
thoughts and opinions critically, to assess ideas and thoughts objectively 
and to consider all options before they make a decision. 
9) Repetition of all the above skills (DfK 2012:11,16) 
These modules thus represent the core of the lessons, while each module has its 
own sub-goals and elements, which are taught in the course of the 38 lessons. I will 
                                                          
30 The manual for Cognitive Skills terms the participants ‘students’ or ‘pupils’ 
[eleven/elever], whereas I have chosen to use the term ‘participant(s)’ in order to avoid 
connotations with pupils in a school setting. This choice is further legitimized by the fact that 
the instructors also call the prisoners ‘participants’ rather than ‘students’ or ‘pupils’. 
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not go into detail of every specific element of each module or lesson, but the above 
should serve as a foundation for understanding the framework for the content of the 
lessons in Cognitive Skills. As there are obvious differences between Cognitive 
Skills and Anger Management in terms of both length and content, I will describe 
the specificities of Anger Management in the following paragraph.  
ANGER MANAGEMENT 
Anger Management was bought from HM Prison Service in 2000 and implemented 
in all Danish prisons, some detention/remand facilities and some centres of the 
Danish Probation Service. The implementation of Anger Management was part of 
governmental initiatives in regards to juvenile delinquents who had been convicted 
of a violent offence (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:2). Since then, the target group has 
been increased to encompass all offenders who struggle to handle their anger. 
Participation in the programme is, in principle, voluntary, but there are ongoing 
trials in which young offenders (15-20 years) have had the possibility of being 
sentenced to participate in Anger Management instead of or in combination with a 
prison sentence. Anger Management represented 65 per cent of all cognitive 
behavioural programmes in 2013. A reason for this overrepresentation in 
comparison to the other five programmes is that Anger Management is a short 
intervention and is thus appropriate even for short-term prisoners or prisoners on 
remand. 95 per cent of the participants in Anger Management are men (DfK 
2013:5). Anger Management consists of eight lessons lasting two hours; a total of 
16 hours over the course of two weeks (DfK 2013:11). Because of the short length 
of Anger Management, it is defined as a ‘pre-programme’ and should preferably be 
combined with other cognitive behavioural programmes or other treatment (Sjöberg 
& Windfeldt 2008).  
It is difficult to establish the theoretical foundation for Anger Management 
(Polaschek 2006:130). Neither the theoretical nor the methodological foundations 
for Anger Management are described by HM Prison Service by whom the 
programme was developed
31
 (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008). However, Anger 
Management draws heavily on Novaco’s (1977) theory in which anger is 
understood as an affective stress reaction. Anger Management also draws upon 
social learning theory (Bandura 1977) as a framework for promoting assertive, as 
opposed to aggressive, social interactions. The participants are thus taught non-
verbal cues, eye contact, body language, and appropriate tone of voice (Perry 
2013b:398). Furthermore, Anger Management is based upon Socratic dialogue, 
which in this context means that the programme manager is seen as a guide and the 
                                                          
31 Anger Management [Sinnemestring] is in use in Norway, but the Norwegian Prison 
Service could not provide the Danish administrators with any further evaluations or research 
regarding this programme (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:3). 
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participant as a scientist. The two of them are seen as being on a joint venture in 
which they set out to explore the participant’s thoughts and actions. The participant 
is thus expected to set his own standards for appropriate conduct through self-
reflective analysis and assessment of the value of his thoughts and actions, with 
guidance from the programme instructor (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:39). The 
following is a translated and condensed version of the eight modules of Anger 
Management as they are laid out in the manual. The lessons are structured as 
follows (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:53, 54): 
1) Introduction to Anger Management including positive and negative 
aspects of anger. 
2) Techniques for controlling anger (part one) and change of own 
behaviour: The participants are taught the body language and body signals 
that commonly appear when one is angry. The participants often 
experience not being in control of their anger, but increased awareness of 
the bodily signals should increase their ability to control their anger. 
3) Techniques for controlling anger (part two) and change of own 
thoughts: This lesson teaches knowledge of how the participants’ thoughts 
affect their behaviour. The participants are taught self-calming exercises 
that they can use in any stage of a conflict or a tense situation. Thus, they 
will learn how to use self-calming thoughts to control their anger. 
4) Techniques for controlling anger (part three) – learning to control 
bodily arousal: The participants are taught how to analyse their body 
signals when they experience anger. The aim is to make the participants 
aware of and able to handle undesired bodily arousal, and they are 
introduced to different relaxation techniques. 
5) Expressing emotions – assertive communication: The participants are 
taught the differences between passive, aggressive and assertive behaviour 
and communication. They are also introduced to a concrete model 
(BUSS32) that can guide them in expressing anger in an assertive manner. 
6) How to handle criticism and insults: The participants are taught how to 
distinguish between (constructive) criticism and insults, and strategies to 
handle such criticism and insults. Furthermore, the participants are taught 
how peer pressure can be a powerful factor in conflicts or tense situations, 
and methods to handle this peer pressure. 
7) Summary of previous lessons and how to handle future problems. 
8) Evaluation.  
                                                          
32 BUSS is short for Beskriv-Udtryk-Specificer-Slutresultat and is used as a tool for 
practising assertive communication in potential conflict situations. In (my) translation: 
Describe (describe your problem in a non-insulting way) – Express (express your feelings) – 
Specify (specify what you wish the other person to do) – End result (tell the other person, in 
a positive and non-threatening way, what positive effects his/her action would have for you).  
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Each module has its own subthemes, which are not described here. Even though I 
have not participated in a cognitive behavioural programme for female prisoners, I 
will briefly juxtapose the above curriculum and a programme curriculum for female 
prisoners because this highlights the gendered structure and content of the cognitive 
behavioural programmes.  
Cognitive behavioural programmes for female prisoners 
The cognitive behavioural programme Strengthen and Win [Styrk og Vind] was 
developed especially for female offenders, and the programme curriculum is 
markedly different from those of Cognitive Skills and Anger Management. The 
aims in Strengthen and Win are to provide female offenders with enhanced insight, 
new social skills and a strengthened self-esteem, as well as to provide them with the 
ability to choose actions that could provide a better quality of life for them 
(reduction of criminality, drug or alcohol abuse, violence or other unwanted 
behaviour). Furthermore, the programme tries to promote an understanding of the 
interconnections between situations and actions so that female offenders will be 
able to assess the interrelations between different aspects of life – in particular with 
regards to alcohol/drug abuse and violence and crime. The central themes are thus: 
• Identity – who am I? 
• Communication 
• Crime 
• Change and choices  
• Boundaries 
• Financial matters 
• Abuse and addiction  
• Sexuality and love 
• Children 
• Mourning and loss  
• Anger 
• Violence 
• Network and relationship 
• Boundaries [sic] (http://www.kriminalforsorgen.dk/Styrk-og-Vind-5155.aspx)     
The programme developers have tried to change the programmes to make them fit 
better with the needs of female prisoners, but these attempts have often portrayed 
women in fairly essentialized and stereotypical ways (for example, case studies 
were changed so that their examples featured secretaries rather than builders 
(Kendall 2002)). Notice how very private aspects of people’s lives (sexuality, love 
and financial matters) are listed as central themes in Strengthen and Win. 
Furthermore, children are also a central theme. In contrast to this, there are no 
themes reflecting intimate topics such as love, sexuality or financial issues in 
Cognitive Skills or Anger Management. Parenthood seems to be considered not to 
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be as central for men as it is for women, and I often found that the instructor would 
change the subject if the participants talked about their children. The instructor 
naturally has a large say in what are relevant discussion topics in the programmes, 
and I will describe below how they are screened, trained and appointed as 
instructors.          
SELECTION AND SCREENING OF INSTRUCTORS  
The cognitive behavioural instructors are prison officers33 with varying degrees of 
experience in this profession. Cognitive Skills instructors are trained in a two-week 
course whereas Anger Management instructors are trained in a five-day course. 
Often the two groups overlap: Cognitive Skills instructors choose to educate 
themselves further in Anger Management, and vice versa. After the theoretical and 
practical course, the instructors are supervised and evaluated during their first two 
programme deliveries until they are finally certified as programme instructors. The 
teaching and ongoing supervision of the instructors is carried out by the Danish 
Prison Service’s Department for Resocialisation, which also hosts biannual 
meetings for all the instructors (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008). In my research I found 
that the instructors’ dual roles as controllers and helpers sometimes made the 
participants discuss the limits of confession in the lessons, because they were 
worried that the instructors had to report any breaches of prison rules or illegal 
behaviour. The instructors emphasized that they just had to report any future 
criminality and any very severe assaults or violence from the past. The instructors 
(and sometimes also the participants) found that their dual role was often beneficial 
because the instructors often knew the landings and wings in which the participants 
led their everyday life in prison, and the instructors said that they gained a better 
relationship with the participants during the programme. This was seen as beneficial 
to ordinary life on the landings and throughout the prison as well.  
The accreditation reports and the manuals for Cognitive Skills and Anger 
Management highlight how the programme instructors are implicit role models for 
the participants. Thus, they should possess above average social competencies, 
particularly with regard to the specific social and cognitive skills that they aim to 
teach the participants. The reason for this selection of instructors is that ‘social 
psychological research has found that if one, in a discrete and diplomatic manner, 
can make the participants behave in a way that they would not normally, then they 
will ascribe to themselves the same skills that people have who would normally 
                                                          
33 Although most of the cognitive behavioural instructors are prison officers, it is also 
possible for social workers, teachers, etc. employed in the Danish Prison and Probation 
Service to be trained in the programmes. The cognitive behavioural instructors in the 
Probation Service are social workers, whereas in the prisons they are most often prison 
officers (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:78).     
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behave in an appropriate manner’34 (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:29, own 
translation). The instructors are thus chosen on the grounds of their interpersonal 
and social skills, and not according to whether they have previous therapeutic or 
teaching experience. Perry (2013a:531) argues that ‘within the “What Works” 
discourse, the practitioner is viewed as a conduit through which the programme 
material can flow’. She describes how the ‘principles of effective practice’ 
(Andrews et al. 1990) underscore the need for ‘programme integrity’, stating that 
the programmes should always be delivered as specified in the manual; otherwise 
they will not reduce reconviction rates. As described above, the Department for 
Resocialisation monitors and evaluates sessions, and assesses instructors in relation 
to a variety of ‘delivery’ skills, including ‘adherence to the programme manual’. 
However, one of the key interests of this dissertation is the concrete practices of the 
instructors, so that I have not automatically assumed that they ‘do what they are 
told’, but rather that they, as well as the participants, adapt, negotiate and interpret 
the programmes according to their own personal beliefs, values and sentiments. 
As also found by Perry (2013a:530) and Fox (1999a, 1999b), the instructors often 
invoked notions of ‘cognitive deficits’, ‘rigid thinking styles’ and egocentrism in 
order to describe the participants’ problems. Also, the participants’ ‘resistance’ to 
the programme or the instructor was often seen, when we discussed the participants 
in my interviews with the instructors, as the consequence of a ‘cognitive deficit’, 
rather than as a rational protest. This is obviously meaningful and understandable, 
and hardly surprising given that instructors’ training has involved an immersion in 
the ‘What Works’ literature and the appropriation of cognitive deficit theories. 
However, it is interesting to examine how the cognitive behavioural instructors who 
are both prison officers and trained in an egalitarian, welfare-oriented prison system 
such as the Danish one, adopt and implement penal policies from a very different 
penal context such as that of Canada, America or the United Kingdom.  
SELECTION AND SCREENING OF PARTICIPANTS 
Prospective participants can either be referred to the programmes by their social 
workers or they can actively seek to enrol themselves. No matter how the 
prospective participants learn about the programme, they go through a two-hour 
interview, conducted by the programme instructor, in which their motivation to 
                                                          
34 The authors do not refer to the origins of this research, but it seems plausible that it derives 
from the RNR model in which Andrews and Bonta (2003) state that criminal behaviour is 
acquired and maintained through operant and classical conditioning and observational 
learning. In this framework, these mechanisms also work the other way around; offenders 
can learn ‘proper’ behaviour from non-offenders (Ward & Maruna 2007).   
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self-change35 and to participate actively is assessed (Scheel & Sjöberg 2005:26ff). It 
is, in principle, a voluntary choice to participate in a programme, but this could be 
termed a ‘coerced voluntarism’ (Peyrot 1985), since prisoners are rewarded with an 
early release, after serving half their sentence, if they demonstrate that they have 
made a special effort to start afresh without crime (Nielsen 2012:139). Prisoners on 
remand who participate in Anger Management or other programmes could also 
have an instrumental motivation to participate in the programme in the hope of 
influencing their case in a positive manner. Besides the instrumental motivation to 
participate, the participants in my study did talk about a wish for self-change and a 
desire to ‘work with themselves’ in the interviews, but they never talked about a 
need or wish to be ‘rehabilitated’ (as also found in other studies, see Ward & 
Maruna 2007).  
The Canadian developers of the RNR tool (Andrews & Bonta 2003) emphasize that 
neither offenders with a very high risk of recidivism nor offenders with a very low 
risk of recidivism should be accepted onto the programme (Scheel & Sjöberg 
2005:18). However, until the implementation of the RNR tool in the Danish Prison 
and Probation Service, this has not been part of a systematized screening 
mechanism and it is still too early to say whether it will be. Instead of using the 
RNR tool, the instructors do their own screening, using a questionnaire that 
explores a prospective participant’s risk of recidivism. The participants are screened 
according to the logic embedded in the prison system and the logic of the 
programmes, even though these blur and overlap in practice. An example is the 
exclusion of members of organized groups such as outlaw bikers [rockere] or 
gangs. These prisoners are seen as being unable to gain anything from participating 
in programmes, while their supposedly dominating behaviour can be disturbing for 
other participants. However, the instructors I followed had all had (mostly positive) 
experience of including members of these groups and/or running a programme 
consisting only of members of gangs or outlaw biker groups. Another reason for 
exclusion is the ethnicity of the participants. The programme manuals explicitly 
state the aim of not including ‘an over-representation of participants with another 
ethnic background than Danish in any given group especially if said participants are 
                                                          
35 The assessment of motivation takes its departure from the ‘the cycle of change’ 
(Prochaska, Norcross, & DiClementes 1995 in Scheel & Sjöberg 2005:23). The theory 
proposes that change is a dynamic motion between different states. The cycle of change 
depicts readiness to change as something circular, rendering readiness to change – even if not 
manifested in an individual, or expressed only in a subtle manner – an immanent potential 
(Karlsen & Villadsen 2008:349). Karlsen and Villadsen (2008:350) argue that this tool 
displaces the conflict from a social relation to a self-relation, and thus transforms the problem 
of governance to a problem of self-governance. In summary, motivational interviewing is a 
governmental technology, which works by making individuals acknowledge their need, or 
‘will’ to change, by which they concomitantly assume a particular form of self-government. 
CHAPTER 4. COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES 
69 
very young’ (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:30). The manual for the Cognitive Skills 
programme states that the programme ‘lacks efficiency in regards to cultures that 
differ much from the “Danish culture”, especially if said culture is grounded in 
collective, family-oriented values’ (Scheel & Sjöberg 2005:30). This prioritization 
of ethnicity is legitimized with the argument that participants with another ethnic 
background than Danish can ‘take up a lot of space’ in the groups, which can be 
difficult for the programme instructors to manage. I have experienced this 
prioritization of ethnicity in my fieldwork, where a number of instructors stated, 
quite bluntly, that they did not wish to include more than two ‘dark’ people in their 
programmes because of the above-mentioned criteria. Besides this screening in 
regards to ethnicity, there are other exclusion criteria such as mental illness, heavy 
drug or alcohol abuse, intellectual handicaps and ‘psychopathic traits’ (Scheel & 
Sjöberg & 2005:18f).  
The origins of rehabilitation and its present status in the Danish Prison and 
Probation Service, as well as the programme implementation and the screening and 
selection of both participants and instructors, have been described above. While 
there is an extensive amount of quantitative research on cognitive 
behaviouralprogrammes, limited qualitative research has been done, especially in a 
Scandinavian context. The following is a review of previous research in cognitive 
behavioural programmes. 
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CHAPTER 5. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
ON COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL 
PROGRAMMES 
Earlier research into cognitive behavioural programmes can be divided into three 
different groups corresponding to the research interests and research questions. 
There is a large body of scholarship that asks, in an evidence-based manner, 
whether the programmes work. Second, there is a smaller research body that asks 
how the programmes are experienced, especially by the participants. Third, there is 
literature asking how we can or should understand this phenomenon in relation to 
overall societal trends and transformations. These three strands are presented and 
discussed in the following, after which I explain where this dissertation and its 
contribution to the previous research are situated.       
DO COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES WORK? 
The existing effect studies of cognitive behavioural programmes are simply too 
numerous and also too widespread in relation to target group, programme ‘brand’ 
and geographical area to present in any detail, so therefore in the following I will 
present only the most influential international evaluations or meta-reviews and the 
few Nordic evaluations.  
The ‘What Works’ movement argues that meta-reviews are a better method of 
assessing the efficiency of correctional programmes than narrative reviews or 
smaller evaluations (Cullen 2005:18; Lipsey & Wilson 1993, 1998; Wilson & 
Lipsey 2001). After conducting a narrative and quantitative meta-review of twenty 
distinct studies, Wilson, Bouffard and MacKenzie (2005:172) conclude that ‘all 
higher quality studies reported positive effects favoring the cognitive-behavioral 
treatment program’, albeit that this was ‘by no means a large effect’ (2005:199). 
Friendship, Blud, Erikson and Travers (2002) evaluated prison-based cognitive 
behavioural programmes in the United Kingdom using two-year reconviction rates 
as a measure of a programme’s success. They showed a significant positive 
difference for ‘low-medium’ risk offenders (14 per cent reduction) and for 
‘medium-high’ risk offenders (11 per cent reduction). However, one year later, 
researchers from the same group, Falshaw, Friendship, Travers, and Nugent (2003), 
found no difference between the two-year reconviction rates of a sample of 649 
adult male prisoners who had participated in a cognitive behavioural programme 
between 1996 and 1998 and a matched control group of 1,947 adult males (Zara & 
Farrington 2015:25). Falshaw and colleagues suggested that this difference in 
effectiveness could be caused by a lower level of motivation of the instructors and 
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participants in comparison with those involved in the earlier programme (Falshaw 
et al. 2003). However, a later study by some of the same researchers, Cann, 
Falshaw, Nugent and Friendship (2003), also showed no significant differences 
between participants in cognitive behavioural programmes and the controls.    
Some of the evaluations and/or meta-analytical reviews have been conducted by the 
developers of the Risk-Need-Responsivity model (Andrews & Bonta 2003). They 
conclude that programmes that adhere to all three principles can ‘anticipate a 26% 
reduction in the recidivism rate, those following two principles an 18% reduction, 
and those following only one principle a 2% reduction’ (Andrews & Bonta 2003 in 
Zara & Farrington 2015:13). Furthermore, the developers of the Reasoning and 
Rehabilitation programme (which was renamed Cognitive Skills in Denmark) 
conducted two early pilot studies in which they compared 22 and 40 participants 
with 40 and 23 unmatched controls. This study showed lower reconviction rates for 
programme participants over periods of 9 and 20 months (Porporino, Fabiano, & 
Robinson 1991; Ross, Fabiano, & Ewles 1988 in Berman 2005:87). The same 
authors followed up with a large randomized controlled study of 1,444 programme 
participants compared to 379 wait-listed controls, and showed 19.7 per cent official 
reconviction rates for programme participants, compared to 24.8 per cent 
reconvictions among the wait-listed controls. This difference was not statistically 
significant (Robinson 1995; Robinson & Porporino 2001 in Berman 2004:87). 
Tong and Farrington (2006) did the first systematic review, using meta-analytic 
techniques, of the effectiveness of the Reasoning and Rehabilitation programme in 
reducing re-offending. Their meta-analysis of sixteen evaluations (involving 26 
separate comparisons) showed, overall, a significant 14 per cent decrease in 
recidivism for programme participants compared with controls. The cognitive 
behavioural programme was effective in community and institutional settings, and 
for low-risk and high-risk offenders. This is an interesting and potentially 
problematic finding, as the Risk-Need-Responsivity model argues that high- and 
medium-risk offenders benefit more from treatment than low-risk offenders 
(Andrews & Bonta 2003). Thus, Tong and Farrington’s findings seem to contradict 
the RNR model. Tong and Farrington did another meta-analytical study in which 
they found that the Reasoning and Rehabilitation programme was effective in 
Canada and the United Kingdom, but not in the United States (Tong & Farrington 
in Zara & Farrington 2015:28). The importance of ‘programme integrity’ and 
‘effective intervention’ was also found in Landenberger and Lipsey’s (2005) meta-
analytical review of 58 experimental and quasi-experimental studies of the effects 
of cognitive behavioural therapy. They concluded that ‘the odds of not recidivating 
in the 12 months after intervention for individuals in the treatment group were 1.53 
times as great as those for individuals in the control group’, with a decrease of 50 
per cent for the most effective configurations of cognitive behavioural programmes 
to 25 per cent for the least effective (Landenberger & Lipsey 2005:470). They 
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found no difference in effectiveness between different ‘brand names’ of cognitive 
behavioural programmes. 
There have been a number of Danish small-scale evaluations and Master’s theses 
(Berger & Brauner 2009; Kyvsgaard 2014; Minke 2009; Poulsen 2012). Kyvsgaard 
(2014) has evaluated the trial periods mentioned above in which it has been 
possible for young offenders (those aged 15-20 years) to be sentenced to Anger 
Management instead of or in combination with a prison sentence. This evaluation 
showed mixed results. Kyvsgaard concludes that, in general, Anger Management 
seems to have a positive effect on the participants as opposed to the control group, 
but the results are not statistically significant (Kyvsgaard 2014:13). In a Swedish 
context, Berman (2004) evaluated the outcomes of the Reasoning and 
Rehabilitation programme for 372 male Swedish prisoners, and concluded that the 
programme was associated with positive short- and long-term results. More 
specifically, she found that ‘significant differences occurred in overall 36-month 
reconviction rates: 48.1% for programme completers (n = 212), 60.3% for controls 
(n = 451) and 73.4% for dropouts (n = 64)’ (Berman 2004:85, 95), but this effect 
was not maintained after 36 months following prison release. It is interesting that 
participants categorized as ‘dropouts, younger and more criminally active’ (Berman 
2004:98) actually have a higher risk of reoffending than the control group.  
Many of the meta-analytic reviews and evaluations show positive effects of 
cognitive behavioural programmes, but some also show no statistically significant 
or no positive effect (Engbo & Smith 2012:75). There are also effect-studies with 
mixed, contradictory, inconsistent or negative results (for a brief overview see 
Kendall 2011:75). A significant problem with many of the evaluations is that the 
follow-up periods for the studies (from 9 to 36 months) are often very short, which 
makes it difficult to ascertain whether the positive effects of the programmes are 
maintained (Mair 1995, 1997). Another ‘black box’ regarding the efficiency of the 
programmes is the oft-referenced need for ‘programme integrity’ or ‘effective 
intervention’ if the programmes are to be efficient, but it is not always clear how 
this should be interpreted,
36
 and it seems that ‘implementation issues’ are too easily 
used as an explanation for poor outcomes (Ward & Maruna 2007). 
                                                          
36 Zara & Farrington (2015:2) suggest that ‘programme integrity’ includes: a cognitive 
behavioural theoretical perspective; a focus on high-risk offenders; a focus on criminogenic 
needs that can facilitate change in the offenders’ lifestyle, thinking, and behaviour; a 
structured intervention with clear aims and objectives; a team of professionals trained and 
qualified to deliver the treatment; an organization that supports, manages and monitors the 
implementation of the intervention; and an evidence-based approach to evaluate the integrity 
of the programme.    
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In a Danish context, Minke (2009) has conducted a narrative evaluation of 
Cognitive Skills in which she draws on interview data from two Danish Master’s 
theses (Bird 2012; Weismann 2009). Minke summarizes how some participants in 
Cognitive Skills find the programme beneficial and useful, but that this is not the 
case in a prison context where the prisoners find it difficult to communicate 
‘assertively’ and find that they are forced to appear tough. This is also a point in 
Berger and Brauner’s (20009) Master’s thesis in which they conducted an 
evaluation of the effect of Cognitive Skills. They conclude that the programme does 
not seem to have long-term effects on recidivism, and they argue that this lack of 
effect is due to an ‘underlying social mechanism’, namely the prison context and 
the sociality of prisons. However, most of the above evaluations and meta-analyses 
do not aim to say anything about how cognitive behavioural programmes are 
experienced, in contrast to the studies portrayed below.   
HOW ARE COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES 
EXPERIENCED? 
While the quantitative studies outnumber the qualitative, there is nonetheless a 
substantive amount of research examining the concrete workings of cognitive 
behavioural programmes. The following review is divided thematically into studies 
with an emphasis on the participants’ agency, studies with a Foucauldian 
perspective on power, studies with a focus on responsibilization and lastly studies 
with an emphasis on the gendered dimensions of cognitive behavioural 
programmes. This division is somewhat heuristic because many of the studies 
overlap and discuss similar issues, but I hope that it serves as an organizing 
mechanism nonetheless.   
Anthropologist James Waldram (2012) carried out participant observation in 
cognitive behavioural programmes for sexual offenders in a Canadian therapeutic 
prison setting. Waldram is interested in ‘therapeutic pragmatics’, or how the 
prisoners learn, accept, reject, manipulate and engage with the lessons, which is 
similar to my research interests. Waldram argues that the cognitive behavioural 
treatment illustrates a tension between, on the one hand, the prisoners’ subjective 
experiences and agency and, on the other, a positivistic, ‘science-based’ therapeutic 
intervention on behalf of the instructors. This tension means that the participants’ 
own world views were often dismissed as ‘cognitive distortions’. Waldram also 
shows how the model of morality in cognitive behavioural programmes is an ideal, 
un-nuanced and unambiguous one in which pro-social behaviour becomes an 
incontestable and utopian model that it is very difficult for the prisoners to live up 
to. Another examination of the participants’ expression of agency in a cognitive 
behavioural programme is found in Alexandra Cox’s (2011) examination of a 
secure residential facility for young people in the United States. The aim of Cox’s 
study was to ‘grapple with some of the sociological puzzles about agency and 
structure that exist in a context which exerts an ostensibly totalizing influence over 
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young people’s actions, yet which places strong expectations on them to govern 
themselves’. Cox argues that there are various ‘splits’ between official notions of 
programme compliance and the notions embodied and understood by the young 
people. These ‘splits’ are thus gaps between the instructors’ programmatic goals 
and the young people’s internalization of the goals. In opposition to this finding, 
Reich (2010:32) found that young men in juvenile facilities, whom he followed in 
and out of custody, expressed self-control in a manner that adhered to the 
disciplinary regime when they participated in cognitive behavioural programmes. 
Unfortunately, he argues, their submission to official aims results in ‘consent to 
remaining relatively powerless within society as a whole’ due to the conflicting 
demands for ‘proper’ masculinity inside and outside the juvenile facilities. As a 
result, the young men found it hard to navigate between the demands of the 
institution and the demands of the communities from which they were drawn and to 
which they returned.        
Another strand of qualitative research in cognitive behavioural programmes uses 
Foucault’s theories on power and governmentality and the development thereof by 
Rose as a theoretical lens with which to analyse how micro-level therapeutic 
practices craft responsible selves (Brownlie 2004; Fox 1999a, 1999b). One example 
of this is Kathryn Fox’s work (1999a, 1999b), which investigates the ‘production of 
forced selves’ in cognitive behavioural programmes in American prisons. Fox 
examines the programme’s rhetorical construction of prisoners as particular ‘types’ 
of beings with a particular ‘criminal thinking’. This has wide-ranging 
consequences, namely that all personal aspects ‘morals, thoughts and actions – are 
bound together through the rhetoric of cognitive self-change […]. Inmates’ selves – 
their sensibilities, actions, feelings, and values – are targets for evaluation, 
intervention, confession, and reconstruction’ (Fox 1999a:97). Fox argues that the 
participants in the cognitive behavioural programmes she observed held strongly to 
the ideal of ‘not to be a victim’, a notion that was derived from their upbringing and 
socialization as well as the prison context (Fox 1999a:96). Importantly, Fox also 
shows how the prisoners must internalize or at least pay lip service to the 
programmatic goals in a credible way; they must not submit too easily or eagerly, 
but must show an authentic transformation. For example, Fox remarked to a group 
facilitator that some group members seemed very compliant, to which he replied 
‘well, you’ve got some guys in there who aim to please – that’s their thing’ (Fox 
1999a:93,97). Both extreme resistance and too ready capitulation were signs of 
typical criminal thinking in this regard (Fox 1999b:442, 447 see also Lacombe 
2008:66).    
One example of the strand of studies that analyse responsibilization in relation to 
cognitive behavioural programmes is Emma Perry’s (2013a) analysis of cognitive 
behavioural programmes for probationers in the United Kingdom. Perry 
(2013a:532) shows how the programme instructors continually use the phrase 
‘we’re not trying to turn them into middle-class Guardian readers’. She argues that 
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this phrase reflects an aim of changing ‘offending behaviour’ rather than the 
personality, values, politics, class, or reading material of the individual. However, 
‘“offending behaviour” cannot simply be extricated from an individual’s values, 
political beliefs, or newspaper of choice. Nor can it be isolated from issues of class’ 
(Perry 2013a:532). Perry suggests that cognitive behavioural programmes function 
as neoliberal regimes of governance that aim to ‘responsibilize’ offenders. Perry 
shows how ‘othering’ discourses relating to offenders intersect with gendered, 
classed and ‘raced’ social identities. Thus she argues that ‘young white, working-
class masculinities were constructed within this educational environment as 
impulsive, irresponsible and “cognitively deficient”’ (Perry 2013a:525). Cox 
(2015), in a later article than that mentioned above, investigates ‘governmentality’ 
in an American juvenile facility, and how the young people who are governed to 
responsibility experience this type of governmental intervention. She shows how 
the young people’s narratives of complex causes of crime that go beyond a rational 
choice framework are deemed unacceptable. Thus, she argues, neoliberalism 
promotes a language of rationality, choice and individuality which pre-empts 
structural explanations for individual and social behaviour (Cox 2015:26,36). Laura 
Abrams and Charles Lea (forthcoming) use ethnographic methods in a critical 
examination of the underlying discourses in life skills courses for prisoners. These 
courses aim to assist prisoners to become ‘employable’. The authors (forthcoming: 
13) identify four major themes in their data material, ‘which were all united by 
discourses of individual responsibility and personal change’. These themes included 
‘re-examine truths and beliefs’, ‘reprogram the mind’, ‘choice is free will’, and 
‘connect with a higher power’. The last discourse discusses a spiritual or religious 
understanding of change that is not otherwise tackled in cognitive behavioural 
programmes. Nonetheless these themes were focused on individual responsibility, 
and structural barriers to employment were thus not addressed.         
A different strand of research has an emphasis on the gendered production of selves 
in correctional treatment. One example here is the work of Allison McKim (2008). 
She draws attention to the notion of the self in play by analysing how 
‘psychological models of women’s deviance, racialized visions of motherhood, and 
therapeutic techniques come into tension with expectations of responsible, 
autonomous citizenship’(McKim 2008:304). Interestingly, McKim reports that one 
key aspect of treatment was ‘getting at gut-level’, which meant an emotional 
confession by the women. Kelly Hannah-Moffat (1999, 2000) argues that a 
psychologizing logic in prison-based treatment programmes obscures the role of 
class, race, and gender inequality. This strategy redefines needs that stem from 
gendered inequalities, such as domestic violence, as personal risks that the prisoners 
become responsible for managing. The RNR model and the consequent cognitive 
behavioural programmes thus subsume social conditions to ‘criminogenic needs’ 
that can be remedied by a change of thought and behaviour. This is an 
individualization of the social that has served to restrict interventions to the 
personal domain of individual change and thus away from social issues (Hannah-
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Moffat & Shaw 1999 in Kemshall 2002:49). In the work mentioned above, Cox 
(2011:600, 601) describes how (young) American female offenders enter 
confinement through contexts that focus on notions of their pathology and 
dependency. Cox shows how the young women feel disconnected from the abstract 
programme goals designed to facilitate their autonomy. Perry (2013b), mentioned 
above, analyses transgressive gender performances in the cognitive behavioural 
programme Aggression Replacement Training (ART) for probationers in the United 
Kingdom. She shows how one female probationer, Michelle, is discursively 
constructed by the instructors as ‘alpha-male’ because she fails to live up to 
gendered stereotypes that see female offenders as fragile, caring and more 
emotional than male offenders. Perry (2013b:396) concludes that ‘the rehabilitation 
of female “offenders” continues to be one of conformity to traditional “feminine” 
gender norms as well as a desistance from crime’.  
I will draw on the above perspectives in the second, third and fourth articles, which 
deal with the prisoners’ experiences and receptions of cognitive behavioural 
programmes. In the following section I examine studies of the larger implications of 
cognitive behavioural programmes.  
HOW CAN WE UNDERSTAND COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL 
PROGRAMMES IN RELATION TO OVERALL SOCIETAL TRENDS 
AND TRANSFORMATIONS? 
A body of scholarship analyses cognitive behavioural programmes from a 
perspective that emphasizes personal responsibility for wrongdoing. Here strategies 
of responsibilization are seen as one of the dominant responses to anti-social 
behaviour (Kemshall 2002; Kendall 2004; Robinson 2008:438; Rose 2000). 
Underpinning this form of rehabilitation is ‘an assumption that individuals within 
“free” societies are all equally socially positioned and are furthermore rational, 
responsible, prudent, moral and self-disciplined’ (Kendall 2011:55). In this line of 
reasoning, cognitive behavioural programmes are thus essentially designed to 
reconstruct the morality of those who do not meet the expectations of these 
demands. Drawing on Rose (1988), Kendall argues that ‘cognitive behavioural 
programmes lack an adequate evidence-base, but none the less have been quickly 
adopted as a cure-all for the problem of offending’; one reason for this is their 
compatibility with neoliberal rationalities (Kendall 2011:61). Offenders are dealt 
with by attempts either to reintegrate them through moral reconstruction or to 
exclude them through further punitive measures (Kendall 2011:67). Thus, the 
cognitive behavioural programmes fit perfectly with neoliberal governance 
strategies of moral reconstruction, namely the instilling of self-blame, self-control 
and self-surveillance, even though the programmes have been criticized for being 
intrusive, dehumanizing and not able to take human subjectivity into account 
(Kendall 2011:70). 
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There is also a fairly large body of scholarship using the widely influential ‘new 
penology’ thesis (Feeley & Simon 1992) as a backdrop for its analysis (e.g. 
Kemshall & Maguire 2001; O’Malley 2001, 2004). Feeley and Simon (1992:452) 
argue that the ‘new penology’ is ‘less concerned with responsibility, fault, moral 
sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention and treatment of the individual offender. 
Rather, it is concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage groupings 
sorted by dangerousness. The task is managerial, not transformative’. Feeley and 
Simon (1992:455) thus argue that the ‘new penology is neither about punishing nor 
about rehabilitating individuals. It is about identifying and managing unruly 
groups’. O’Malley argues that one key example of the ‘new penology’ is the 
replacement of a ‘socially oriented and explanatory criminology’ by a ‘risk oriented 
rational choice model’ in which social justice is replaced with an emphasis on the 
‘individual responsibility of offenders’ (O’Malley 2001:89). Lacombe (2008) 
departs from the ‘new penology’ thesis and argues that rehabilitation of sex 
offenders has effectively become risk management. She draws on an ethnographic 
study of a cognitive behavioural programme for sex offenders and show how 
management of risk relies on techniques of introspection, self-discipline and 
reflection. The goal is thus to instil a sense of responsibility in the sex offenders and 
a belief that they can manage their risk of reoffending (Lacombe 2008:60). Hence, 
the choice to become ‘manageable’ is essentially the individuals’ own if only he 
learns the connection between his thoughts, behaviour, and feelings (Lacombe 
2008:60). Kemshall (2002:41) argues that the dominant emphasis upon effective 
programmes in the probation service in the United Kingdom can be understood as 
‘an example of a key mechanism of social control in advanced liberal societies’. 
Kemshall uses Rose’s concept of ‘responsibilization’ to examine the role of 
effective programmes in the re-moralization, responsibilization and inclusion of 
citizens. She argues that self-surveillance is achieved through the discourse of 
expertise (such as cognitive behavioural programmes) and ‘through the discourse of 
moral virtue and rational choice which the individual is encouraged to experience 
and operate as an autonomous form of control’ (Kemshall 2002:49). Kemshall 
(2002:52) concludes by arguing that these new interventions have led to ‘a 
subjugation of the rehabilitative and welfare ideal to an economic discourse’ of 
rationalization and accountability.       
Following Garland (1997, 2001), Robinson (1999:427, 2008) does not see the 
above trends as conflicting with new rehabilitative interventions such as cognitive 
behavioural programmes. Actually, she views the ‘old’ (clinical, individualized, 
treatment-oriented) and ‘new’ (actuarial, managerial, risk-oriented) penologies as 
mutually supportive. In fact, Robinson (1999:427,428) describes a ‘new 
rehabilitationism’ (Hudson 1987) in which risk management and rehabilitation 
thrive; a primary principle of what works is risk classification, in the sense that 
interventions should be directed at those who pose a higher risk (see also Hannah-
Moffat 1999; Hannah-Moffat & Shaw 1999, 2000). Thus, the new rehabilitative 
‘WE DON’T WANT YOU TO THINK CRIMINAL THOUGHTS’ 
78
 
interventions have earned their legitimacy precisely because of their contribution to 
the broader project of risk management: 
The practice of rehabilitation is increasingly inscribed in a framework of 
risk rather than a framework of welfare. Offenders can only be ‘treated’ 
(in drug-abuse programmes, anger-management groups, offence-
reduction programmes, etc.) to the extent that such treatment is deemed 
to be capable of protecting the public, reducing risk, and being more 
cost-effective than simple, unadorned punishment (Garland 2001:176).   
Nordic researchers have also examined the cognitive behavioural programmes in 
relation to overall societal trends and formations. The Swedish criminologist Robert 
Andersson (2004) has investigated the re-emergence of the treatment idea, and 
argues that present-day treatment ideology has the goal of creating moralistic, 
responsible and reasonable citizens. Cognitive behavioural programmes stand in the 
forefront of this endeavour and are built upon methodological models and scientific 
optimism, but in a modest, specific manner; the goal is not to cure all, but to target 
those who are the most fit for treatment. Andersson argues that nowadays 
assessment of risk is fundamental to the construction of subjectivities in prison. 
Hence, the obvious question becomes how to reduce risk or avoid risky behaviour 
altogether. Furthermore, the hierarchical surveillance techniques of the old 
rehabilitation regime are replaced with a horizontal type of surveillance in which 
the participants are seen as the drivers of their own rehabilitation. Thus the aim is to 
make the participants see the ‘obvious and crystal-clear fact that a normal person is 
responsible for his/her own actions’ (Andersson 2004:384). Hence, the programmes 
seek to develop a form of self-knowledge in the participants through the confession 
of their faults and errors and through careful self-management. A similar line of 
reasoning is found in Roddy Nilsson’s work (2013) in which he analyses historical 
developments in Swedish prison policies from the 1930s till the present day. 
Nilsson argues that Swedish prison policies have undergone a paradigmatic shift in 
which different understandings of the criminal subject push forward beliefs about 
individual responsibility and risk assessment. A central characteristic of the ‘What 
Works’ movement is how the ‘[…] discourse is overloaded by talk about 
scientifically evaluated and proven methods, program accreditation and evidence-
based work, knowledge and practices’ (Nilsson 2013:25). Furthermore, Nilsson 
shows how the quest for ‘evidence-based’ knowledge in the rehabilitative field is 
characterized by a strong proclivity for relying on large-scale meta-analyses. This 
development is closely related to an intertwining of neoliberal ideas and practices 
and transformations in prison policies (Nilsson 2013:32). Nilsson points to an 
anthropology that sees man as a rational and self-interested creature judged 
according to his capacity for controlling himself and for taking responsibility for his 
own actions.  
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This dissertation contributes to the above research, especially in relation to the 
second and third perspectives. I cannot contribute much to the question of whether 
the programmes work or not in an evidence-based manner, but I can possibly shed 
some light on some of the reasons why evaluations yield mixed results. This 
dissertation is thus a contribution to the many studies asking how the programmes 
are experienced. Here, my main contribution is to uncover frictions that arise 
between participants and instructors. Also, this dissertation contributes to and also 
expands on previous research by examining and considering the instructors’, as well 
as the participants’, perspectives and experiences. In relation to the third research 
area, dealing with larger societal trends and formations, my contribution is to take 
the participants’ agency into consideration. The Foucauldian and Rose-inspired 
scholarship seems to lack an agentic perspective that would make it possible to 
analyse how the participants may or may not align themselves to the programmatic 
goals. The participants do not readily self-manage in an efficient manner, but on the 
contrary it seems that they often pay lip service in order to pass through the 
programmes, and then continue to live as they see fit.  
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CHAPTER 6. METHODS 
The soundscape of the prison is overwhelming; in fact all of my senses 
are bombarded. There is a sound of clinging and clanging from every 
corner of every locked door. I am in the official reception area of the 
prison where a security camera watches my every clumsy move. The 
prison officer in the reception area gives me shady looks – she must be 
able to tell what an imposter I am. Finally, the instructor, Mohammad, 
comes and saves me from my misery by greeting me warmly. We walk 
around the prison where I am introduced to many prison officers. One of 
them says ‘so you’re going to interview participants in Anger 
Management? Just be aware that many of them have deficits in their 
thinking styles’. With that characteristic in mind, I am introduced to the 
four participants and we walk towards the classroom (Field note, March 
2014, closed prison).         
The overall purpose of this chapter is to convey transparency in the research 
process, and what better way to do this than by starting with a mental picture of a 
novice in prison. The passage above serves as a departure point for the following 
descriptions of my methodology, methods, ethical considerations, description of the 
data analysis, and finally, a presentation of the research participants. The empirical 
material described below consists of:  
- Ethnographic fieldwork and participant observation in one Cognitive Skills 
programme and three Anger Management programmes in three different 
prisons. 
- Participant observation in a three-day educational course for cognitive 
behavioural programme instructors and four biannual meetings for 
instructors.  
- Twelve semi-structured focus group and individual interviews with 
participants, instructors, and one programme consultant. 
METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation draws upon a social constructionist framework. Following 
Bourdieu, the social world is socially and historically constructed; not intentionally 
by someone, but as a result of historical and social battles between humans. Social 
phenomena are thus not given, natural or inevitable, but they present themselves 
like they were (Prieur & Sestoft 2006:216). Ian Hacking (1999) argues that, instead 
of asking what social constructionism means, we should ask what the point of a 
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social constructionist analysis is. One main point is to raise scepticism towards the 
status quo. Thus, social constructions tend to argue that X need not have existed, or 
need not be at all; X is not determined by the nature of things, it is not inevitable 
(Hacking 1999:6). In this dissertation, ‘X’ is cognitive behavioural programmes. By 
asking, as I did in the introduction, what the underlying problem definitions of 
criminality and offenders are in these programmes and what solutions they propose, 
I implied that they are not determined by the nature of things. Cognitive 
behavioural programmes are thus not inevitable, but brought into existence or 
shaped by social events, forces, and history, all of which could have been different 
(see Hacking 1999:7). Hacking argues that any idea that is debated, assessed, 
applied and developed is situated in a social setting (see also Berger 1963:149). 
Hacking’s purpose is to ‘consider a kind of human behaviour that has undergone 
radical changes, so that we can see how human kinds are formed and molded’ 
(1991:258). He examines the ‘making and molding’ of child abuse as an idea that 
emerged at a specific time and place and since emerging in new legislation and 
practices, changed many professional activities. To call child abuse an ‘idea’ is not 
to say that it is not real, but rather, to show how a ‘kind’ can be made and molded, 
how ‘child abuse’ and ‘child abuser’ denote kinds and what those kinds do to us 
(Hacking 1999:130). In order to relate these insights to the current analysis, I refer 
to the second article of this dissertation (see Appendix 2). Here, I argue that from an 
anthropological, constructivist stance, violence is fluid and hard to pin down. In this 
context, an analytical focus on how violence is attributed meaning, how it is 
legitimized or how attempts are made to avoid it must not be understood as a 
relativistic argument for the positive significance of violence. In this regard, what is 
‘violence’ in one context does not necessarily have to be in another, and that which 
one person views as violence can be understood entirely differently by someone 
else (Laursen 2015). However, it matters how we talk about and understand 
violence (or criminality in general) as people are affected by the available 
classifications within which they can describe their own actions and make their own 
constrained choices (Hacking 1991:254): 
Classification can change our evaluations of our personal worth, of the 
moral kind of person that we are. Sometimes this means that people 
passively accept what experts say about them, and see themselves in that 
light. But feedback can direct itself in many ways. We well know the 
rebellion of the sorted. A classification imposed from above is 
rearranged by the people to whom it was supposed to apply (Hacking 
1999:131).            
This dissertation’s aim is to examine how certain problem definitions and solutions 
came to be; I also add to this by empirically examining how these solutions unfold 
in practice. I especially focus on the reception of the cognitive behavioural 
programmes, thus examining the ‘feedback’ that Hacking mentions above or the 
rearrangement of classifications.  
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One of the purposes of ethnography is to study ‘[…] the cultural contexts in which 
behaviors of interest occur […]’ (Page & Singer 2010:4). This definition is 
beneficial because it underscores the importance of the context for behaviour. Here, 
the context is the prison and all the implications for the practice of rehabilitation it 
carries (Mjåland 2015:84). Similar to the fact that behaviour occurs in a specific 
context, the ethnographer does not approach the field as a ‘tabula rasa’, but carries 
the heavy luggage of culture and preconceptions. Thus an ‘ethnography of 
ethnography’ is needed – a double awareness of the process of research (Bourdieu 
2004; Geertz in Young 2011: 109). Ethnographic fieldwork directs the attention of 
the researcher as ‘method, ideology and focus are intrinsically meshed’ (Liebling 
1999:149). My attention is directed towards the experiences of being a participant 
in or teaching in cognitive behavioural programmes. As argued by Scheper-Hughes 
(1984:91), ethnographers approach ‘a reality that cannot be fully separated from our 
perceptions of it. It shifts over time and in response to our gaze. It interacts with 
us’. This inability to separate the researcher from the researched is somehow 
embedded in the oxymoron of participant observation – participating and observing 
–thus, being both inside and outside of the sociality (Davies & Spencer 2010). 
Knowledge in anthropology is reductive as it renders empirical complexity clear, 
but also has limited ideas about the world and is selective – knowledge has to 
disregard some information (Fangen 2010:251f; Hastrup 2004). However, one way 
of enabling the reader to judge the ‘rightness’ of the analyses of this dissertation is 
to convey the details of my fieldwork and interviews which are presented below.     
ACCESS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELDWORK 
I sought permission to conduct fieldwork and interviews in Danish prisons from the 
Directorate of the Danish Prison Service in June 2013, two months after this PhD 
project commenced. They invited me to a formal meeting, wherein the initial ideas 
and methods for this study were elaborated. A short while after, I was granted full 
permission to conduct the research as proposed. This quick approval might sound 
strange to some fellow prison researchers, as prison ethnography particularly in 
Anglo-Phone countries has been under dire conditions, and access to prisons seems 
almost impossible (Wacquant 2002a). However, officials’ resistance towards 
research does not seem to be the case in the Nordic countries, where prison scholars 
are generally granted access surprisingly easily (see e.g. Minke 2012a:62; Ugelvik 
2014). My permission was formally granted through the Directorate of the Prison 
and Probation Service who forwarded my request to the Governors and Security 
Coordinators of the relevant prisons. I was granted permission to conduct fieldwork 
in both open and closed prisons. I found it potentially important to include both 
types of penal institutions because there are obvious differences between low 
security and high security prisons in Denmark in terms of restrictions of the regime, 
allowance to take leave, movement and free-flow, and the amount of association 
between prisoners. While the experience of imprisonment is contingent with the 
penal context (Ricciardelli et. al. 2015:509), I argue that my findings are not shaped 
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so much by the security regime of the prisons as by the logics embedded in the 
cognitive behavioural programmes across different prisons. The main differences 
between the different prison settings were practical; the instructors in closed prisons 
had to make more practical arrangements in order to make the programmes flow. 
This meant that they needed to carefully assess which prisoners were allowed to 
interact with each other and make sure that the prisoners did not move in areas of 
the prison that they were not allowed to be in. Another important distinction was 
the level of surveillance in the closed prison as opposed to the open. In one of the 
closed prisons, the security department had installed CCTVs in the classroom, 
which made the prisoners very uncomfortable in the beginning. They were 
confident that the prison officers were laughing while looking at the video-footages 
from, for example, the role-plays, while the instructor emphasized that the tapes 
were only watched in detail if some kind of ‘trouble’ were to occur. 
Despite the relative ease of gaining access to the prisons, I was refused access to a 
particular group of participants in cognitive behavioural programmes, namely 
female prisoners. This confirms that even if formal access is granted, informal 
access from the participants in the field of study can be harder to obtain (Fangen 
2010:58). My interest in the gendered experiences of participating in cognitive 
behavioural programmes was further sparked by an instructor saying that ‘women 
naturally think that their problems involves and hurts other people whereas men do 
not’ (Birthe, Cognitive Skills instructor). However, after some initial negotiation 
with the instructors in the open prison and in one of the maximum-security prisons 
that held women, I was repeatedly told that it would be too difficult for me 
participate. One explanation was primarily practical and due to the sheer difference 
in the number of female prisoners (179 female prisoners out of 4120 in total), since 
only 33 female prisoners participated in cognitive behavioural programmes in 2013 
(DfK 2013:9). Another reason for my failure in obtaining access to conduct 
participant observation in programmes with female prisoners could be the fact the 
female prisoners tended to be protected more than males. The instructors thus 
talked about the women’s frailty and vulnerable position which could be enforced 
by having an outsider participate, while they did not seem to worry about the men’s 
psychological health in the same manner. I can obviously not tell whether this was 
the case in practice, as I never participated in a programme for female prisoners, but 
the gender specific logics and perceptions are interesting in themselves. 
Stevens (2012:542) argues that it is ‘impossible for any ‘free world’ researcher to 
become completely immersed in, or truly experience the realities of the prison’ and 
suggest that prison researchers use the term ‘semi-ethnographic’ fieldwork as an 
indicator of this failure or obstacle. While I agree with Stevens that it might be 
impossible to truly understand the prison without actually being imprisoned, I coin 
my fieldwork as semi-ethnographic in the sense that I did not ‘hang out’ on the 
landings, sit in cells, or work out in the gym with the prisoners (see e.g. Crewe 
2009; Ugelvik 2011). The term ‘reserved participation’ (Bottoms in Liebling 
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1999:160) or moderate participation as suggested by Spradley (1980) might be 
more fitting to describe my experiences in the cognitive behavioural programmes. 
Spradley argues that any fieldwork ‘requires the ethnographer to increase his or her 
awareness, to raise the level of attention, to tune in to things usually tuned out’ 
(Spradley 1980:56, 60), but suggests that moderate participation is a type of 
ethnographic fieldwork. Here, the ethnographer (tries to) strike a ‘balance between 
being an insider and an outsider, between participation and observation’. I 
navigated between participating and observing, with an overweight of observing as 
described in the following.       
The prison-based fieldwork consisted of ‘moderate participation’ (Spradley 1980 
see also Fangen 2010:74-80) in one Cognitive Skills programme and three different 
Anger Management programmes in one open prison and two closed prisons. In 
total, I conducted around 400 hours of observation in prisons and in the training, 
supervision and meetings of the instructors. I followed 24 participants and four 
instructors in total. During the participant observation, I mostly sat quiet and 
observed the lessons. This is similar to other researchers’ experiences of conducting 
participant observation in cognitive behavioural programmes (see Fox 1999a, 
1999b; Waldram 2012:40). While this reserved-participation was challenging at 
times because I would have liked to participate more actively, Perry’s (2013b:403) 
experience of being placed outside of the classroom, observing lessons on a monitor 
seems much more challenging than mine. Depending on the instructors’ 
preferences, I sat either on the margins of the group, or by myself on a chair away 
from the participants. This placement in the room was not negotiated as I wished to 
respect whichever decision the instructor had made. The instructors did not wish to 
let me participate in the role-plays as it would ‘not have the same pedagogical 
effect’ (Mohammad, Anger Management instructor) if I participated. However, they 
invited me to participate in relaxation exercises and other types of exercises such as 
writing short-stories or filling out quizzes, which I happily did.     
My reserved participation and the passive role that followed provided rich 
opportunities to write lengthy and detailed field-notes (Sanjek 1990), including 
many citations from the participants and the instructors’ conversations. This is 
otherwise quite rare in ethnographic fieldwork where researchers often have to go 
to the bathroom in order to write field notes (see e.g. Jensen 2007, Mjåland 2015). 
While my reserved participation fostered rigorous note-taking, I also paid close 
attention to body language throughout the lessons, especially during role-plays and 
other interactive exercises. Oftentimes, the flow of the lessons was disrupted by 
discussions between the instructors and the participants. Identifying talk which is 
disruptive ‘is not a straightforward task and can involve interpreting tone and visual 
information about interaction, as well as what is actually said’ (Brownlie 
2004:524). My field notes represent these interruptions and seem quite fragmented 
in some places where I wrote down the discussion going from A to Z without a 
clear pattern. After each lesson, I would debrief with the instructors and ask them to 
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share their thoughts and opinions on the lesson. After leaving the prison each day, a 
more coherent narrative of the day was written down, followed by an analytical 
note on questions, peculiar observations and initial findings. These preliminary 
concepts, explanations, and questions served to guide the next observation. I used 
my field notes in systematic ways when I manually coded my observations and 
findings, but the field notes were also put to use in a more sensual way: as a time 
machine to take me back to certain interactions, feelings, smells or sounds. The 
field notes thus served several functions, but most importantly, they helped build an 
evolving analytical framework. 
In some ways, my fieldwork could be coined as ‘multi-sited’ (Marcus 1995), at 
least in the literal sense of the term. Besides doing fieldwork in three different 
prisons, and as a supplement to the main fieldwork, I did (participant) observation 
in four national meetings for cognitive behavioural programme instructors from 
2013-2015. Here I took part in supervision, lectures, and informal conversations 
about the aims and content of the programmes. Furthermore, I conducted 
participant observation in the education of new cognitive behavioural instructors 
during a three-day training course. The education of new instructors involved 
lectures delivered by programme consultants from the Danish Prison Service and 
practical exercises in which the instructors discussed their experiences with 
programme delivery in different prisons. The empirical material is also 
supplemented with notes from informal conversations with a number of other 
cognitive behavioural programme instructors during these meetings and training 
sessions. This multi-sited fieldwork and my aim to study both the participants and 
the instructors raised several dilemmas common in ethnographic fieldwork: the 
ethnographer cannot just freely choose any role or position in the field. Roles, 
positions and alliances are negotiated, contested, context-dependent and 
continuously in flux, which requires the researcher to continuously reflect on 
his/her role in the fieldwork (Hastrup 2004; Sandberg 2010). Perhaps this dilemma 
is exaggerated in prison research where two distinct positions are so juxtaposed - 
the position of the prison staff and the position of the prisoners. Obviously, there 
are different nuances within these two groups and subgroups among them, but 
deciding and negotiating about ‘whose side to be on’ (Becker 1967) are often 
discussed in prison research (e.g. Liebling 1999; Nilsen 2010; Ugelvik 2014). This 
dilemma might be more pressing in prison, but it is an often discussed theme in 
ethnography more broadly as a standard methodological condition: 
Embedded as we are, in the field situation, and removed, as we are, from 
it, we find any perspective unstable. Throughout our fieldwork, we are 
constantly negotiating our respective identities and our understanding of 
the situation in which we find ourselves (Crapanzano in Davies & 
Spencer 2010:72).   
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Anthropologist Malene Molding Nielsen conducted fieldwork in Danish prisons 
and argues that fieldwork in a prison setting is filled with shifting engagements 
between the prisoners, guards, and the researcher, and that these shifting 
engagements can shed light on important notions of everyday life (Nielsen 2010). 
Nielsen describes how ‘the involvement of the researcher is characterized by partial 
impartiality and shifting engagements and positioning as an informed outsider who 
is constantly challenged by being discredited as an informer and potentially losing 
rapport and access to the people who populate the field’ (Nielsen 2010:319). I tried 
to navigate this terrain by expressing my loyalty towards both the participants and 
the instructors, which, in practice, meant that I talked to both instructors and 
participants, sought to understand how both groups experienced the cognitive 
behavioural programmes, and interviewed both groups.    
INTERVIEWS 
Data from interviews are in many ways different than observational data. Fangen 
(2010) suggests that observational data are ‘action’ data, whereas interview data 
mostly reflects the interviewees’ self-representations. However, when the two 
different approaches are combined, interview data becomes more than self-
representations (Fangen 2010:172). Interviews are valuable in their capacity to 
excavate and interpret emotions, but they are perhaps best guided by previous 
observations and interactions with the interviewees (Agar 1996:157). In my 
experience, the observations were essential for developing meaningful interview 
questions and thus shaped the conversation in interviews, while the interviews shed 
light on aspects which the observational data could not. Hence, I waited until after 
the programmes had ended with interviewing participants and instructors in order to 
let the observations guide the interview framework. Interviews in prison can be 
beneficial because they (may) enable the interviewer and interviewee to create a 
room wherein it is possible to talk in a different way and about other subjects than 
they would normally in the everyday life of the landings (Crewe & Maruna 
2006:117). In my understanding, that goes for both prisoners and instructors, 
although the former might feel more restricted in their ability to talk about whatever 
they want in prison than the latter. 
I aimed to interview all participants and instructors in the three different Anger 
Management programmes and the Cognitive Skills programme which I participated 
in. I succeeded in interviewing all of the instructors, but did not manage to 
interview all of the participants in each group due to several reasons. The first 
group I participated in was Cognitive Skills. While I was present and able to give 
further information, the instructor told the prisoners about my request to conduct a 
focus group interview with them. Four participants chose to stay after the lesson to 
participate in the interview while the other half of the group had appointments/work 
to attend to – or perhaps they just did not want to be interviewed. The second Anger 
Management group was almost dissolved at the point of the prospective interview 
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which I had planned to conduct after the eighth lesson where the programme was 
evaluated. Unfortunately for me, but fortunately for them, two of the participants 
had already been released and one was on leave from the prison. I chose not to 
request an interview with the remaining three participants as they (and the 
instructor) were busy leaving the classroom when the lesson ended. I managed to 
interview participants from both the third and fourth Anger Management groups. 
Besides the interviews with all four instructors, I chose to interview a programme 
consultant employed in the Department for Resocialisation in order to increase my 
understanding of the demands and expectations put on the instructors. Furthermore, 
I conducted a ‘research workshop’ in a meeting for instructors wherein I presented 
my initial findings on humour. The research workshop turned into a focus-group 
interview when I asked the 12 participating instructors to discuss the meanings of 
humour in small groups, after which we discussed their findings in plenum.  
I have conducted twelve semi-structured interviews in total: 
- One focus-group interview with four prisoners from Cognitive Skills in an 
open prison.  
- One focus-group interview with three prisoners in the second Anger 
Management group in a closed prison.  
- Four individual interviews with prisoners in the third Anger Management 
group in a closed prison.  
- Individual interviews with four instructors. 
- One focus-group interview with 12 instructors.  
- One individual interview with a programme consultant employed in the 
Danish Prison Service’s Department for Resocialisation.  
All interviews lasted between 1-3 hours and were recorded digitally, which I later 
transcribed verbatim. I transcribed the interviews myself so as to enhance continual 
reflection and increase a developing analytical ‘feel’ of the material. The 
transcription includes non-verbalized activities such as pauses, sighs, and laughter, 
but I have not included these in the final versions of the articles in order to ensure 
readability and to avoid to make the interviewees’ speech seem fragmented (Fangen 
2010: 271). I have translated all field notes and interview quotes from Danish to 
English in the three English articles. The semi-structured interviews covered 
various themes including: the participants’ own perception of violence, their 
understanding of the aims of the programme, their own perceptions of their 
criminality, and their perceptions of values such as respect, honour and dignity. The 
themes in the interviews with the professionals consisted of: the participant 
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selection process, teaching style, the content of the programme and their 
understanding of programme goals, the demands placed on instructors, the 
theoretical and practical foundation of the programmes, and the training and 
supervision of instructors. I aimed for the interviews to feel like a ‘conversation 
with a purpose’ (Burgess 1984 in Mason 2002:62). Hence, the interviews were 
relatively unstructured and consisted of many open-ended questions, which allowed 
space for the interviewees to talk in length about their experiences. However, I did 
follow an interview guide (see Appendices 6, 7 and 8) which was more or less 
memorized in order not to consult my paper all the time. As also found by other 
prison researchers (Crewe 2011:481), prisoners (or people in general) do not always 
have neat, linear stories to tell which can be easily guided by a fixed set of 
questions. Interviewees were prompted to tell me about their interpretation or 
experiences in the programmes (i.e., how did you experience the role-plays?), 
which often led to interconnected stories from prison life in general or life on the 
outside. One episode re-told from the programme would lead to an episode in the 
prison yard which would again lead to a childhood story. I did not see these side-
stories as malign interruptions, but as meaningful narration of a life lived (see 
Chase 1995; Ricoeur 1984:402).      
In the first focus group interview with the participants in Cognitive Skills, the 
instructor left the classroom, but did not leave the building. In the second focus 
group interview, the instructor did not leave the classroom due to ‘security reasons’. 
I accepted this, but worried that the instructor’s presence might be a disturbance and 
distracting for both the participants and I. As it turned out, the participants seemed 
relatively unconstrained by the instructor’s presence and spoke freely of their 
experiences of participating in Anger Management. At certain points, the instructor 
was drawn into the discussion and it began to feel like the instructor was a 
legitimate member of the group rather than an intruder (sounds familiar, said the 
ethnographer). One reason for the relative success of the interview despite the less 
than perfect circumstances could be the relatively innocent nature of the discussion; 
after all, we were not discussing illicit practices or rule-breaking behaviour, but the 
participants’ subjective experiences of engaging in role-plays, etc. However, it was 
a relief when I was given permission to conduct the four single-interviews with 
participants in Anger Management without the presence of the instructor. We sat in 
the Chaplains office in the maximum-security prison which was described by the 
prisoners and the instructor as the ‘nicest and most quiet place in the prison’. I 
agreed. Hardly any noise came through the walls and it quickly became possible to 
imagine that the interviews were conducted in a place completely different than a 
prison.  
A few lines on the importance of my gender, age and ethnicity is needed. Young 
(2011:66) argues that sociological studies like the present occur in a world ‘which 
is stratified by class, gender, age, race and ethnicity’. Fieldwork includes the ‘whole 
being’ (Okely & Callaway 1992:16) of the ethnographer and is an embodied 
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experience (Okely 2007). The interviews as well as observational situations are 
thus, a social relationship, and the results of this encounter will vary with the 
gender, age, and class of the researcher and the research participants: 
The positivist dream of an epistemological state of perfect innocence 
papers over the fact that the crucial difference is not between a science 
that effects a construction and one that does not, but between a science 
that does this without knowing it and one that, being aware of work of 
construction, strives to discover and master as completely as possible the 
nature of its inevitable acts of construction and the equally inevitable 
effects those acts produce (Bourdieu 1999:608)  
As an ethnic Danish, female doctoral student, I do not share many demographic 
characteristics with the participants. These obvious differences in class, gender and 
educational level have obviously influenced participant observation and interview 
situation. Sometimes these differences were expressed loudly as jokes (‘I’d rather 
role-play with Julie’) or compliments (‘It’s nice to look at someone other than a 
bearded man in this room’ or ‘You’re welcome back here anytime’) and other 
times, the differences became visible in a subtler way. For example, some of the 
interviewees would express uncertainty about whether they could provide the 
‘right’ answers: ‘I am not sure that I know what this is about, but I guess I’ll find 
out’ and ‘I don’t know what you are looking for’ (Michael, closed prison) when we 
sat down for the interview. When asked what he did for a living before his 
imprisonment, another interviewee said that he ‘used to own a restaurant and I had 
a car, money; everything was alright, I did not need anything. I drove a big 
Mercedes, lived in a huge house and went on holiday three-four times a year’ 
(Samir, closed prison). It seemed important to Samir that I understood the man of 
importance he had been before he went to prison, how he was financially afloat and 
could provide for himself and his family. Similar tales of financial prowess and 
self-reliance were present in other interviews and they shed light on the importance 
of understanding self-narratives and the relationship between the role and position 
of the interviewer and the interviewee.    
DATA ANALYSIS AND THEMATISATIONS  
The anthropologist Daniel (1996:132) argues that an ethnographer must ‘tune her 
ear in the field to statements, claims, accounts, and stories that – in the words of a 
political scientist friend […] – have nothing to do with anything’. How is it possible 
to turn such ‘meaningless’ material as field notes into sound analyses and move 
from participant observation to ‘participant description’ (Geertz 1988:83)? The line 
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between data generation37 and data analysis is fluent in qualitative studies, 
particularly in ethnographic fieldwork. Research questions, methods and analytical 
categories change in the meeting with the particular field of study and in a 
continuous dialog between these aspects of a research design (Fangen 2010:41). 
This is also one of Bourdieu’s points, namely that the construction of knowledge 
should occur in a dialogue with the field of study. Hence, the construction of 
knowledge is not just a process embarked on before the study, but is also embedded 
in the analysis process (Bourdieu in Jensen 2007). Bourdieu paraphrases Kant's 
dictum by stating that ‘theory without empirical research is empty, empirical 
research without theory is blind’ (Bourdieu 1988:774,775). Hence, theory and 
empirical material is interrelated and co-dependent in the sense that theory is 
involved from the beginning to the end of research, but does not make sense 
without empirical material (Prieur & Sestoft 2006:212). For Bourdieu, the 
seemingly small and concrete facts says something about the larger picture, hence it 
makes sense to conduct ‘small-scale fieldwork, but comment on large-scale issues’ 
(Moore 2005:362). I did not enter the field with a set of hypotheses or a large 
theoretical framework to ‘test’, but rather, approached the field in an explorative 
manner (Fangen 2010:45) while bearing previous research in cognitive behavioural 
programmes in mind. I thus aimed to conduct a ‘theoretically informed 
ethnographic study’ (Willis 1997). Understanding in anthropology is linked to 
participation, and evidence to experience. Hence, knowledge in anthropology is 
partial and positioned, and, in essence, ‘a social phenomenon rather than simply a 
substance’ (Hastrup 2004:456). Thus, 
The point of anthropology is not to tell the world as it is (which would 
be practically impossible), but to interpret it and suggest possible 
(theoretical) connections within it […] (Hastrup 2004:468). 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1983:175) use a funnel metaphor in order to describe 
the ethnographic research process which becomes progressively focused over its 
course. This resonates with my research process, where some research themes (e.g., 
violence, choice, rationality, respect, and humour) seemed more important than 
others in the course of the fieldwork, whereby future observations were shaped by 
this increased focus. The ideas that came to shape the four articles stem from the 
empirical material which was already shaped by my attention and interest at that 
point in time (Emerson et al 1995:9). I did not use Nvivo or other data organising 
tools in the data analysis process. Rather, I manually organized the interview 
                                                          
37 Data generation is used instead of data collection in acknowledgement of the co-
constructed nature of interview data. In this regard, stories come into being as a joint 
enterprise between the interviewer and the interviewee, rather than existing ‘inside of the 
narrators, waiting to be expressed’ or ‘collected’ (Presser 2008:123 in Wright 2014). 
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transcriptions and the field-notes into different themes and analysed these in line 
with ‘adaptive theory’, in which themes are determined both by prior theory and 
literature and by emergent data (Layder 1998). The ideas for the articles thus grew 
out of the empirical material, after which I developed analytical ideas and concepts 
through theory, previous research of cognitive behavioural programmes, and 
discussions with my research group ESSET. The analytical processes were similar 
for all four articles, but they emerged out of different research questions and 
interests which are described in the following. 
As presented in the introduction to this dissertation, current problem definitions of 
criminality and offenders, and consequent solutions in the shape of cognitive 
behavioural programmes are of central interest to me. More concretely, I was 
interested in the messages that the instructors send and those that the participants 
received - the delivery and the reception of the programmatic goals. These interests 
fostered a need and wish to investigate the instructors’ self-perceptions, work-
trajectories and their understanding of the programmatic goals in order to 
investigate whether the professionals themselves come to see responsibilization as a 
natural response to social problems (Bondi 2005). The first article ‘Caught between 
Soft Power and Neoliberal Punitiveness – An Exploration of the Practices of 
Cognitive-Behavioral Instructors in Danish Prisons’ thus grew out of these 
interests. I mainly draw on the interviews with the instructors and programme 
consultant, and also on my participant observation in the education and supervision 
of the instructors to shape the arguments of this article.  
The second article, "Man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand": Perspektiver på 
vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet "Anger Management" [“You Wouldn´t Beat up the 
Grocery Guy!” Perspectives on violence in the prison-based cognitive behavioural 
programme Anger Management”], zooms in on the reception of the programme 
instructors’ messages about violence, choice and rationality. I only draw upon field 
notes and interviews with participants and instructors from Anger Management in 
this article in order to focus on violence and anger. The article was aimed to be 
published in a special issue of ‘Tidsskriftet Antropologi’ with the theme 
‘Treatment’. This theme obviously helped shape my ideas, but I was free to develop 
the analysis as I saw fit. The rationalities of violence presented itself in two distinct 
ways in the material: as an erroneous choice made by a free actor, versus a rational 
behaviour in certain social and structural contexts. The former understanding was 
pushed forward by the instructors, who then sought to change the participants’ 
thoughts, choices and behaviour while the participants fought to legitimize and 
contextualize their violence or conflictual behaviour as they saw fit. 
The third article, ‘Honour and Respect in Danish Prisons – Contesting ‘Cognitive-
Distortions’ in cognitive-behavioural Programmes’, is co-authored by PhD student 
Ben Laws from the University of Cambridge. The article departs from the second 
article on violence, rationality and choice because I was left with a feeling that I did 
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not fully understand why the participants were so adamant in their resistance 
towards the instructors’ interpretations of violence and anger as, essentially, 
choices. It seemed important to investigate some of the drivers behind their 
resistance. We suggest that they belong to subcultural definitions of respect and 
honour, which seemed to thrive both in and outside the prisons.  
The fourth and last article ‘(No) Laughing Allowed – Humorous Boundary-making 
in Prison’ arose out of serendipity38. I had not expected to laugh so much as I ended 
up doing in the fieldwork, and it surprised me that the lessons were so saturated 
with humour. This means that the article grew out of a surprising observation which 
was analysed in order to describe larger implications (Fangen 2010: 38). My laughs 
and giggles also put me in a dilemma; I was afraid to laugh when only the 
participants laughed and afraid to laugh when only the instructors laughed out of 
loyalty for each group. This very concrete manifestation of the dilemma of ‘whose 
side to be on’ led me to analyse the ways humour was used as a tool to create 
boundaries between the participants and the instructors. I originally planned to 
analyse humour as resistance, and conducted the aforementioned workshop with 
that exact theme in mind. However, it turned out that neither the instructors in the 
workshop nor the researchers in ESSET seemed to agree with me that humour was 
all about resistance. This resistance (no pun intended) from both instructors and 
fellow researchers led me to analyse humour through a variety of lenses instead of 
just one. These multiple perspectives allowed for an examination of how humour 
seemed to function as boundary-making, but also as a tool to object towards the 
sometimes infantilizing nature of the cognitive behavioural programmes. 
Furthermore, humour was so disruptive in the lessons that it called for a questioning 
of whether ‘soft power’ in the shape of cognitive behavioural programmes always 
works.               
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
I have anonymized all prisons, participants and instructors in order to protect the 
identity of the individuals. I explained the aims of my research, the terms of 
anonymity and data use, and gained so-called ‘informed consent’ from each 
participant and instructor. However, ‘informed consent’ is not a green-card to 
conduct the research without regard to ethical considerations in the process. On the 
contrary, and perhaps especially so in prisons, one must continuously be aware of 
and consider any verbal or non-verbal clues of withdrawal or lack of approval. 
After the initial approval, including a check of my non-existent criminal record, the 
Directorate of the Danish Prison and Probation Service assisted me to contact the 
relevant prisons and instructors by forwarding an amended version of my PhD 
                                                          
38 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, serendipity is ‘The faculty of making happy 
and unexpected discoveries by accident’. 
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project description and my request to participate in the cognitive behavioural 
programmes. The Directorate underscored that while they recommended the prisons 
to accept the request, the governors, managing officers and instructors would have 
the final say in whether the research proposal would be accepted. This letter and 
request to participate in the programmes was responded to quickly and positively. 
However, it might have been very difficult for the prisons or instructors to actually 
decline my request as it, and I, had already been approved of by the Directorate. 
This top-down approach might have influenced the initial stages of the research, but 
as found in other prison studies (e.g. Minke 2012a:62; Ugelvik 2011:30), it is 
proceeding in the ‘right’ order is unavoidable when one wishes to conduct research 
in prisons. I paid careful attention to whether the instructors expressed any 
reluctance towards my participant observation due to the relatively ‘forced’ nature 
of my access, and obviously, whether the prisoners did as well. One of the 
instructors was a little worried about my wish to participate in all lessons, and I felt 
a bit squeamish about insisting upon the importance of my being there in all of 
them. Her scepticism, I believe, can shed light on the more or less consensual 
elements of this fieldwork, and any fieldwork where acceptance is negotiated from 
‘top down’. Even though the Directorate, the Governor of this particular prison, the 
Security Coordinator, and the treatment manager had all agreed to my participation, 
she remained sceptical. While she did agree to let me participate after some 
negotiation, she waited quite a while to call me back after the initial conversation. 
This was frustrating at the time, but I understood her choice to not contact me for a 
while as an expression of her protest of having me ‘forced upon her’. As soon as the 
fieldwork actually commenced, she seemed to accept my presence completely and 
said: ‘It is nice to have someone to talk through the lessons with’ (Birthe, Cognitive 
Skills instructor).    
Another ethical dilemma is the handling of information about illegal or criminal 
activities among prisoners as experienced by many prison researchers (e.g. Nielsen 
2010:311; Crewe 2011:481; Ugelvik 2014), They are, indeed, sometimes the topic 
of interest, as seen in Ugelvik’s paper (2011) on illicit food practices, and in 
Mjåland’s paper (2015) on illicit drug diversion. It is a difficult balance to maintain 
as a researcher; we are obliged to report any future serious crime, but out of loyalty 
towards the prisoners (and our data collection), we turn a blind eye to many illicit 
activities. Polsky (1967) defines all the rule-breaking or law-breaking activities that 
qualitative researchers may encounter during fieldwork or interviews as ‘guilty 
knowledge’. He argues that one simply has to avoid guilty knowledge, ignore it, or 
withhold information in order to protect and respect the confidentiality of the 
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research participants
39
. However, the nature of the fieldwork (participating in the 
programmes rather than everyday life on the wings) made it much easier for me to 
avoid seeing or hearing episodes that could compromise the confidentiality I 
promised the prisoners, and my ‘guilty knowledge’ is, therefore, very innocent. My 
interviewees would tell me stories of rule-breaking behaviour such as smoking 
cigarettes in the bathroom during lessons or reports about contraband in their cells, 
but they did not share more serious reports of crime that happened or were about to 
happen. Thus, I felt no obligation to report back to the prison officials and was 
never faced with more serious dilemmas. The candidness and openness of the 
prisoners was challenging in other ways. It is, of course, difficult to be faced with 
human suffering, troubles and struggles without being able to do something to 
ameliorate their circumstances. These feelings are common in prison research (see 
Liebling 1999:150) as well as in ethnography in general (e.g. Okely & Callaway 
1992; Daniel 1996).  
PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS AND THE EMPIRICAL 
MATERIAL 
The following is a presentation of the research participants and the substance and 
reach of the empirical material. Young (2011:2) argues that researchers should aim 
to bridge the gap between the inner life of human actors and the historical and 
social setting they are placed in. While I agree with him about the importance of 
placing the individual actor in his/her social and structural context, the aims of this 
research are a bit different. While I do provide some contextual information about 
the research participants, my overall objective has been to situate the cognitive 
behavioural programmes within a certain time, context and space in prison-based 
rehabilitation and the broader penal field, and show how they play out in concrete 
practice. Also, the empirical material is too small to properly describe each 
participant because it would be very difficult to ensure their anonymity were I to do 
so.    
The participants are a heterogeneous group. Out of the 24 participants I followed in 
total, 13 have non-Danish backgrounds. The participants were all male and between 
18 and 50 years of age with a skew towards younger participants (41 per cent were 
between 18-25 years of age). In the closed prisons, the participants had received 
lengthy prison sentences of more than 5 years, and some of the participants were in 
                                                          
39 ‘Guilty knowledge’ has been debated heavily lately after the publication of Alice 
Goffman’s ethnography ‘On the Run’ (2014). One particular passage of the book, in which 
she describes how she rides in a car with an informant who is armed and looking to seek 
revenge over a murdered friend, has led to a fierce debate on liability and responsibility in 
ethnographic criminology (see for instance http://newramblerreview.com/book-
reviews/law/ethics-on-the-run).   
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remand and therefore, had not yet been convicted, whereas the participants in the 
open prison were primarily serving sentences of less than 2 years. The participants 
have been convicted or charged with assault, manslaughter, attempted 
manslaughter, extortion, drug trafficking, uttering threats, robbery and so forth. The 
participants have various experiences with the educational system and a ‘portfolio’ 
of income possibilities (Bottoms et. al. 2004:378); a few owned their own 
companies, most have limited education (the Danish equivalent to High School or 
less), many were unemployed before imprisonment, and some were employed in 
various low-skilled and non-permanent jobs. Most of the participants can be 
characterized by relative deprivation. In a welfare state, relative deprivation 
characterizes individuals or groups as poor if they lack the resources to feed 
themselves adequately, participate in activities, and have the living standards and 
privileges that are considered normal or at least recognized in surrounding society 
(Townsend 1979 in Jensen & Prieur 2015b).  
The four instructors that I observed during their teaching in the cognitive 
behavioural programmes are all simultaneously prison officers with different work 
trajectories. They are ‘mature’ (between 35 and 55 years of age), have children, and 
live in close proximity to the prisons they are employed in. They can be 
characterized by their large engagement with the participants and their aim to do 
more than ‘marihuana inspections in the perches [prison cells]’ (Birthe, Cognitive 
Skills instructor). They all want to help the prisoners by doing ‘more’ than their 
regular job as prison officers allows. This general description also seems to fit with 
the larger group of cognitive behavioural instructors whom I met during the annual 
meetings for instructors. The instructors’ self-understandings, work-trajectories, and 
implementations of the cognitive behavioural programmes are described in more 
depth in the first article (see Appendix 1).      
The empirical material is rich in the sense that I have had every opportunity to write 
‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973) of the interactions in the cognitive behavioural 
programmes and to interview participants as well as instructors about their 
experiences at length. However, whether I would be able to comprehend the 
experiences of the participants and the programme instructors in such a short time 
period has been a concern; would it be possible to see the world from the native’s 
point of view (Hastrup 2004), and who are the natives exactly? Is it the participants 
or the programme instructors? I believe my material can shed light on both groups’ 
experiences, but I have obviously chosen to represent certain perspectives, 
opinions, situations and interactions rather than attempting to represent 
‘everything’. I both agree and disagree with Young (2011:135) when he warns 
about the dangers of the author’s meta-narrative. He argues that, frequently, ‘the 
meta-narrative of the author can have a greater coherence than the narrative of the 
people observed and it is this meta-narrative rather than the narrative which drives 
the story’. While this might very well be the case for a lot of research, the argument 
has the inherent flaw of assuming that you can ever get it ‘right’ - that is, to assume 
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that field-notes, interviews and conversations are suddenly ‘enough’ or ‘right’ 
(Steinberg in Liebling 2015:11). Young’s argument also seems to obscure the fact 
that the meta-narrative (or class, gender, ethnicity and training) of the ethnographer 
is deeply ingrained into the research process, which is exactly what the postmodern 
turn in anthropology has taught us (Hastrup 2004:468). Hence, it is not possible to 
write a narrative of the people observed in a vacuum outside of the author’s 
narrative. The previous chapter has been my attempt to provide insight into the 
research process with all its methodological, practical, analytical and ethical 
considerations. As such, it aspires to provide a platform from which to judge 
whether I ‘got it right’, while bearing in mind that this judgment is not possible in a 
positivist sense (Hastrup 2004).  
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION AND CORE 
FINDINGS 
The aim of this dissertation has been to show ‘what goes on’ in prison-based 
cognitive behavioural programmes in Denmark. Through participant observation in 
Cognitive Skills and Anger Management, as well as focus group and individual 
interviews with the participants and instructors, I have aimed to analyse how they 
experienced, used, challenged, rejected and/or accepted these programmes. I wished 
to shed light on dominant descriptions of criminality and ‘criminals’ which come to 
shape specific social technologies such as cognitive behavioural programmes. I 
have identified the problem definition underlying the cognitive behavioural 
programmes (crime is essentially a choice and the result of erroneous thinking and 
behaviour), and the consecutive solutions (acquisition of new ‘thinking styles’ and 
‘social skills’ via role-plays, thinking exercises and discussions in cognitive 
behavioural programmes). More specifically, I wished to provide an empirically 
derived description of how dominating problem-definitions and solutions play out 
in practice. In this regard, the articles point to the relationship between dominating 
descriptions of problems and solutions versus lived experience.  This chapter will 
summarize my core findings and conclude the introductory frame of this 
dissertation.  
As laid out in the introduction, my main research question is: How do prison-based 
cognitive behavioural programmes’ problem definitions and suggested solutions 
play out in concrete practice? 
I have answered this main research question via four sub-questions, and I will 
summarize the answers provided by these. While my research is a contribution to 
existing research of how cognitive behavioural programmes are experienced (e.g. 
Fox 1999a, 1999b; Perry 2013a), I also expand and go beyond this research body. 
The previous research has not examined how the instructors experience and 
understand the concrete practice of the programmes. I fill this gap by examining 
both the participants and the instructors’ experiences in order to show how 
cognitive behavioural programmes are experienced, used, challenged, rejected 
and/or accepted.  
I was interested in exploring the constraints and possibilities which guide and shape 
the instructors’ practices and the opportunities and obstacles for their success in 
reaching the programmatic goals. The following is a summarization of my findings 
from the first sub-question: How do cognitive behavioural programmes affect and 
transform the instructors’ self-perceptions, work-trajectories and their 
understanding of the programmatic goals? 
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I have aimed to shed light on the fusion of more traditional penal-welfarist 
rehabilitation and neo-liberal interventions in the shape of cognitive behavioural 
programmes. This theme is explored in depth in the first article: ‘Caught between 
Soft Power and Neoliberal Punitiveness – An Exploration of the Practices of 
Cognitive-Behavioral Instructors in Danish Prisons’. The cognitive behavioural 
instructors whom I followed and interviewed take great personal and professional 
interest in the participants, and they strive to help them in a manner that prison 
officials deem is most efficient - through cognitive behavioural programmes. 
Cognitive behavioural programmes are seen as an outlet for targeting prisoners’ 
‘criminogenic needs’, which is framed in opposition to an aim of addressing the 
prisoners’ needs in a holistic manner which the instructors describe as ‘just talk’ 
and thus, not very efficient. As described in this dissertation, the instructors are 
screened and selected in accordance with their personal and social skills, and they 
must be a role-model for the participants. The instructors are, thus, also formed by 
the wish to transform the participants into self-reflective, self-reliable, rational and 
responsible individuals; they must live up to these goals themselves (see also 
Järvinen & Mik-Meyer 2012). I have found that the instructors walk a tight rope 
between respecting the participants’ individual wishes, values, rationalities and 
desires while seeking to change erroneous or inefficient thoughts and behaviour.  
Some scholars have found that instructors in cognitive behavioural programmes for 
female offenders seek to get to ‘gut level’ (Mckim 2008) to engage the participants 
in a ‘deep’ and personal manner. Interestingly, my data does not reflect this 
therapeutic wish of disclosure of one’s emotions and painful past experiences; on 
the contrary, the instructors’ often redirect the conversation from past experiences 
to current issues. The reason for this derailing of the past is an emphasis upon the 
importance of the here-and-now, and the thoughts and behaviour that occur in this 
particular moment of time. The instructors argue that ‘there is never anyone else 
responsible for creating an emotion in you’ (Jeppe, Anger Management instructor); 
hence, the participants cannot blame ‘everyone’ else for their behaviour and 
reactions. The image of a rational actor who can freely choose whichever action or 
emotion he deems best or most fitting decontextualizes the participants’ experiences 
and frame complex past and future experiences as merely choices. This might be a 
reasonable assertion; after all, the instructors cannot change the participants’ past 
experiences, class or upbringing. Nonetheless, the differences between these two 
understandings of crime and choice lead to many discussions between the 
instructors and the participants. 
The discrepancies between the instructors’ focus upon criminality as a choice and 
the participants’ fierce insistence upon the context for their crime resulted in the 
second sub-question: How is criminality explained and rationality and choice 
understood, negotiated and interpreted in the cognitive behavioural programmes? 
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The second article, "Man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand": Perspektiver på 
vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet "Anger Management" [‘“You Wouldn´t Beat up 
the Grocery Guy!” Perspectives on violence in the prison-based cognitive 
behavioural programme Anger Management’], examines how understandings of 
violence are produced and negotiated in Anger Management. The instructors’ 
framing and interpretation of violence, conflict and anger and the participants’ 
understandings diverged in important ways. I analysed violence from a 
constructionist perspective, where ‘violence is always a social fact; it belongs to the 
domain of intersubjectivity’ (Jackson 2002:44), but in cognitive behavioural 
programmes, violence is torn out of its context and presented essentially as a 
choice. I found that the Anger Management programme and the instructors reject 
the relevance of the context for aggression and violence, which the participants 
typically emphasize as being highly relevant. In that manner, the programme and 
the instructors sketch an image of violent actions not just as illegitimate, but 
actually irrational. Violence is thus portrayed as occurring in a vacuum, where 
certain thoughts lead to certain choices and behaviours. This individualization of 
violence and anger results in ongoing clashes between the participants and the 
instructors. The participants draw on subcultural assessments of specific behaviour 
as a necessary and expected aspect of urban street life and life in prison that does 
not resonate in an individualized method of treatment. The borders between 
perpetrator and victim are often fluid and volatile with respect to violence within 
sub-cultures or in the nightlife. The participants thus have experiences with street 
violence and violence in prison – as victims and offenders alike. The participants’ 
narratives on violence are contextualized in specific social situations and are thus 
filled with other people’s (re)actions in conflict and potential violent situations. The 
participants’ aggression and violence seem to bear their own rationale, maintaining 
or defending a kind of masculine self-respect and dignity in everyday life inside and 
outside the prison.   
I wished to further examine why the participants were as adamant in their resistance 
towards the instructors’ interpretations of violence and anger as essentially choices. 
The above observation led to the formulation of the third sub-question, namely: 
How does the participants’ subcultural belonging influence the workings of the 
programmes? 
The importance of respect (and honour) in prison is analysed in depth in article 
number three: ‘Respect and Honour in Prisons: Contesting “Cognitive Distortions” 
in Cognitive-Behavioural Programmes’. Here, the concept of ‘respect plus’ is 
introduced in an attempt to bridge the gap between the concepts of respect and 
honour. This is needed to analyse how these concepts merge with the ‘prisoner 
code’ into a form of subcultural capital. The meanings of respect and honour in 
prison can be understood more fully in relation to the framework of subcultural 
capital (Bourdieu 1990; Bourgois 2003; Jensen 2006; Sandberg 2008). The 
masculine ideals of being ‘tough’, ‘standing your ground’ and being loyal merge 
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with honour and respect into a certain ‘code of honour’, which dictates particular 
rules and rituals that prisoners feel obliged to follow, or at least not contest too 
openly. Prisoners’ subcultural capital shapes reception of and responses to demands 
for ‘cognitive self-change’. Subcultural capital is valued by street and prison 
cultures, but cannot be cashed in (Anderson 1999) in a context of neoliberal 
expectations of efficient self-government. In order to analyse how prisoners’ 
distinctive relationships to subcultural capital, masculinity, and respect, intersect 
and often undermine the programming goals, this article draws upon studies of 
prisons and total institutions (Cohen and Taylor 1972; Goffman 1961; Mjåland 
2015; Sykes 1958;  Ugelvik 2011).  
The analysis shows that often, when the participants vociferously mentioned the 
importance of honour, respect and loyalty, these values were seen as confirmations 
of participants’ ‘distorted thinking’ or ‘criminal values’. This 'normative 
imperialism' (Crewe 2011: 516) or dismissive incredulity to subcultural norms was 
pervasive in the cognitive behavioural programmes. The cognitive behavioural 
programmes attempt to create accountable and rational actors (Bosworth 2007) who 
efficiently self-manage, but this line of reasoning neglects participants’ 
contextualized interpretations of their lives (both in and out of prison). Non-
utilitarian aspects of care, loyalty and affection (Skeggs 2011) seem more important 
to the participants in cognitive behavioural programmes than neo-liberal, self-
interested rationales. The neoliberal language of rational calculation and interest 
maximization embedded in the cognitive behavioural programmes do perhaps not 
resonate with the participants’ own world-views and moral reasoning. I found that 
the self-reliant and responsibilized individual stand in opposition to the participants’ 
perceptions of ‘proper’ personhood in cognitive behavioural programmes; they 
weigh their loyalties towards their friends and family as heavier than their loyalty 
towards their employer or society in general. However, an idealization of self-
reliant individuals need not stand in opposition to weighing family and friends 
above anything, but these two rationales clash when the friends and families also 
orient themselves towards subcultural values and/or commit crimes, which is often 
the case in this context.    
The participants do take responsibility for their lives, although in ways that are 
foreign to the penal system and its moral ideals. Subcultural values such as the 
importance of self-defence are dismissed as being regressive in the cognitive 
behavioural programmes (Fox 1999a:449). However, the alleged discrepancy 
between rational choices and defence of honour is directly challenged by the 
participants; that is, they view defence of honour as the only rational choice to 
make. The models proposed in prison treatment programmes seem ‘undignified and 
at times unfeasible’ (Irwin 1987:37 in Fox 1999b:97) for prisoners who orient 
themselves towards subcultural values. These values were often deemed ‘cognitive 
distortions’ by the instructors and thus seen as thoughts, values and behaviour that 
needed to be corrected or changed. This is in line with Garland’s reasoning when he 
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states that a prisoner ‘who enjoys criminal behaviour, or who embraces the 
consequences of crime, or for whom a law-abiding life is not a viable option, will 
be deemed ‘irresponsible’ no matter how self-aware and autonomous his or her 
actions are’ (Garland 1997:152).  
The fourth sub-question is inspired by a surprising observation, namely that the 
lessons were saturated with laughter and humour. This observation inspired the 
question: How does humour saturate the lessons and what uses does humour have 
in the programmes?        
The fourth article, ‘(No) Laughing Allowed – Humorous Boundary-making in 
Prison’, argues that the participants’ use of humour serves as disruptions of role-
plays and exercises that take place during the cognitive behavioural programmes. I 
argue that the use of humour enables the participants to object in subtle ways that 
do not call for reprimands. Furthermore, the participants’ use of humour functions 
to transform a supposedly problematic being into an asset. Thus, they manage to 
object towards the embedded ‘cognitive deficit’ lens that their behaviour is 
understood through by humorously negotiating with the premises for identity 
construction. Jocular gripes and stories of masculinity, violence and crime also 
serve as frictional behaviour which can remedy the otherwise ‘forced production of 
selves’ (Fox 1999b) in cognitive behavioural programmes. The jokes and comments 
made by the participants might seem silly, puerile, or chaotic, but they could also be 
understood as attempts to restore autonomy and dignity in an otherwise infantilizing 
and emasculating institution and programmatic setting. In this regard, humour can 
neutralize uncomfortable but repeated experiences, such as asymmetrical power 
relations and infantilizing situations. Humour is embedded in the ‘defences of the 
weak’ (Mathiesen 1965:148) and may help alleviate the pains of imprisonment by 
creating a humorous distance in order to protect oneself. 
My findings in this article also touch upon the subject of power and friction by 
asking whether ‘soft power’ in the shape of cognitive behavioural programmes 
actually work. When the participants continuously interrupt, twist and disturb the 
lessons by joking, horse-playing and turning the role-plays into comedy shows, they 
actively contest the power at play here. As shown by Foucault (1988) and Rose 
(1999), self-technologies are most (or perhaps only) efficient when groups or 
individuals are central and active actors in their own self-government. This includes 
self-discipline, self-scrutiny and self-control. However, my examination of a social 
technology in practice, the cognitive behavioural programmes, has found that the 
participants do not readily engage in this self-work. The analysis of how cognitive 
behavioural programmes are experienced, used, challenged, rejected and partly 
accepted, reveals that not everyone self-governs as efficiently as wished for. 
Humour seems to allow the participants in cognitive behavioural programmes to 
create friction (Rubin 2015) against the psychological power imbedded in this type 
of ‘treatment’ while avoiding serious repercussions.   
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After this presentation of the core findings and answers to the four sub-questions, I 
will now return to the main research question: How do prison-based cognitive 
behavioural programmes’ problem definitions and suggested solutions play out in 
concrete practice?   
A central finding is that the instructors’ problem definitions of criminality diverge 
in significant ways from the participants’ definitions of problems. The participants 
explain their criminality in a framework of structural and social factors, whereas the 
instructors understand criminality in the sphere of agency - a rational actor who 
freely chooses that action he sees best fit. The theory behind cognitive behavioural 
programmes understands criminality as a result of the individual’s cognitive 
deficits, erroneous choices and lack of self-control (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008; 
Yochelson & Samenow 1976). The aim of the instructor is thus to teach participants 
how to change their thoughts and actions, but the manual-based structure of the 
cognitive behavioural programmes fails to take the prisoners’ experiences into 
account. For example, the role-plays used are often rooted in rational-choice 
models, which assume that actors are unconstrained by, or resistant to the kinds of 
pressures that dominate the (street) cultures to which the participants return (Crewe 
2009; Laursen & Laws in press). The participants emphasize perspectives on 
criminality that are justified in specific social contexts and a particular social 
milieu, whereas the instructors argue that criminality should be viewed as a 
principled choice and as an expression of the lacking ability of the participants to 
control themselves. Oftentimes, the participants resist and object when the 
instructors claim that crimes or doubtful moral rationalizations are an expression of 
a lack of accountability or erroneous thought. The participants’ narratives are thus 
often deemed irrelevant, while the instructors’ problem definitions and rationales 
are pushed forward. This results in ongoing clashes between the two parties. 
Another central finding is that the participants actively contested the normative 
guidelines and presented alternative models of ‘good and proper’ behaviour. They 
engaged in a range of frictional behaviours which illustrate a whole spectrum of 
non-engagement (Brownlie 2004:519). While there might be consequences of 
choosing not to be rehabilitated through the forms prescribed by the prison, or not 
to conform to institutional demands, Scandinavian prison practices seem to allow 
for fairly large amounts of friction as long as it is well-meant, rational, and 
eventually leads to compliance (Shammas 2014; Ugelvik 2011). The participants 
used humour to disrupt the lessons, engaged in a variety of discussions about the 
format and content of the programmes, and used bodily movements such as 
yawning, moving around in their chair, leaning against each other, or simply 
standing up and walking around in the room. While these frictional behaviours do 
not always seem like hostile attempts to undermine the instructor or the cognitive 
behavioural programmes, they illustrate the ways prisoners struggle to maintain 
their dignity and autonomy. These moments of friction point to a central finding, 
namely that the ‘soft power’ in cognitive behavioural programmes does not seem to 
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work efficiently; the participants do not always steer or govern themselves in the 
wanted direction. On the other hand, they seem to, to a greater or lesser degree, pay 
‘lip service’ to the programmatic goals in order to pass the programme. These 
findings also raise a number of theoretical issues which are discussed below.  
Theoretical and analytical implications  
My findings contribute to discussions on agency and power by showing how 
participants in cognitive behavioural programmes exercise frictional behaviours 
such as using humour to disrupt the lessons. The participants seemed to object more 
by means of humorous interruptions to the programmatic goals than they internalize 
them. These findings help to shed light on the many ways in which subjects of 
power resist oppression and subordination, even when greater resistance such as 
refusing completely to participate in cognitive behavioural programmes is not 
present. Drawing upon these findings, I supplement the large scholarship 
investigating neo-liberal responsibilization, risk and governmentality in relation to 
current rehabilitative interventions (e.g. Andersson 2004; Feeley & Simon 1992; 
Garland 2001; Kendall 2011; Nilsson 2013). These studies often operate on a 
macro-level (Hannah-Moffat & Lynch (2012), which calls for a study of ‘localized 
on-the-ground processes’ (Hannah-Moffat & Lynch 2012:119f). I also supplement 
the body of prison research that draw upon Foucault when they analyse prisoners’ 
acts of resistance (e.g. Ugelvik 2014) even though they rightly point to the 
productiveness in Foucault’s conceptualizations of power. Digeser’s (1992:995) 
argument that ‘the self will not completely fit into whatever form it is pushed, there 
will always be some resistance, some friction’ resonates, but the concept of 
resistance seems too open and vague. This vagueness may result in the concept of 
resistance potentially losing its analytical power (Rubin 2015). Hence, we might 
need a conceptual framework to analyse what this resistance, or better yet, friction 
actually entails and latches on to.  
Power is an omnipresence in a Foucauldian framework; hence, ‘power is 
everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere’ (Foucault 1978:93). Resistance is intrinsic in subjectification processes 
and there does not appear to be a space outside of power. Some scholars argue that 
Foucault treats resistance as a ‘black box’ (see Brownlie 2004). In order to address 
this problem, I have analysed the participants’ resistance, or rather, friction, by 
drawing on the concept of subcultural capital to show how they align themselves 
with different and subcultural values, which shapes and orients their frictional 
behaviour. In order to explain how the participants ascribe values to their own lives, 
norms and behaviour, I have drawn upon Skegg’s (2004, 2011) ideas of how people 
who are marginalized from a wider moral community attach value to themselves 
despite the negative representations of them. I draw on these perspectives to argue 
that the acts of friction in the cognitive behavioural programmes should be 
understood as active attempts of subscribing value to the participants’ own values, 
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sentiments and understandings of good and ‘proper’ behaviour in the prison, as well 
as the subcultures they draw upon outside of prison. Many of the participants in 
cognitive behavioural programmes do form an alliance with institutional ideals, 
such as demonstrating a special effort to start afresh without crime (Nielsen 
2012:139). However, these prisoners often dodge the moral project while, 
simultaneously using institutional stimuli to pursue individual ends. Against this 
background, it seems fair to ascertain that ‘prisoners deflate institutional power and 
appear to escape the regime and its ideals without leaving it’ (Nielsen 2012:141). I 
have shown how the participants in cognitive behavioural programmes engage in 
frictional behaviour in order to avoid subversion to middle-class values. This 
finding is similar to Rubin’s (2015:14), who showed how 19th century prisoners’ 
frictional behaviours in the shape of love affairs, masturbation, and refusal of work 
‘frustrated reformers’ attempts to indoctrinate prisoners with middle-class values’.  
Some concluding lines of precaution are needed to further strengthen the arguments 
above and re-contextualize this analysis. The ‘exceptional’ Danish penal field, with 
its emphasis on humane prisons, rights to education and vocational training and a 
holistic approach to prisoners (Engbo & Smith 2012) also challenges whether it 
makes sense to interpret cognitive behavioural programmes as evidence of neo-
liberal risk management. While it seems likely that we have seen and continue to 
see a fusion of former welfare-oriented goals with neo-liberal risk management 
strategies (Kolind et. al. 2015; Prieur 2015; Prieur & Laursen in process), cognitive 
behavioural programmes are not the only rehabilitative efforts in Danish prisons, 
but they merge with previous ideals and interventions. An explicit goal under the 
headline ‘Reducing Recidivism’ in the 2013-2016 strategy40 of the Danish Prison 
and Probation Service is education and vocational training of prisoners, as well as 
drugs and alcohol treatment and cognitive behavioural programmes. This implies 
that educational and vocational training initiatives continue to be in the forefront of 
activities offered Danish prisoners
41
. Penal-welfarism42, thus, hopefully continues to 
guide governing of and policy implementation in Danish prisons in order to ensure 
that the primary goal of punishment should not go beyond deprivation of liberty 
(Engbo 1997) while a simultaneous goal continues to be motivating and supporting 
prisoners.   
 
                                                          
40 http://www.faengselsforbundet.dk/media/74557/hvidbog.pdf  
41 These initiatives were also emphasized in a speech by the Director General of the Danish 
Prison and Probation Service, Johan Reimann, during an annual meeting for the cognitive 
behavioural instructors that I attended. 
42 Or, what Bourdieu calls the ‘left hand’ side of the state (Bourdieu 1998). 
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„MAN BEGYNDER JO IKKE AT SMADRE EN 
KØBMAND“
Perspektiver på vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet „Anger Management“ 
JULIE LAURSEN
Det er torsdag morgen i et åbent, dansk fængsel, og tredje lektion af i alt otte i 
programmet „Anger Management“ er i fuld gang. Dagens tema er „Teknikker til at 
kontrollere vrede“, hvor deltagerne skal fortælle om deres tanker under en såkaldt 
risikoepisode. Pointen med lektionen er at vise deltagerne, at de kan kontrollere
deres tanker og ændre måden, de tænker på, for dermed at ændre måden, de 
handler på. Deltageren Khazar fortæller en historie fra sin skoletid om Rune og
hans slæng, som konstant var ude efter ham, fordi han ikke var „deres type“. En
dag til morgensamling sparkede Rune gentagne gange til Khazars stol, hvorefter 
Khazar sagde: „Stop, nu er det sidste gang!“ Rune stoppede ikke, så Khazar 
„knaldede ham én“. Khazar fremhæver, at han ikke blev smidt ud af skolen, selv 
om alle lærerne så, hvad der skete. Han er derfor sikker på, at de forstod, hvorfor 
han slog. Khazar omtaler endvidere episoden som positiv, fordi Rune endte med 
at forstå hans grænser. Instruktøren udfordrer dette og spørger resten af holdet,
om det ikke var bedre ikke at slå. Amin svarer straks, at „hvis du ikke havde gjort 
noget, så ville du have været en gulvmåtte“. Jesper tilføjer, at „mobning er et ømt 
punkt – der er folk, der begår selvmord på grund af mobning, og hvis det kunne 
være stoppet med en flad, så var det måske fint“. Instruktøren spørger igen, om 
det ikke var bedre ikke at slå. Haadi svarer instruktøren, at nej, det synes han 
ikke. Jesper mener, at det er bedre at slå med det samme end at vente et år og 
så gå amok. Omar: „Vi bliver aldrig enige [henvendt til instruktøren, der fortsat 
protesterer] – for nogen er det bedst at slå!“
Ovenstående er blot et af mange eksempler på uoverensstemmelser mellem
instruktører og deltagere i det fængselsbaserede program Anger Management.
Artiklen er forankret i etnografiske data fra feltarbejde i et åbent og to lukkede 
fængsler, hvor jeg har foretaget deltagerobservation og interviews med såvel
deltagere som instruktører i programmet.1
70
Antropologen Steffen Jöhncke har introduceret begrebet treatmentality som
en beskrivelse af, hvordan behandling er et sine qua non, når der diskuteres 
løsninger på diverse problemer (Jöhncke 2009:15). Behandling er et politisk og 
kulturelt passende svar, uanset om den forbedrer livet for de implicerede eller ej.
Behandling bliver et gode, der står i kontrast til straf som et onde – behandling 
er det rationelle, humanistiske svar på problemer (op.cit.14) som vrede og vold i
dette tilfælde. Det er derfor svært at være imod eller sågar kritisere behandling, da
behandling bliver en slags magisk amulet, der automatisk er eksistensberettiget.
Behandling i fængsler er dog præget af paradokser, som opstår i krydsfeltet mellem 
rehabilitering og kontrol, i balancen mellem Kriminalforsorgens dobbelte princip
om hensynet til kontrol og sikkerhed versus hensynet til støtte og motivation til
den indsatte. Den viden, der ligger til grund for behandlerblikket, er afgørende for, 
hvordan mennesker i behandling taler om vold, og hvorvidt de oplever at kunne 
handle anderledes (Henriksen 2013:223; Pawson & Tilley 1997). Det er derfor 
interessant at undersøge, hvad der sker, når deltagere og instruktører diskuterer 
vold i Anger Management.
Anger Management hviler på en kombination af behavioristiske og kognitions-
psykologiske teorier, hvor voldelige handlinger begrundes i individets kognitive 
mangler (deficits), fejlagtige valg og mangel på selvkontrol (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 
2008; Samenow & Yochelson 1976; Fox 1999; Andersson 2004). Artiklen tager 
i modsætning til denne voldsforståelse afsæt i en konstruktivistisk forståelse af 
vold, hvis identifikation og definition afhænger af konkrete sociale kontekster og
relationer (Zizek 2008; Kilby 2013). Artiklen knytter an til antropologisk volds-
forskning ved at inddrage deltagernes perspektiver og positioneringer og fokusere
på henholdsvis instruktørernes og deltagernes forståelser af vold og konflikt. Det
bærende spørgsmål i artiklen er dermed, hvordan vold fremstilles og forhandles 
i programmet Anger Management. Afledt af dette spørgsmål vil artiklen vise, 
hvordan deltagerne positionerer sig efter bestemte maskulinitetsnormer, som står 
i opposition til programmet.
I det følgende beskrives først metode, derefter gives en kort oversigt over 
behandling i fængsler, hvorefter jeg præsenterer forskning i vold med relevans for 
den empiri, artiklen bygger på. Afslutningsvis samler jeg op på hovedpointerne
fra artiklens analysedel og diskuterer kort, hvilke implikationer artiklens resultater 
kan have for vredeskontrolprogrammer i fængsler.
Metode
Artiklen bygger på mit feltarbejde fra 2013 og 2014 i danske fængsler,2 hvor jeg
har deltaget i Anger Management, som er et såkaldt forbehandlingsprogram, der 
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vare tages af Kriminalforsorgen og forløber over 2 uger med 8 lektioner af ca.
2 timers varighed. Artiklen tager afsæt i feltnoter og interviewtransskriptioner 
fra min deltagelse i 3 programafviklinger med 3 forskellige instruktører, hvilket 
vil sige 24 lektioner i 3 forskellige fængsler. Min deltagelse i programmet er i
lighed med sociologen Kathryn Fox (1999, 2000) karakteriseret ved observation
og noteskrivning, men jeg har deltaget aktivt i afslapningsøvelser, snak og gruppe-
aktiviteter, når det har været muligt og passende. Mine feltnoter er nedskrevet så 
ordret som muligt, hvilket min observationsrolle gav rig mulighed for. Feltnoterne
har dermed karakter af mange citater fra instruktører og deltagere samt udførlige
beskrivelser af rollespil, videosekvenser og andre øvelser. Jeg har talt med deltager-
ne i talrige pauser, hvor jeg har fået et indblik i deres hverdagsliv, familiære 
omstændigheder, livet i og uden for fængslet og dermed etableret en relation til 
deltagerne, men ikke så tæt som den, et længerevarende feltarbejde i et fængsel 
kan give anledning til (jf. Crewe 2011; Ugelvik 2014). Ud over feltarbejdet har jeg
foretaget 1 semistruktureret fokusgruppeinterview med 3 deltagere af ca. 1 times 
varighed. Efterfølgende foretog jeg enkeltinterviews af 1½-2 timers varighed med 
4 andre deltagere med henblik på at få nuanceret og perspektiveret nogle af de 
temaer, som fokusgruppeinterviewet havde rejst. Interviewtemaerne centrerede
sig om deltagernes oplevelser af forbehandlingsprogrammet Anger Management,
deres selvforståelse i relation til vold og konflikt samt deres perspektiver på 
mulig forandring af egen adfærd. Jeg har desuden foretaget semistrukturerede 
enkeltinterviews af 1-2 timers varighed med alle 3 instruktører, hvor jeg forsøgte 
at forstå, hvilken forandring de forsøger at igangsætte hos deltagerne, og hvilke
forståelser af vold og aggression der ligger bag deres praksis.3
Mine informanter har forskellige fængselsdomme. I det ene lukkede fæng sel 
havde deltagerne længere domme på over 5 år, enkelte deltagere var varetægts-
fængslet og derfor (endnu) uden dom, hvorimod deltagerne i det åbne fængsel
primært afsonede domme på under 2 år. Deltagerne er dømt eller sigtet for vold, 
manddrab, forsøg på manddrab, afpresning, handel med narkotiske stoffer, trus-
ler, røveri mv. Deltagerne er alle mænd i alderen 18-36 år med en overvægt af 
yngre mænd i starten eller midten af 20’erne. Ud af de 16 deltagere i de 3 Anger 
Management-kurser,4 som min empiri er baseret på, har halvdelen af deltagerne 
anden etnisk baggrund end dansk. Deltagerne har forskellige erhvervs- og 
uddannelsesmæssige erfaringer; 4 har udelukkende folkeskolens 9.-klasses-
eksamen, 3 driver selvstændig virksomhed uden for fængslet, 3 er under
uddannelse, mens flertallet var uddannelses-/arbejdssøgende før fængslingen, 
hvilket de forsat vil være, når de løslades.5 Instruktørerne er typisk uddannede 
fængselsfunktionærer, der har suppleret deres uddannelse med et 2 uger langt 
praktisk og teoretisk kursus i Anger Management. Instruktørerne superviseres
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løbende af de programansvarlige hos Kriminalforsorgens Uddannelsescenter og 
certificeres endeligt som instruktører efter 1 års undervisning samt godkendelse af 
videooptagelser af undervisningen (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:1). Instruktørernes 
forskellige perspektiver, forståelser, udførelse og repræsentation af programmet 
er interessante, men uden for denne artikels fokus. Instruktørerne har generelt et 
stort engagement, og en af dem beskrev sin motivation for at videreuddanne sig til
instruktør således: „Jeg vil gerne gøre en forskel og ikke bare lave hashvisitationer
på pindene [fængselscellerne].“ Balancen mellem kontrol og rehabilitering i
fængsler er genopstået i nye og interessante former i løbet af de seneste 20 år, 
hvilket jeg diskuterer i det følgende.
Fornyet, men beskeden tro på rehabilitering i fængsler 
De kognitive færdighedsprogrammer, der er en aktuel del af fængselsvæsenets 
rehabiliteringsforsøg, skal ifølge historiker Peter Scharff Smith forstås i lyset af 
fortidens forsøg på forbedring og rehabilitering af indsatte. Forbedringstanken, der 
slog igennem med det 19. århundredes nye fængsler, overlevede frem til 1970’erne, 
hvor den moderne form for indespærring kom i modvind, fordi recidivprocenten 
ikke faldt, og de forsøgte rehabiliteringstiltag tilsyneladende ikke virkede (Smith 
2003:22, 2006; Cohen 1985). De kognitive færdighedsprogrammer er dermed 
affødt af den såkaldte „what works“-bølge inden for rehabilitering i fængsler, der 
efterfulgte den nedslående „nothing works“-æra (Martinson 1974). Fra slutningen 
af 1980’erne og frem opstod en række nye, specialiserede behandlingsprogrammer, 
der var målrettet lovbrydere. Den canadiske kriminolog Elizabeth Fabiano og 
psykolog Robert Ross (1985) udviklede programmet „Reason and Rehabilitation“, 
der blev implementeret i danske fængsler i 1994 under navnet „Det Kognitive 
Færdighedsprogram“ og er forløber for mere specialiserede programmer som 
Anger Management. Programmerne hævder at være evidensbaserede og har været 
udsat for talrige metaevalueringer i en positivistisk model (for eksempel Tong & 
Farrington 2006; Lipsey et al. 2007; Wilson et al. 2005; Porporino, Fabiano & 
Robinson 1991; Porporino & Robinson 1995; Porporino & Fabiano 2000). Der 
findes et mindre antal kritiske, kvalitative studier af programmerne (for eksempel
Perry 2013; Crewe 2011; Fox 1999, 2000; Andersson 2004; Waldram 2012; 
Nilsson 2013; Kramer et al. 2013). Der er hidtil ikke foretaget egentlig forskning
af Anger Management i Danmark (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:12), men der findes
evalueringer og kandidatspecialer (Berger & Brauner 2009; Bird 2008; Poulsen
2012; Jørgensen 1999; Kjær 2009; Weismann 2009; Pedersen 2012).
Anger Management er importeret fra den britiske kriminalforsorg i 2000 og
benyttes nu i alle danske fængsler samt i Kriminalforsorgen i Frihed (Pedersen 
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2012).6 Anger Management benyttes ikke længere i England. Den britiske krimi-
nalforsorg har dog ikke opgivet at benytte sig af kognitive programmer, men
tilbyder hele 47 specifikke programmer under paraplybetegnelsen „Offender
Behavior Programmes“, hvoraf 3 omhandler vrede og vold. Der foreligger ingen 
engelske manualer for Anger Management eller uddannelse af instruktører, og 
programmets teori, metode og underliggende forandringsmodel er heller ikke
beskrevet (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:2). Programmet blev dog akkrediteret i
Danmark i 2008 (ibid.), og ifølge akkrediteringen hviler programmet på adfærds-
kognitionsmodellen, hvor adfærd opfattes som indlært gennem betingning,
hvilket henviser til individets oplevelse af negative og positive konsekvenser 
af en bestemt adfærd. Denne behavioristiske forståelse af adfærd suppleres med 
viden fra kognitionspsykologien, som hævder, at individets erfaringer lagres og 
genkaldes i hjernen i form af kognitioner. Vrede, og ikke mindst håndtering af 
samme, er i denne forståelsesramme en konsekvens af individets tankemønster. 
Kognitive adfærdsprogrammer ønsker dermed at identificere, analysere og 
omstrukturere tankemønstre og indlære nye interpersonelle og adfærdsregulerende
færdigheder gennem betingning og modellering. Modellering skal i denne kontekst
forstås som træning i at „ændre den impulsive, egocentriske, ulogiske og rigide 
tænkning“ (op.cit.4f.), for eksempel ved at iagttage egen eller andres adfærd ved 
hjælp af videooptagelser af situationsspil, gennem øvelser og/eller ved hjælp af 
instruktørens eksempler på, hvordan en given situation kan tackles uden vold.
Undervisningen i Anger Management er varieret og består, ud over introduk-
tion og opsummering, af modulerne „Teknikker til at kontrollere vrede del 1, 2 
& 3“, „At udtrykke følelser – assertiv kommunikation“, „Håndtering af kritik 
og fornærmelser“ og „Højrisikosituationer“. Indlæringen af „prosocial“ adfærd 
sker gennem rollespil, videosekvenser om vrede/konflikter, gennemgang af 
„vredesdagbøger“ og afslapningsøvelser (op.cit.82). De indsatte visiteres til Anger 
Management af fængslets socialrådgivere og instruktører eller tager selv initiativ 
til at deltage. Mange af dem nævner, at deres primære motivation for at deltage
er et ønske om at opnå prøveløsladelse.7 De er dog ikke udelukkende motiveret 
af et instrumentelt behov for løsladelse, men også af et ønske om forandring og 
om at modtage hjælp.
Den kognitionspsykologiske og behavioristiske teori, som ligger til grund for 
Anger Management, repræsenterer en anden voldsforståelse end et antropologisk, 
konstruktivistisk perspektiv. Præmissen om, at kognitive mangler såsom forvræn-
get tænkning resulterer i vold, udfordres blandt andet af, at det ikke kun er 
kriminelle, som undskylder, kontekstualiserer eller forsvarer deres handlinger,
men at dette er et almenmenneskeligt forhold (Thomas-Peter 2006:36; Ugelvik 
2012; Presser 2008; Maruna & Mann 2006). Et antropologisk perspektiv på vold 
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kan måske bidrage til at forstå nogle af de uoverensstemmelser mellem deltagere
og instruktører, der opstår undervejs i programmet. Jeg vil derfor kort opridse 
nogle centrale perspektiver. 
Voldens flertydighed, kontekstafhængighed og positioneringskraft
Vold som empirisk og teoretisk begreb er svært at definere, og netop voldens
flydende karakter udgør et signifikant karaktertræk (Vigh 2004; Stanko 2003; 
Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2004:1). Det, som er vold i én kontekst, er det ikke 
i en anden, og det, som for én person udgør vold, opleves helt anderledes for 
en anden. I et antropologisk, konstruktivistisk perspektiv er vold ikke bare et 
spørgsmål om rå, fysisk handlekraft, men indbefatter magt, social differentiering
og fratagelse af handlerum. Artiklens problemstilling indbyder til at analysere
vold ud fra nedslag i 3 teoretiske og analytiske pointer: 1) Vold som begreb er 
ontologisk flertydigt og flydende, 2) voldens legitimitet er kontekstuel/situeret,
og 3) vold kan være redskab til positionering i relation til begreber som ære og 
respekt. Disse pointer er centrale i antropologisk voldsforskning, der i modsætning 
til kognitive teorier hævder, at vold er indlejret i social praksis. Vold kan derfor 
ikke meningsfuldt studeres som individuel afvigelse, men skal undersøges som et
produkt af det sociale liv (Henriksen 2013:33). Et analytisk fokus på, hvordan vold 
tillægges betydning, legitimeres eller forsøges undgået, skal ikke forstås som et 
relativistisk argument for den positive betydning af vold, men som en henvisning
til konteksten for volden og dens kommunikative budskaber (Abbink 2000).
Antropologen Ann-Karina Henriksen (2013) beskriver vold som meningsfuld 
social praksis indlejret i kulturelle logikker, der både fremmer og hæmmer brugen 
af vold. Henriksen diskuterer selvrespekt og betydningen af personlig oprejsning 
med udgangspunkt i feltarbejde blandt unge, marginaliserede og voldelige piger 
i København (op.cit.111). Hun pointerer, at nok søger pigerne efter en form for 
kønnet respekt, men pigernes handlinger skal også forstås som en stræben efter 
at få værdi i sociale verdener, der ellers rutinemæssigt devaluerer dem. Dette
indebærer ikke et normativt standpunkt om, at vold er positivt, men derimod et 
forsøg på at forstå pigernes handlinger som meningsfulde (op.cit.454).
En lignende pointe kan findes hos antropologen David Riches (1986, 1991). 
Riches argumenterer for, at voldsudøvere sjældent selv benytter begrebet vold om
deres skadevoldende handlinger, da vold konnoterer illegitimitet (Riches 1986:
3f., 1991:285). Voldsudøvere distancerer sig således fra vold ved for eksempel 
at omtale deres handlinger som uundgåelige eller som nødvendigt selvforsvar.
Riches (1991:286) argumenterer for at inddrage udøveres eget perspektiv på
skadevoldende handlinger snarere end at tage for givet, at der er enighed om, 
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hvornår vold er vold. Antropologen Anton Blok (2000) stiller sig ligeledes kritisk 
over for et entydigt voldsbegreb og argumenterer for, at vold ikke er et naturligt 
faktum, men derimod et historisk udviklet begreb, som er indlejret i kulturelle
kontekster, og at forskning i vold derfor skal stille spørgsmål til voldens form, 
kontekst og betydning. Blok kritiserer dermed en a priori-definition af vold som
meningsløs eller irrationel og fremhæver, at vold skal forstås som en meningsfuld 
form for interaktion og kommunikation.
Artiklens pointe om, at vold (også) kan forstås som et positioneringsredskab,
bekræftes af psykiateren James Gilligan, som argumenterer for, at vold motiveres 
af en søgen efter respekt og/eller kan ses som en respons på fornærmelser mod 
én selv eller ens nærmeste (Gilligan 2003:1149). Og sociologen Lucas Gottzén,
som beskæftiger sig med mænds narrativer om (hustru)vold, pointerer, at mænds
vold kan være et forsøg på at leve op til bestemte maskulinitetsnormer, når andre 
magtressourcer ikke opleves som tilgængelige. Gottzén fremhæver, hvordan hans 
informanter forsøger at kontekstualisere volden og beskriver sig selv som normale 
mænd, som på grund af omstændighederne bliver voldelige (Gottzén 2013:82).
Deltagerne i Anger Management giver udtryk for, at de bliver mødt med en 
manglende forståelse for deres motiver og begrundelser for at handle, som de 
gør. At instruktørerne fastholder en normativ betragtning om, at voldsudøvelse
er forkert, og søger at fremme en ikke-voldelig adfærd, er ikke overraskende. 
Men programmets og instruktørernes insisteren på, at vold skyldes en forkert 
tankegang og en tvivlsom moral, kan muligvis betyde, at deltagerne modarbejder 
undervisningen.
Erfaringer med vold
Succesfuld behandling må blandt andet handle om at skabe et terapeutisk rum, 
hvor der er en fælles forståelse og et fælles udgangspunkt for problemet, der søges
behandlet (Kolind, Asmussen & Holm 2014). Deltagerne giver alle udtryk for, at 
de gerne vil have hjælp til at kontrollere deres temperament og håndtere konflikter 
uden brug af vold. Eksempelvis udtrykker Michael fortrydelse i forbindelse med 
de røverier, han har begået: „Altså, jeg er godt klar over, at det er for meget, det 
jeg har gjort, ikke? Men det kunne jeg aldrig finde på at gøre, som jeg har det 
nu. Jeg har jo været påvirket og presset, og det er jo ikke noget, man er stolt af.“
Michael forklarer sin kriminalitet ud fra sit behov for stoffer samt sin oplevelse af 
pres som et resultat af netop manglen på samme. Dømte rationaliserer ofte deres
kriminalitet på den måde, hvilket skaber en distance mellem en forståelse af deres 
moralske selv og de handlinger, de har begået: Michael har gjort noget voldeligt,
men han er ikke voldelig i egen optik (jf. Copes, Hochstetler & Sandberg 2015:
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33). I modsætning hertil bygger Anger Management på ideer om en essentiel 
kriminel personlighed med mangler i tankegange og handlingsmønstre, hvor det 
kognitive behandlingsprojekt:
[…] nærmest hviler på en teori om et ʻ kriminelt menneske’, der afviger fra en ikke 
klart defineret normalitet, idet han eller hun savner visse kognitive færdigheder, 
der giver sig udslag i antisocial og kriminel opførsel. Den kriminelle udviser i 
den forstand en form for patologisk tankevirksomhed, der angiveligt kan kureres 
via den korrekte påvirkning (Smith 2003:326). 
I denne individualiserede model kan kriminel adfærd altså påvirkes og forandres, 
ved at der hos den dømte sker en identificering og bearbejdning af tanke- og 
adfærdsmønstre knyttet til kriminalitet samt indlæring af nye prosociale færdig-
heder (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:5). Denne behandlingsagenda indeholder nogle 
modsætninger, da deltagerne på en og samme tid bliver beskrevet som et rationelt 
selv, der er i stand til at forandre sig, mens selvet også beskrives som kognitivt 
forstyrret og på sin vis essentielt kriminelt (Fox 1999; Rhodes 2010).
I informanternes fortællinger udviskes og sløres grænserne mellem udøver 
og offer for vold. Deltagerne afviser ikke, at de har begået handlinger, som har 
skadet andre, men måske skal man ikke forstå deres gerninger i et individuelt 
patologisk perspektiv, men snarere som en art social navigation (se Henriksen
2013:232 om dette begreb). Deltagerne fremhæver perspektiver på vold, der 
begrundes i konkrete sociale sammenhænge og personer, hvorimod instruktørerne
argumenterer for, at vold udelukkende skal ses som et principielt valg og som
et udtryk for deltagernes manglende evne til at kontrollere sig selv. Grænserne 
mellem udøver og offer er ofte mere flydende og omskiftelige, hvad angår vold 
inden for subkulturelle og kriminelle grupperinger eller i nattelivet, end de er i
forhold til vold i nære relationer. Mange af deltagerne har endvidere personlige
erfaringer med vold i hjemmet, som Andreas, der siger: „Jamen, jeg er altid 
blevet tævet af min far, så …“ Eller Michael, der holder af sin stedfar, fordi
„han aldrig har slået min mor, og det gjorde min far jo“. Deltagernes erfaringer 
med voldsudøvelse eller det at være voldsoffer relaterer sig også til at sidde i
fængsel. Fængselsforskeren Gresham Sykes identificerede 5 såkaldte „pains of 
imprisonment“,8 hvoraf den ene er frygt for egen sikkerhed (Sykes 1958). Disse 
5 forhold er siden videreudviklet (Crewe 2011), men indsattes frygt for vold og 
beredskab over for vold er fortsat høj i fængsler (Liebling & Arnold 2012). Nadim
siger da også: „Herinde har du skudsikker vest på, er kampklar. Fængslet er en 
base, hvor man er en kriger. Alle er ens herinde.“
Deltagerne har desuden erfaringer med gadevold – både som offer og
gerningsmand. Denne dobbelthed understøttes af offerundersøgelserne 2005-
2013 (Balvig et al. 2012), som viser, hvordan ofre for vold ofte har samme demo-
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grafiske profil som gerningsmanden. De registrerede ofre for vold er typisk unge,
enlige mænd med etnisk minoritetsbaggrund, grundskole som højeste uddannelse, 
arbejdsløse og med lav indkomst. Vold er ydermere typisk situationsbetinget og 
sjældent noget, der planlægges og kræver, at ofret opsøges (op.cit.133f.). En 
dikotomisk forståelse af vold, hvor man enten er voldelig eller ikke voldelig, alt 
efter hvilke valg man foretager, giver ikke megen genklang i analysen af deltagernes 
fortællinger. De former for vold, der italesættes (jf. Bosworth & Carrabine 2001:
508) af deltagerne i Anger Management, udfolder sig ikke i de nære relationer, men
derimod oftest i nattelivet, fængslet samt i kriminalitetsprægede, subkulturelle
grupperinger. Det er dog ikke til at vide, om deltagernes afstandtagen fra vold i 
nære relationer er udtryk for en moralsk positionering, eller om den er en korrekt 
gengivelse af deres virkelighed. Eksempelvis argumenterer voldsforskeren Jeff 
Hearn for kompleksitet og selvmodsigelser i narrativer, idet han viser, hvordan 
mænd siger, at de ikke udøver vold mod kvinder, men så alligevel opremser 
talrige episoder, hvor de har udøvet fysisk og psykisk vold mod deres kvindelige
partner (Hearn 1998:71, 2012:599f.). Fortællinger skal måske ikke forstås som 
sandhedsnarrativer, men derimod som processer, hvor identitet og selvforståelse 
produceres og forhandles (Henriksen 2013:48; Presser 2008, 2012; Sandberg 
2010). Vold i nære relationer stigmatiseres og fordømmes, her eksemplificeret 
af Kasper:
Prøv og hør, jeg kunne aldrig drømme om at slå på nogen, jeg holder af […] 
Folk, der ikke er i fængsel, det er jo typisk folk, som gør vold mod deres koner 
eller kærester, og i det miljø, hvor jeg kommer fra, der er det jo totalt tabu! 
Det gør du bare ikke! Jeg skal jo have noget mod mit temperament altså i al 
almindelighed! 
Kaspers udsagn kan måske ses som en form for moralsk skillelinje, hvor han
samtidig positionerer sig som et ordentligt og anstændigt menneske. Kaspers 
skelnen mellem vold i hjemmet og hans egen form for voldsudøvelse i nattelivet 
og subkulturelle miljøer kan også forstås som en narrativ betydningsdannelse, hvor 
Kasper forsøger at pege på folk, der er værre end ham selv, fordi de bruger vold 
uden for situeret legitime områder såsom nattelivet (Ugelvik 2012). Deltagerne 
navigerer også i et krydsfelt af relationer, som indbyder mere eller mindre til vold,
hvor vold og truende adfærd kan være et redskab til positionering. Deltagerne
positionerer sig ydermere både i og uden for fængslet samt over for hinanden og 
instruktøren, hvilket jeg diskuterer i det følgende.
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Forhandlinger om voldens betydning og legitimitet
Deltagerne i Anger Management protesterer generelt, når instruktørerne hævder, at 
forbrydelser eller tvivlsomme moralske rationaliseringer er udtryk for manglende 
ansvarlighed eller tankefejl. Måske er begreber som moral, etik og loyalitet kon-
tekstafhængige og uforståelige uden for den sociale og strukturelle virkelighed, 
de befinder sig i (Mattingly 2013; Henriksen 2013). Et kontekstafhængigt og 
situeret perspektiv på nødvendigheden af vold eller selvforsvar er i hvert fald 
et tilbagevendende diskussionsemne i undervisningen, hvilket eksemplificeres
gennem nedenstående diskussion om, hvorvidt man kan forsvare at medbringe
en kniv i nattelivet:
Instruktør: ʻDet handler hele tiden om valg, I har hele tiden et valg. Kniven i 
lommen; den brænder. I har magten, I skal tænke over det, før I tager kniven med. 
Den er jo ikke kun til forsvar!’
Khazar har i pausen fortalt om sin barndomsven, der blev stukket ned med en 
kniv og døde: ʻ Det er en helt normal reaktion. Hvis en er blevet stukket, så er man 
nødt til at have en kniv med.’ 
Instruktør: ʻSå må man lade være med at tage i byen!’ 
Hamza: ʻ Du skal holde dig væk fra Strøget, fordi hvis I kommer fire indvandrere, 
der ser godt ud, og I vil gerne lave damer, der kommer problemer. Sid derhjemme 
og ring til damerne!’
Instruktør: ʻDet er jo ekstremsituationer med knive.’
Khazar: ʻNej, det er ikke så ekstremt. Folk stikker hinanden ned, fordi de kigger 
skævt til hinanden.’
Instruktør: ʻDet er en dårlig undskyldning, for jeg har ikke brug for en kniv, når 
jeg går ud!’
ikke denne forståelse af de omstændigheder, som han oplever i sit hjemmemiljø,
som er en dansk ghetto med betragtelige problemer med arbejdsløshed og
kriminalitet.9 Det er forventeligt, at instruktøren udfordrer Khazars forsvar for 
at medbringe en kniv, når han bevæger sig ud i nattelivet, men Khazars egen
opfattelse af sit kvarter vil givetvis være betydningsfuld for den måde, han
oplever at kunne agere på (jf. Copes, Hochstetler & Sandberg 2015:38). En 
anden deltager, Mikkel, fortæller ligeledes om en gammel episode med nogle 
større drenge, som over en periode truede Mikkel og hans venner med en kniv.
Mikkel endte med at „slå dem“ i sidste ende, og han ser denne oplevelse som 
en form for socialisering, „en læring i at klare sig, når man er en lille knægt“. 
Mikkel mener tilmed, at hvis man har „styr på sit eget“, holder de andre op med at 
genere én, hvorefter han henkastet siger, at „sådan er det at være ung i en ghetto“. 
Måske skal unge mænds involvering i gadeslåskampe hverken forstås som en 
mangel på normativ selvkontrol eller en fejlagtig moral, men som en integreret 
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del af et marginaliseret liv, som nogle hævder (Wacquant 2008; Bengtsson 2012). 
Manualen bag Anger Management hævder i modsætning hertil, at et fokus på
strukturelle faktorer udelukkende får mennesker til at tro, at deres muligheder 
er begrænsede, hvilket deltagelse i programmet kan afhjælpe, da man dermed 
bliver i stand til at ændre sine tanker og som følge heraf sine handlinger (Sjöberg 
& Windfeldt 2008; Kramer et al. 2013:538). Anger Management tilstræber at 
virke i et socialt vakuum, fordi deltagerne bliver bedt om at fjerne konteksten fra 
narrativer om det skete, hvilket resulterer i, at den voldelige handling står alene
og forekommer helt irrationel (jf. Fox 2001:181). Dette er i tråd med Riches’ 
pointe om, at fortællinger om vold fastfryses i perspektiver, som udelukker den 
hverdagslige kontekst for volden (Riches 1991:286). Deltagernes voldsudøvelse 
bærer sin egen form for kontekstualiseret rationalitet, hvorfor det eksempelvis
ikke er meningsfuldt at „smadre en købmand“ i fængslet, men derimod rationelt
at slå Rune, som kontinuerligt overskrider Khazars grænser.
Artiklens pointe er ikke, at vold er acceptabel, men at deltagernes handlinger 
giver mening i et antropologisk perspektiv på vold og krænkelser som social praksis, 
som udøves på linje med andre handlinger. En socialt situeret forklaring stemmer 
ikke overens med forestillingen om kognitive mangler, så kontekstafhængige 
narrativer bliver dømt som tankefejl eller manglende ansvarstagen. Deltagerne
trækker derimod på subkulturelle vurderinger af specifik opførsel som en nødven-
dig og forventet del af et urbant gadeliv og fængselstilværelsen, hvilket ikke 
finder genklang i en individualiseret behandlingsmetode. Nedenstående eksempler 
stammer fra et enkeltinterview med Nadim, et rollespil i undervisningen samt en
nedfældet episode fra Ahmads vredesdagbog, der danner grundlag for en samtale
mellem ham og instruktøren. Eksemplerne understreger pointen om, at brugen af 
vold ikke nødvendigvis skyldes mangel på sociale kompetencer, men derimod 
en særlig forståelse af organiseringen og kommunikationen i det sociale miljø
(jf. Henriksen 2013:76f.).
Nadim: ʻDet [Anger Management] har været godt. Men det er lidt svært, jo. Det 
kommer an på situationen, hvad for nogle situationer man kommer ind i. Jeg er 
kommet i en situation, hvor personen truer med at hoppe på mig i morgen på gårdtur 
[motion i fængslet]. Hvad fanden skal jeg gøre oppe i mit hoved, hvad fanden 
skal jeg tænke på? Skal jeg tage boksehandskerne på i morgen og gå på gårdtur, 
eller skal jeg slet ikke gå på gårdtur eller …? Hvad har jeg af andre muligheder? 
Jeg har bare ikke andre muligheder. Enten kan jeg blive låst inde, eller også kan 
jeg gå på gårdtur og så tage, hvad der nu kommer. Fordi jeg tænker, at hvis der 
er én, der slår mig, så slår jeg tilbage. Jeg ved ikke, hvad fanden jeg skal gøre … 
det var derfor, at jeg blev så ked af det og sur […] Jeg sidder inde jo, og jeg vil 
ikke slås for ingenting, hvorfor skal jeg slås? Men hvis der er én, der slår mig, så 
bliver jeg nødt til at slå tilbage.’
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Ahmad og Viktor rollespiller en købmandssituation, hvor fængslets købmand 
siger, at Ahmad ikke har bestilt varer, hvilket Ahmad er sikker på, at han har, og
han skal bruge dem til sin datters forestående besøg. Det går ikke så godt med 
spillet, som egentlig skal illustrere en potentiel voldelig konflikt. Ahmad siger, 
at det er et dårligt rollespil, fordi han jo ikke kan blive sur på købmanden over 
det! De to bytter roller og får omsider spillet færdigt. Viktor siger afsluttende, at 
ʻman begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand’.
Samtale mellem Ahmad og instruktør på baggrund af oplevelse nedfældet i Ahmads 
vredesdagbog: Ahmad var ude at køre med en ven og stødte på en fremmed mand, 
der råbte ʻ perker’, mens han stod sammen med en masse piger og ʻ spillede smart’. 
Ahmad kørte bilen voldsomt derhen, steg ud og stak en pistol [med løse skud] 
ind i munden på manden og spurgte: ʻ Hvad fanden snakker du om?’ Manden blev 
bange og tissede i bukserne foran pigerne, der grinede. Instruktør: ʻ Hvad skulle du 
have gjort?’ Ahmad: ʻ Gået hen stille og roligt, sige, at han skulle snakke ordentligt, 
eller måske bare pande ham én.’
Interviewet med Nadim illustrerer både hans manglende tolerance over for fornær-
melser og hans nervøsitet og ambivalente forhold til at tackle den potentielt
voldelige konflikt på gårdturen. I det sidste eksempel med Ahmad reagerer han 
på det nedladende, racistiske tilråb og positionerer sig ved at reagere voldsomt.
Ahmads kommentar om, at han måske i stedet bare kunne have „pandet ham én“
kan måske ses som en form for småflabet positionering over for instruktøren, 
men instruktørerne anerkender til tider, når deltagerne foreslår at vælge mindre
voldelige løsninger: „[Det er] fint nok, hvis man har været helt vild og så lærer 
bare at stikke en flad“. Ahmad kan til gengæld ikke hidse sig op over de hypotetisk 
manglende købmandsvarer, så rollespillet med en lige så uforstående Viktor går 
i vasken. Det fejlslagne rollespil skyldes måske, at der ikke er noget på spil for 
deltagerne såsom ære eller maskulinitet, hvilket samtidig understreger kontekstens
betydning for deltagernes positionering.
Deltagerne beskriver, hvordan de føler skam over deres voldelige handlinger,
men det virker vanskeligt for dem at overføre de konstruerede eksempler på vold 
fra undervisningen i fængslet til situationer uden for fængslet. Dette blev disku-
teret i fokusgruppeinterviewet, hvor Kasper netop sætter spørgsmålstegn ved, at 
instruktøren kontinuerligt irettesætter deltagerne, når de bruger eksempler på vold,
der er sket uden for fængslet. Denne modstand kan måske forstås som et forsøg på 
at dirigere opmærksomheden væk fra Kaspers egne voldshandlinger, men Kasper 
peger også på elementer i programmet, som han finder kontraproduktive. Kasper 
diskuterede nemlig åbent sine voldshandlinger i løbet af programmet, men han
ønskede at tale om dem i den kontekst, de foregik i, nemlig i socialiteten uden 
for fængslet:
81
Kasper: ʻJamen, vi skal ud på et tidspunkt, og det skal jo ikke kun være ting, 
vi kan bruge inde i et fængsel, det skal også være noget, vi kan arbejde med 
udenfor! Man skal jo også kunne se et positivt resultat ved ikke at gå amok på 
taxachaufføren over, at han har kørt en omvej på 100 km eller et eller andet. [ …] 
Vi sidder her jo alle sammen af en grund, jo. Ahmad, han sidder her, fordi han 
har afpresset nogen, du ved, så han kunne jo godt have kommet med et negativt 
eksempel på det. Viktor har været inde at sidde for vold før, så han kunne også 
godt have kommet med et negativt eksempel på, at han mistede besindelsen, og 
jeg har jo et hav af voldsdomme, så jeg kunne også sagtens have kommet med 
eksempler fra udenfor!’
Instruktør: ʻHvis I bruger eksempler fra livet uden for fængslet, kan jeg ikke 
henvise til de positive og negative konsekvenser. For eksempel hvis I henviser til et 
vellykket tyveri, så var det positive, at I fik jeres penge, og hvad var så de negative 
konsekvenser? Jamen, der var ikke rigtigt nogen, fordi jeg slap – jeg fik jo mine 
penge.“ Og det er jo ikke derfor, jeg er her! Det skal være sådan, at den negative 
konsekvens ved at miste kontrollen, den skal altid opveje det positive. […] Hvis 
I bruger eksempler udefra, så kan jeg jo ikke bruge det positive i logbogen. Der 
var ingen isolation, der var ingen ekstrastraf og alt det der, så hele det her med 
slutresultatet og de positive ting, der er sket, ved at du håndterede din vrede på 
den der måde, det ryger jo væk!’
Viktor: ʻ Jamen, hvis man ser helheden i det med pengene og inden for de fornuftige 
normer og sådan noget, så er der jo en negativ konsekvens! Han går måske og er 
bange og sætter et rygte i gang om, at ham der [Viktor] han smadrer dig altså, hvis 
du ikke giver ham pengene. Så der er jo en negativ konsekvens – i det lange løb er 
der jo negative konsekvenser, selv om der ikke er fængselsrelaterede konsekvenser 
som isolation eller ekstrastraf.’
Den manualbaserede undervisnings fokus på negative og positive konsekvenser 
tager ikke højde for en hverdagslig kontekst, som ikke altid er sort-hvid. Dette
eksemplificeres af Viktor, som påpeger, at uanset straffens formelle karakter er 
der moralske konsekvenser ved at afpresse andre, mens Kasper søger redskaber 
til at undgå at „gå amok“ på taxachaufføren. Måske positionerer deltagerne sig
også over for instruktøren, hinanden og undertegnede ved at understrege deres 
autonomi ved hjælp af modsigelser og lettere provokerende udsagn. Deltagerne
er i hvert fald optaget af at positionere sig ud fra en forestilling om maskuliniseret 
respekt, hvilket jeg diskuterer nedenfor. Det maskulinitetsideal, som deltagerne 
frem hæver, skaber forhindringer i behandlingen, men kan også være med til at 
øge forståelsen for deres egne opfattelser af vold, konflikter og fornærmelser. 
Maskulinitetsidealer er præget af diversitet og kompleksitet samt indlejrede i
sociale og strukturelle forhold, hvorfor en hegemonisk maskulinitetsforståelse
møder kritik (Connell & Messerschmidt 2005). Deltagernes maskulinitetsideal
handler dog blandt andet om at sætte sig i respekt, ikke tabe ansigt, forsvare sin 
ære og at positionere sig i forskellige sociale sammenhænge både i og uden for 
fængslet.
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Vold som (potentiel) positioneringskraft
Ifølge sociologen Eva Illouz er ære ildeset i en terapeutisk sammenhæng, hvor 
voksne personer forventes at handle rationelt i en nytteorienteret optik, og folk,
som hellere forsvarer deres ære, bliver derfor set som følelsesmæssigt inkompe-
tente (Illouz 2008:84). I antropologisk (volds)forskning er der dog ikke noget 
modsætningsforhold mellem rationalitet og forsvar for ære ved brug af vold. Vold 
kan både betragtes som en defensiv mekanisme, en (potentiel) kilde til magt og 
som et middel til at opnå noget, eksempelvis en form for respekt. Dermed frem-
står voldelig adfærd som et „handlingsmønster, der er motiveret af et forsvar af 
mennesker, muligheder, integritet eller værdier, der opleves som truede“ (Vigh
2004:4). Deltagerne i Anger Management er meget optaget af, hvor betydningsfuldt 
det er for dem ikke at underkaste sig en anden eller acceptere fornærmelser, men at 
de derimod må sætte sig i respekt på forskellig vis. Sådanne maskulinitetsnormer 
(Gottzén 2013) er muligvis kontraproduktive i en behandlingslogik, hvor man 
søger at ændre moral, værdier og tankemønstre. Instruktørerne underviser i hvert 
fald i, hvordan man skelner mellem og håndterer fornærmelser eller kritik på en 
hensigtsmæssig måde, så deltagerne undgår at reagere aggressivt. Deltagerne
lader ikke til at have problemer med at skelne mellem nuancerne i henholdsvis
kritik og fornærmelser, men de er ikke nødvendigvis enige i, hvordan man tackler 
sådanne situationer. Nedenstående eksempel er fra en diskussion om, hvordan
man kan eller bør håndtere potentiel kritik og konflikt, som visitationen af ens 
fængselscelle indebærer:
Instruktør: ʻHvad kan man gøre [i stedet for at slå]?’
Makin: ʻLatterliggøre den anden.’
Instruktør: ʻDer er vi ikke helt enige […] Hvis du kører på én, så kan det være, at 
den anden mister kontrollen.’
Makin: ʻFedt!’ 
Instruktør: ʻVi skal ikke tænke planlagt vold, vi skal tænke i konsekvenser. Vi 
skal ikke ud i, at I tænker kriminelle tanker … og vælger at slås. For det er ikke 
hensigtsmæssigt at køre den anden op!’
Makin: ʻDet er dig, der afbryder, du kan jo ikke forstå det, hvis du afbryder mig. 
Det er forskelligt fra situation til situation. Fordi jeg ikke har noget magt i mine 
hænder, så tager jeg bukserne langsomt af [under visitationen]. Det var bare et 
eksempel, du tager det som kernen i emnet. Jeg kan ikke lide at underkaste mig 
nogen, som jeg ikke har lyst til at underkaste mig.’
Kasper: ʻDet er et spørgsmål om selvrespekt.’
Makin: ʻ Man bliver meget konfliktsky, synes jeg [ved at følge Anger Managements 
tankegang].’
Disse diskussioner om oprejsning og respekt handler både om personlige
græn ser, kontekstualiseret rationalitet og ikke mindst om forestillinger om
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maskulinitet og ære. Eksempelvis argumenterer Kasper for, at „det er vigtigt,
at man ikke nedværdiger sig selv – man skal holde fast i det, man mener“.
Deltagerne trækker på bestemte forståelser af ære og opfattelser af rimelige
niveauer for tolerance, hvilket betyder, at det er væsentligt at løse problemer på 
„den mandlige måde“,10 som eksempelvis betyder, at en slåskamp kan afslutte en
konflikt én gang for alle (jf. Copes, Hochstetler & Forsyth 2013:771f.; Jewkes 
2005). Som Kasper udtrykker det: „Det er simpelthen, fordi jeg har en stolthed, 
der siger spar to, og jeg kan simpelthen ikke klare, at nogen træder på den, og så
bliver der bare reageret med det samme!“ Denne indstilling og de medfølgende 
konsekvenser er naturligvis problematiske, hvilket Kasper også medgiver og
uddyber undervejs i programmet. Anton Blok argumenterer for, at fornærmelser 
kan opleves som en seriøs form for verbal vold, hvilket kan forklare Kaspers 
stålfaste manglende accept af fornærmelser. Blok beskriver ligeledes, hvordan
følsomhed over for fornærmelser varierer inden for forskellige kontekster, og folk 
har forskellige følsomhedsgrænser (Blok 2000:25). Makins historie fortælles i en
fængselskontekst, hvor den indsattes agens og handlerum er vældigt indsnævret 
(Crewe 2011; Liebling & Arnold 2012), hvilket kan forklare, hvorfor det bliver 
væsentligt selv at bestemme tempoet for afklædning i forbindelse med en
obligatorisk celleinspektion. Samir fortæller ligeledes, hvordan han oplever, at 
det er svært blot at acceptere fornærmelser eller trusler i fængslet:
Samir: ʻDu forklarer det lidt dårligt. Hvis der er en, der taler grimt til mig – jeg 
hopper på ham! Det gør alle herinde. Jeg tror, at jeg ville sige, at han skulle tale 
pænt.’
Instruktør: ʻMen hvad kunne du gøre?’
Samir: ʻDu tænker ikke så meget over det, du svarer bare tilbage, som han har 
startet. Det handler også om gruppepres. De andre vil tro, at du er en kylling, hvis 
du ikke gør noget.’
Instruktør: ʻOg hvad så?’
Samir: ʻDet er ubehageligt, det er ligesom at blive mobbet.’
Eksemplet, som indledte artiklen, hvor Khazar fortæller sin historie om mobning
og vold, omhandler både en søgen efter respekt og oprejsning og viser, hvilke
forestillinger om maskulinitet der er på spil for deltagerne i Anger Management. 
Fortællingen om Khazar, der følte sig presset til at slå for at undgå ydmygelsen
i at blive drillet af Rune og hans venner, kan belyse, hvordan vold er indlejret i 
komplekse sociale processer og dermed kan forstås som et produkt af en bestemt 
situeret dynamik og rationaler (Henriksen 2013). Voldelige handlinger kan måske 
forekomme i en acceptabel eller forståelig form, hvor udøverens motiv er moralsk 
genkendeligt, som hvis man bliver udsat for noget, som man opfatter som en 
krænkelse (Vigh 2004). Episoden med Khazar kan også ses som et spørgsmål om 
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positionering, ære og respekt, idet Khazar følte sig krænket og trådt på, men det 
væsentligste er måske, hvor betydningsfuld konteksten er for at forstå episoden.
Uden konteksten ville tilhøreren formodentlig ikke kunne acceptere volden, der 
ville forekomme meningsløs og irrationel, men fordi vi kan genkende Khazars 
motiv for at slå, bliver episoden meningsfuld eller i hvert fald forståelig. Khazars 
historie er ligeledes et eksempel på den forhandling af vold, der diskuteres i Anger 
Management, og de sammenstød og positioneringskampe mellem deltagere og
instruktører, som de forskellige voldsperspektiver resulterer i.
Konklusion
Artiklen har rejst spørgsmålet om konstruktion og forhandling af vold i vredes-
kontrolprogrammet Anger Management og om deltagernes positionering i
forhold til instruktørernes dagsorden. Programmet udfordres af, at deltagerne
positionerer sig ud fra bestemte maskulinitetsnormer (jf. Gottzén 2013; Connell 
& Messerschmidt 2005; Hearn 2012) både i og uden for fængslet og derfor konti-
nuerligt udfordrer instruktørerne. På den anden side tillægger programmet og 
de tilknyttede instruktører ikke deltagernes perspektiver legitimitet, og al vold 
opfattes som et udslag af fejlagtige tankemønstre, hvilket udelukker kontekstuelle, 
sociale og strukturelle forklaringer. Ved at benytte prædikater som antisocial 
personlighed, manglende selvkontrol og fejlagtigt tankemønster formaliseres og 
institutionaliseres personligheden i de kognitive programmer, hvilket betyder, at 
deltagernes egne narrativer ofte overhøres og negligeres (jf. Crewe 2011:515).
Anger Management-programmet og de tilknyttede instruktører afviser relevansen 
af den kontekst for aggression og vold, som deltagerne typisk fremhæver som
relevant. På den måde får programmet og instruktørerne tegnet et billede af 
voldshandlinger som ikke bare illegitime, men irrationelle. Dette er i tråd med 
de kognitive færdighedsprogrammer, hvor der findes forkerte eller problematiske 
tankemønstre, der resulterer i fortsatte kriminelle handlinger.
Vi kan måske forstå deltagernes fortællinger som en form for narrativ menings-
skabelse frem for at forstå dem som undskyldninger for kriminalitet (jf. Ugelvik 
2012). Deltagernes aggression og vold bærer ofte deres egen rationalitet, som 
blandt andet kommer til udtryk i ønsket om at bevare eller forsvare en form
for maskuliniseret selvrespekt og værdighed i hverdagslivet både i og uden for 
fængslet. Det er muligt, at disse opfattelser i højere grad skal inddrages bevidst,
hvis et program som Anger Management skal fungere bedre. Sammenstødet
mellem forskellige rationaliteter og instruktørernes insisteren på at arbejde med 
konstruerede eller irrelevante situationer fra fængslet kan være en begrænsning 
for programmernes mulighed for at kunne „behandle“ og forebygge vold.
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Noter
1. Ph.d.-projektet og dermed denne artikel er en del af et større forskningsprojekt ESSET
(Education in Social Skills and Emotional Training), Aalborg Universitet. ESSET handler om
de krav, der stilles til sociale kompetencer i børnehaver, skoler, arbejdsliv, socialt arbejde og
i Kriminalforsorgen, hvilket undersøges af fire forskellige forskere. Se esset.aau.dk. Tak til 
Kriminalforsorgen samt instruktører og deltagere i Anger Management for samarbejdsvilje,
interesse og engagement i projektet.
2. Fængslerne forbliver unavngivne af hensyn til instruktører og deltagere. Deltagernes navne er 
anonymiseret på en måde, der afspejler deres etniske baggrund. Instruktørerne kaldes blot for 
instruktør, da datamaterialet er så småt, at det ville være vanskeligt at bevare anonymiteten,
hvis de blev navngivet i forhold til køn.
3. Både instruktører og deltagere er blevet informeret om anonymitet, retten til at stoppe eller 
forlade interviewet samt orienteret om formålet med studiet.
4. I 2013 blev der afviklet 162 forløb af de 6 forskellige kognitive programmer i Kriminalforsorgens
institutioner. Anger Management udgør samme år 65 procent af det samlede antal forløb, der 
afvikles. I 2013 var der i alt 657 deltagere, der påbegyndte et kognitivt program, og 514 der 
gennemførte (Årsrapport fra Programvirksomheden 2013).
5. Klientundersøgelsen af alle indsatte (Clausen 2011) viser, at 68 procent af de fængselsdømte
og 69 procent af de varetægtsfængslede har grundskole som højeste fuldførte uddannelse. 15
procent af fængselspopulationen er indvandrere, og 7 procent er efterkommere. 62 procent
af fængselspopulationen er registreret som værende „øvrige uden for arbejdsstyrken“
(op.cit.71). Kriminalforsorgen publicerer så vidt vides ikke statistik om, hvorvidt indvandrere
og efterkommere udgør en større andel af de indsatte med voldsdom. Det er derfor vanskeligt 
at vide, hvorfor deltagere med etnisk minoritetsbaggrund er overrepræsenteret i Anger 
Management.
6. Kriminalforsorgen i Frihed (KiF) har ansvaret for tilsyn og kontakt med Kriminalforsorgens 
dømte uden for fængsler og arrester. Desuden er det KiF, der udarbejder personundersøgelser 
af sigtede, før deres sag behandles i retten, samt fører tilsyn med fodlænkeafsonere.
7. Ifølge § 40a i straffeloven kan en indsat blive løsladt på prøve, hvis hensynet til retshåndhævelsen 
skønnes ikke at tale imod det, og den dømte har ydet en særlig indsats for ikke på ny at begå
kriminalitet, herunder ved at deltage i behandlings- eller uddannelsesforløb, eller hvis den 
dømtes forhold taler herfor (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:28).
8. Sykes definerede følgende fem såkaldte „pains of imprisonment“: 1) afsavn af [deprivation
of] frihed, 2) afsavn af varer og services, 3) afsavn af heteroseksuelle forhold, 4) afsavn af 
autonomi, 5) afsavn af personlig frihed (Sykes 1958:65f.).
9. Ghetto er defineret i forhold til de såkaldte ghettokriterier for 29 særligt udsatte almene 
bolig områder, som den daværende regering udviklede i 2010. Disse kriterier har været meget 
omdebatterede – en kritik, som artiklen ikke beskæftiger sig yderligere med.
10. Antropologen Lorna Rhodes diskuterer ligeledes maskulinitet og oprejsning (Rhodes 2004:
53), men med fængselsbetjente i USA som eksempel. De henviser nemlig til at gøre tingene 
på „den mandlige måde“, hvis der er optrapning til konflikt med en fange, hvor de ønsker at 
sætte sig i respekt. Denne parallel kunne være interessant at udforske.
Søgeord: Anger Management, vold, behandling, fængsler, kognitive færdigheds-
programmer
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Focus group interview guide: Cognitive Skills 
Thank you all for agreeing to participate in this interview. We can discontinue the interview at any 
point if you do not wish to continue or if you do not have time to go on. I will use a digital recorder 
if that is alright with you, but I will be the only one listening to the recording and I will transcribe it 
myself. As you all know, my PhD is about the cognitive behavioural programmes and what goes on 
in them. I am interested in what the instructor is trying to teach you and what you think you gain 
from participating. The point of this interview is to learn a bit more about why you chose to 
participate and how you have experienced the programme. 
- Could you please tell me your age, your occupation before your imprisonment and a bit 
about your personal situation (are you married, do you have children, etc.)? 
  
- Why did you choose to participate in Cognitive Skills?  
- How were you accepted into the programme?  
- Was it difficult to be accepted into the programme?  
- How do you find the lessons in general?  
- Do you think that the programme is too long, too short or the right length?  
- How do you find the format and structure of the programme? For example, how do you find 
the role-plays or the story-telling exercises? Do the exercises make sense to you? 
- How do you feel about being in a group with five other prisoners, whom you may or may 
not know? Does it matter who the other participants are? 
- What is it, in your own words, which the instructor is trying to teach you?  
- What skills do you find useful?  
- What skills are most important to you? (For example problem-solving skills, verbal/non-
verbal communication, alternatives, assessment of consequences, creative thinking, assertive 
communication, facts/opinions, social skills, values, critical thinking, etc.?)  
- Do you think you will be able to use the programme anywhere else than the classroom? (For 
example in prison, with your families, in relations to friends, in an encounter with the Prison 
and Probation service, in relation to criminality, etc.)  
- Is it possible to use assertive communication in prison?  
- Would it be possible/easy for you to use the skills in a future situation if a conflict or a 
problem should arise?  
- Would you please finish the sentence: Cognitive Skills would be much better if only…? 
Interview guide: Anger Management   
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. We can discontinue the interview at any 
point if you do not wish to continue or if you do not have time to go on. I will use a digital recorder 
if that is alright with you, but I will be the only one listening to the recording and I will transcribe it 
myself. As you know, my PhD is about the cognitive behavioural programmes and what goes on in 
them. The point of this interview is to learn a bit more about why you chose to participate and how 
you have experienced the programme. 
- Could you please tell me your age, your occupation before your imprisonment and a bit 
about your personal situation (are you married, do you have children, etc.)?  
 
- How long have you been imprisoned/on remand? 
 
- Have you been imprisoned before? And/or have you participated in cognitive behavioural 
programmes in other prisons or probation settings?  
 
- Why did you choose to participate in Anger Management?  
 
- How were you accepted on to the programme? Was it difficult to be accepted?  
 
- How do you feel about being in a group with five other prisoners, whom you may or may 
not know? Does it matter who the other participants are? 
 
- How do you find the format of Anger Management? For instance the role-plays, the video-
recordings, the discussions?  
 
- Which kind of impact does the instructor have in regards to your experiences of the 
programme?  
 
- How did you experience the individual conversation(s) that you have had with the 
instructors? Are it/they important? 
 
- I would like to talk about violence and/or anger. Do you find that there is a connection 
between your temper or anger and the conviction/sentence you have received?  
 
- I am interested in how Anger Management and the instructor understand and interpret anger 
and violence versus your understanding. Do you think of yourself as violent? Do you think 
that you have problems controlling your temper? Or how do you perceive of yourself in this 
regard? 
 
- Can you give me an example of an episode or a situation which ended up with violence or 
anger? What happened?  
 
- And the other way around; can you mention a situation which did not end with a conflict or 
an episode of violence? How did you solve this? Did you use the techniques or tools that 
you learned in Anger Management?  
 
- How would you define honour or respect? What do these concepts mean to you if anything? 
 
- Can you give me an example where someone protected your honour or made you feel 
respected? And the contrary; can you give me an example where you did not feel respected?  
 
- Have you tried to use the tools that are taught in the programme such as BUSS or self-
calming exercises or relaxation exercises in order to avoid a conflict or to avoid that a 
conflict would lead to violence?  
 
- The instructor talked about how you can change your behaviour by changing your thoughts. 
For example, if you think differently or choose differently when you encounter other people 
or particular situations then you would be able to avoid problems? Does that make sense to 
you? 
 
- Could you imagine using the tools outside of the prison? For example in relations to your 
family, friends, work, encounters with the Prison and Probation Service, or in regards to 
criminality?  
 
- Is there anything I forgot to ask you? Or anything else that you would like to tell me?  
 
 
 
Interview guide: Instructors 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. We can discontinue the interview at any 
point if you do not wish to continue or if you don’t have time to go on. I will use a digital recorder 
if that is alright with you, but I will be the only one listening to the recording and I will transcribe it 
myself. As you know, my PhD is about the cognitive behavioural programmes and what goes on in 
them. I am interested in to learn a bit more about why you chose to become a cognitive behavioural 
programme instructor, your perception of the programmatic goals, and the purposes of the 
programme as you understand them. 
- Why did you choose to become a cognitive behavioural instructor? How did you find the 
education? What, in your opinion, is valued during the selection of future cognitive 
behavioural instructors (why were you chosen, do you think?) 
 
- Have you found it difficult to change occupational identity from prison officer to cognitive 
behavioural programme instructor? How did your colleagues react to your new role?  
 
- How do you screen and select the participants? What is important to you during the 
screening interview?  
 
- Do you use a scheme or a scale (for measuring anger/motivation) in the interviews? 
 
- What are the most important factors in screening participants and forming a group?  
 
- Could you describe a really well-functioning group and a not so well functioning group? 
What are the consequences in both cases?  
 
- If you should describe, in your own words, what it is that you are trying to teach or tell the 
participants, what would you say?  
 
- What skills/lessons/concepts are most important in your opinion?  
 
- Could you give an example of a success story? (For example a participant who gained a lot 
from participating, a good experience with a particular group, a really valuable lesson, etc.?) 
 
- On the contrary; can you give an example of a participant/a group/a situation which did not 
work well?  
 
- You said, following the programme manual, that it is important to make the lessons relevant 
to the participants. Could you please say a little more about that?  
 
- Could you also say something more about the difference between thoughts and 
feelings/behaviour that are pushed forward in the programme?  
 
- Have you ever tried to exclude someone form the group? What happened?  
 
- What is, in your opinion, the difference between instrumental/planned violence and 
impulsive violence? Why is it not possible to work with the former in Anger Management?  
 
- How do you react to and handle resistance from the participants? Both the explicit 
(negotiation/disruptions) and the implicit (disturbances, bodily movements, jokes, etc.)  
 
- Do you think that the participants will be able to use the skills that they are taught anywhere 
else that the particular classroom (in prison, in relations to their friends/families, work, the 
Prison and Probation Service, in relations to criminality, etc.)? 
 
- Is it possible to use assertive communication in prison?  
 
- Did I forget to ask you anything? Or do you have something to add to this discussion? 
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